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Introduction
Threats and the challenges of uncertainty
How do states respond to threats issued by rivals or that result from regional 
or systemic power shifts? What options are available to states? What difficulties 
do states face in crafting successful strategies to confront potential challengers? 
These questions have shaped states’ foreign policies since states were formed. 
With the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, 
Russia’s renewed attempts to increase its influence in its near abroad, and the 
altered balance of power1 in the Middle East – a result of the Arab Spring, shifting 
demographics, and a weakened Iraq – these questions are as important as ever. 
How states respond to these new conditions will shape global and regional 
landscapes for years to come. Thus, while these questions are important for 
security specialists in particular, they have resonance well beyond the field.
Equally important is that the answers to these questions are not immediately 
obvious. Will states coordinate to array their strength against rising powers, work 
with the rising powers to ensure their own safety and obtain rewards, or simply 
try to avoid any resultant diplomatic entanglements altogether? Historically, 
states have pursued strategies at least as varied as these (Schroeder 1994). States 
ultimately decide what strategy to pursue based on their calculations of threat, 
risk, reward, the probable responses of other powers, and their ability to influence 
the distribution of power. In doing so, states face a great deal of uncertainty 
about their opponents’ intentions, relative capabilities, the best time to act, and 
other potential balancers’ behaviors. How states deal with all of these types of 
uncertainty and what strategies they would choose given their beliefs are all vital 
questions for understanding global politics today.
Yet, academic work on how states respond to potential threats has stalled in 
recent years. Existing realist and liberal explanations have been insufficiently 
integrated with newer rationalist insights on the roles that commitment problems 
and uncertainty play in influencing states’ responses to potential threats. Also 
much, although not all, existing work focuses on great power behavior to the 
exclusion of smaller states.2 Therefore, this book builds on existing realist, 
liberal, and rationalist concepts of balancing, bandwagoning, hiding, commitment 
problems, and asymmetric information to craft explanations about how states 
respond to potential threats. We generate several formal models which provide 
new insights into key types of uncertainty states face when making decisions about 
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how to respond to potential threats and to shifts in relative power. We then use the 
well-known 1930s cases of the failed attempts at balancing by British and French 
and the equally disastrous mix of hiding and bandwagoning by smaller states in 
East Central Europe in response to the growing German threat to illustrate the 
concepts of the models. Finally, the lessons learned about how states respond to 
potential threats resulting from shifting local power distributions are applied to 
the contemporary case of the South China Sea.
From our formal models we derive three new propositions which are vital to 
understanding responses to threats and power shifts. First, all balancing results from 
commitment problems. In the absence of such problems, states would be able to 
strike bargains to avoid the costs of balancing and being balanced against. This 
finding is entirely new, though it is consistent with much of the rationalist literature 
on commitment problems.3 Second, uncertainty about the rising state’s capabilities 
is more problematic for potential balancers than uncertainty about the rising state’s 
intentions. Third, states are more likely to delay balancing to the future than to pass 
the buck to another state. These last two findings run contrary to what might be 
expected from some of the existing realist literature (Christensen and Snyder 1990; 
Mearsheimer 2001; Pape 2005; Powell 1999), which argues that buck-passing is 
central in understanding failed balancing especially in 1930s Europe. Each of these 
findings will be discussed in turn below, beginning with why commitment problems 
are a necessary cause of balancing – a finding which is formally derived in Chapter 1.
Before proceeding further, however, it would be profitable to discuss what 
is meant by balancing, bandwagoning, and hiding since the terms are used in 
different ways throughout the literature. While there is a fuller discussion about 
the terms’ definitions in Chapter 1, a preliminary presentation of our definitions is 
necessary. Balancing is the marshaling of military resources, either internally or 
externally, against a threat which has yet to be actualized (Brooks and Wohlforth 
2011). Thus, our definition of balancing is what many scholars call hard balancing 
and excludes the concepts of soft and asymmetric balancing.4 Bandwagoning on 
the other hand is a state aligning itself militarily with a challenger to the status 
quo, either to protect itself from that challenger (Walt 1985; 1987), to gain spoils 
as a result of aiding the challenger’s success (Jones 1994; Schweller 1994), or 
some combination thereof. Finally, hiding entails not responding to a threat even 
though it has been recognized. This may be out of a hope that the threat will not 
become actualized, that the best way to avoid being attacked is to not antagonize 
the threatening state, or that both balancing and bandwagoning are too costly 
or risky. In other words, hiding is a conscious, calculated policy of inaction 
in response to a recognized threat which has yet to be actualized. While other 
responses are certainly possible, these three have received the most attention in 
the international relations literature and thus are the behaviors we aim to explain.
Commitment problems and balancing
As indicated earlier, the book’s first major claim is that commitment problems 
are a necessary cause of all balancing. Commitment problems are an important 
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rationalist explanation of conflict in the international system (Copeland 2000; 
Powell 2006; 2012; Reiter 2009; Weisiger 2013). Commitment problems, along 
with private information and indivisibility, are one of the few rational causes 
of costly international conflict (Fearon 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and 
Zorick 1997).5 This is because if each side knew how the costly conflict was going 
to end and could credibly commit to honor agreements, they would simply agree 
to that outcome ex ante without paying the costs. Yet uncertainty and expected 
future power shifts often make this impossible.
Balancing is a form of costly, and often tacit, interstate bargaining requiring 
significant increases in armament expenditures or settling with and making 
concessions to former rivals in order to create alliances. The state or states 
engaged in balancing hope that by mobilizing resources and forming alliances 
against the perceived threat, the threatening state or coalition of states would be 
deterred from attacking and ultimately desist from attempting to overturn the 
status quo. Failing this, the balancer aims to aggregate sufficient power to defeat 
the revisionist state in either a defensive or preventive war.
Given that balancing is costly and that it is not a response to a direct attack (thus 
not immediately necessary for a state’s survival) states must consider whether the 
benefits of balancing are worth the costs. A state would balance only if it believed 
that it would be cheaper or more effective to address a potential threat now rather 
than at some future point when it may or may not materialize (He 2012; Powell 
1999). In other words, balancing entails assuming definite short-term costs to 
avoid greater expected, but uncertain, long-term costs.
Also, it must be the case that no cheaper, satisfactory alternative to balancing, 
such as passing the buck to another potential balancer or accommodation 
through appeasement, exists. No state wants to be the target of balancing as this 
threatens its security and autonomy in the international system. Thus, reaching 
a compromise to avoid balancing may be possible and is certainly desirable. So 
why do potential balancers and revisionist states sometimes fail to come to an 
agreement, tacit or otherwise? The answer as suggested above is commitment 
problems. It is often difficult for revisionist states to credibly commit to limit 
themselves to the immediate and localized changes to the status quo they are 
proposing. This is because potential aggressors often seek agreement with 
potential balancers so that they can isolate and defeat their opponents piecemeal 
or gain time to further strengthen themselves, striking only when they are 
confident of success. It is this inability of revisionist states to bind themselves 
and commit to never using the relative power gained to harm potential balancers 
which results in balancing behavior.
Thus, potential balancers are faced with the problem that both aggressive and 
benign challengers of the status quo (from the potential balancers’ points of view) 
have incentives to declare that they do not harbor future hostile intentions toward 
the potential balancers and thereby avoid being balanced against. It can, therefore, 
be difficult for balancers to determine which revisionists they need to concern 
themselves with. Not only is the challenger’s “type” hard to determine but also it 
is subject to change. A government challenging the status quo may sincerely not 
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intend to take advantage of their enhanced power at present but it could change its 
mind at a later date or be replaced by a new, more aggressive, government.
For example, it would be quite difficult for Iran to credibly commit to refrain from 
building a nuclear bomb once it had the capacity to do so even if Iran had no intention 
of become a nuclear power. The enhanced status and greater freedom from US 
military threats that possessing a nuclear bomb would give Iran to expand its influence 
throughout the Middle East creates an additional commitment problem.6 Thus, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, several other Persian Gulf states, and many western powers including 
the United States have pressed Iran to dismantle much of its uranium enrichment 
capability. Yet, the Iranians were reluctant to do so. Whether this was because the 
Iranians wanted a bomb or wanted the enrichment program for other reasons is 
unknown outside of top Iranian leadership circles.7 The confrontation proved costly, 
with sanctions hurting the Iranian economy and the United States having to strike 
deals with many states in order to keep the sanctions in place. The 2015 agreement 
struck between Iran and the P5+1 states8 in Geneva, for an easing of the sanctions 
in return for Iranian concessions on enrichment and the initial compliance on both 
sides for carrying it out, show that Iran and the United States would like to escape 
from the confrontation if possible. However, the great difficulties experienced during 
negotiations and the continued and widespread opposition to the agreement show 
just how hard that is, given the nature of the commitment problem. Whether the 
agreement will continue to hold in the long term remains to be seen.9
This conclusion that balancing is always the result of commitment problems 
is new. Neither work on commitment problems nor balancing has previously 
advanced it. This is important as it identifies when balancing is a possibility 
and when it is certain to not occur. Also, given the difficulty in eliminating 
commitment problems it suggests that if balancing occurs it is likely to endure 
for some time and it will be quite difficult to solve the underlying problems which 
brought it about.10 Thus, this is the most important of the book’s claims and it 
serves as the theoretical basis for further explorations about how uncertainty 
and asymmetric information affect the likelihood of balancing in response to 
commitment problems.
For instance, states in Southeast Asia would be unlikely to balance against 
China if the Chinese could credibly commit to not use their growing power to 
harm Southeast Asian states in the future. In particular, if there was some way for 
China to renounce its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea in a decisive 
and irrevocable way, it would be hard to see why any state in Southeast Asia 
would forego the benefits of closer economic ties with China and instead balance 
against growing Chinese power. Yet, it is hard to see how China could do that as it 
could always renege on any agreement not to push its territorial claims once it was 
in a better position to do so and of course China is at present already aggressively 
pushing those claims. Likewise, fears amongst Arab Gulf monarchies about 
growing Iranian power would be much reduced if Iran could irrevocably commit 
itself to not revise the status quo in the region. Thus, it is not power itself that 
causes balancing, but rather the fear that a rising state would use its growing 
power to harm another state’s interests in the future.
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Uncertainty about capabilities and intentions
As mentioned above, the book’s two remaining major claims involve the role of 
uncertainty in potential balancing situations. The first of these is uncertainty about 
the rising state’s intentions and capabilities. Generally, public rhetoric about and 
academic studies on balancing have focused on uncertainty surrounding the rising 
challenger’s intentions (Glaser 1997; Taliaferro 2001; Walt 1985). In other words, 
does the challenger intend to use the change in the status quo to harm the potential 
balancers or is the challenger benign (i.e., simply interested in the revision for its 
own sake and not the advantage it provides over the potential balancers). Realists 
often argue that intentions are particularly devilish as they reside within the 
minds of leaders, meaning they cannot be directly observed and they are highly 
changeable, either due to leadership changes or an alteration in preferred strategy 
by a given leadership group. In addition, capabilities are arguably easier to observe 
and assess. While some in fact dispute the realist claim regarding the difficulty 
of observing intentions (Hopf 2010; Wendt 1999), it is widely advanced in the 
literature.11 Thus, one would expect that a central problem potential balancers face 
in deciding if a potential challenger is in fact a threat is determining what the 
challenger intends to do rather than what the challenger is capable of doing.
We, however, find that uncertainty over relative capabilities is more problematic 
for determining whether a state should balance than is uncertainty over intentions. 
This finding, which runs counter to common intuition and much of the academic 
literature, is originally derived through formal modeling in Chapter 2 and is 
borne out in our case on 1930s Europe in Chapter 3 – a case often cited as driven 
by French and especially British uncertainty over Hitler’s true intentions. This 
suggests that while policy makers should consider both what states are capable 
of doing and what they intend to do, it is more important to resolve uncertainty 
surrounding the former question than the latter in potential balancing situations. 
This in turn has implications for what sorts of intelligence gathering techniques 
and programs should receive funding when targeting rising states. Incidentally, 
this is consistent with classic advice from defensive realists that states should 
focus on capabilities rather than intentions though the reasons for this are 
completely different (see Waltz 1979). We, unlike many realists, are not arguing 
that intentions are unknowable or even harder to discern than capabilities – we 
are agnostic on the point – but rather that it is easier to devise strategies given 
uncertainty about intentions rather than uncertainty about capabilities. In other 
words, if a state knows its potential opponent’s strength, it can determine the 
appropriate scale of any needed military response if its potential opponent is 
indeed hostile. If it is unsure of its opponents’ strength, however, determining 
the appropriate scale of any military buildup is highly problematic even if the 
opponent’s hostility is assured.12
This is also illustrated by the Russian proverb – “Trust, but verify!” – which 
Reagan adopted as his watchword during the negotiation of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in the mid-1980s. Reagan came into office as 
a hawk who criticized the US–Soviet Détente of the 1970s. Although his views of 
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the Soviet Union softened during his presidency, he never trusted the intentions 
of either the Soviet Union or international communism. The INF treaty was not 
signed and ratified because the Regan administration was finally convinced of 
the benign intentions of Gorbachev and his sincere commitment to reduce the 
Soviet intermediate ballistic missile arsenal. It was signed and ratified because it 
included carefully negotiated provision that would allow both parties to monitor 
the progress made by the other. The provisions helped to reduce their uncertainty 
over the commitment problem created by the agreement. This shows that because 
the changes in capabilities could be monitored, the uncertainty surrounding Soviet 
intentions could be overcome through a cleverly constructed agreement.
Furthermore, if realists are correct that it is easier to determine capabilities 
than intentions, our finding is good news for states facing potential challengers 
as they should be able to resolve one of the key uncertainties facing them in 
deciding whether to balance. If realists are wrong in this regard, the problem 
becomes thornier. Thus, this finding has important policy implications in addition 
to theoretical implications.
Uncertainty about timing or the value of delay
The final major contribution of this book is that it explores the impact of 
uncertainty surrounding the value of delay in balancing. It is tempting to think 
about the decision to balance – or indeed to bandwagon or hide – as a onetime 
decision, but this is not the case. States must make this decision repeatedly. In the 
regular course of relations between states it can recur over a period of months or 
years, especially in cases of established rivalries such as the Cold War. Therefore, 
even a state that is inclined to balance faces a tricky choice. It is not “should I 
balance?”, but rather “should I start balancing now or wait for a more opportune 
moment?” States may wish to save resources now to make a maximum effort later 
if they do not anticipate the threat materializing until some point in time down the 
road. Additionally, if there is uncertainty about the need to balance, delay could 
be tempting given the hope that time will reveal whether the challenger really 
is a threat and the scale of that threat.13 Finally, if leaders discount the future 
somewhat it may be tempting to put off costs provided the risk of doing so is not 
too severe. Complicating this further, it is often unclear whether it will be cheaper 
and easier to meet a threat now or at some point in the future due to uncertainties 
about the speed of rearmament, economic growth, shifting alliances, and evolving 
technologies. Hence deciding when and if to balance is very difficult and fraught 
with uncertainty.
Given the complicated nature of the question of the value of delay, subjecting 
it to formal modeling makes sense. Much as with uncertainty about capabilities 
and intentions, this too has a clear payoff. The model in Chapter 2 shows that the 
temptation to pass off threats to the future is more compelling than the temptation 
to pass the buck to another state. This is important as much discussion of coalition 
balancing behavior focuses on concerns about free-riding rather than passing the 
burden off to a future date (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Mearsheimer 2001; 
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Pape 2005; Powell 1999). Our historical case supports the model’s insights. We 
find that Britain and France in the 1930s were more apt to pass off balancing to 
the future rather than to each other. The French in particular realized the threat 
the Germans posed, yet both France and Britain hoped that their rearmaments 
programs would allow them to confront Germany more successfully in 1940 
than they could in 1936 or 1938. Thus, time considerations are important when 
thinking about if and when states balance.
Other factors affecting balancing
While the above three hypotheses form the core of the book’s argument they 
do not capture everything affecting states’ propensity to balance. We, therefore, 
develop two ancillary hypotheses about the likelihood of balancing. First, the 
offensive value of the challenger’s move influences the likelihood of balancing. 
Second, the degree to which the challenger’s move is motivated by a desire to 
revise the distribution of power as opposed to the intrinsic value of the move 
itself affects both the propensity to balance and potential balancers’ ability to find 
accommodation with the challenger. Each of these is discussed below in turn.
The first of these, the offense value of the move of the rising state’s actions, 
has been explored in the security dilemma and offense/defense balance literatures 
(Biddle 2001; Jervis 1978; Reiter 1999), but has direct bearing on the propensity 
to balance (Powell 1999). To understand what is meant by the offensive value, 
consider that actions taken to strengthen a state militarily may be more or less 
threatening in nature. New fortifications and a new tank division may both enhance 
a state’s security, but the latter move is far more offensive in nature and hence more 
threatening to its neighbors than the former. This is also distinct from intentions. 
A state which is not intending to take advantage of its move to threaten a neighbor 
may not have a move available which is mainly defensive. Thus, while states may 
take the move as a signal of intentions, it is not the same thing. Yet, the greater the 
offensive value of the move, the more need there is to balance. It is important to 
understand that we do not conceptualize this aspect of the problem as an either/or 
issue. In other words, it is not that some moves are inherently defensive and others 
are inherently offensive. Rather, threats fall on a continuum between two ideal 
types: purely defensive vs. purely offensive changes to the balance of power. As 
with capabilities and intentions, uncertainty can surround this variable.
Second, we argue counter-intuitively that less revisionist challengers are more 
willing to risk being balanced against than are more revisionist challengers. This 
is because less revisionist states are likely making the threatening move mostly 
for the move’s intrinsic value and not because they are trying to alter the relative 
balance of power. Thus, a state’s threats to balance against the challenger and 
wipe out any relative power gains which would accrue to the challenger are not 
compelling. On the other hand for a challenger that was mainly interested in the 
relative gains, such threats to balance might remove most or all of the incentive to 
make the threatening move in the first place. Returning to the earlier example of 
the Iranian nuclear program, this argument means that if Iran wanted the program 
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either for reasons of domestic politics or its own security – in other words the 
intrinsic value of the program – rather than for altering the strategic balance of the 
Middle East, it would have been hard to dissuade Iran from pursuing the program 
through threats of counterbalancing to offset the increased Iranian capabilities.14 
Actions such as economic sanctions which cause direct pain to Iran to offset the 
intrinsic value of the nuclear program, however, were more likely to be effective 
as the costs sanctions inflict would directly reduce Iran’s utility assuming it values 
economic gains, whereas balancing would only reduce Iran’s ability to further 
alter the status quo, something Iran would not value if it were true that it pursued 
a nuclear program for the program’s intrinsic rather than relative value. Of course 
states, including Iran, can value both the intrinsic and relative gains values of a 
move and Iran’s willingness to strike a deal regarding its enrichment program 
does not indicate whether Tehran was more interested in intrinsic or relative gains.
On the other hand, Russia’s seizure of the Crimea may also be due to the intrinsic 
value of the territory rather that the strategic advantage it gives. First, regaining this 
“lost territory” satisfies domestic Russian irredentism and thus boosts Vladimir 
Putin’s domestic popularity. Second, this redemption of lost territory also likely has 
a strong emotional value for Putin and his view of himself and his role in Russian 
history. Alternatively, the argument could be made that this is just about securing 
Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol. However, there are a number of reasons to doubt 
this. Under the 2010 Kharkiv Pact, Russia’s lease of Sevastopol was extended from 
2017 to 2042 in exchange for a multi-year gas contract. This accord was only 
unilaterally terminated by Russia on 31 March 2014, two weeks after Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and the accord was not in any clear trouble before Russia’s 
actions. Furthermore, annexing an entire province to keep one base is unnecessarily 
provocative and risky. After all, the US has dealt with similar issues surrounding 
Guantanamo by simply ignoring Cuba’s demands to leave while paying rents to 
the Cuban government for the base. On the other hand, it seems likely that in 
supporting separatists in the Donbass region of Ukraine, Russia is concerned about 
relative gains (or avoiding relative losses) in relation to the West. This may explain 
why Putin has modulated Russian behavior in the Donbass in response to Western 
reactions far more than he has in Crimea. Thus, understanding a state’s motives 
behind an action which is perceived as threatening is important in crafting the 
most effective strategy for dissuading that state from continuing its provocative 
strategy. This hypothesis, as well as the argument about the offensive nature of the 
challenger’s move, is fully developed in Chapters 1 and 2 and applied to the case 
French and British balancing against Nazi Germany in the 1930s in Chapter 3.
Factors affecting the propensity to bandwagon
The book also explores what drives states to bandwagon with potential 
challengers. Bandwagoning is often seen as the opposite side of the coin from 
balancing and thus to understand balancing behavior it is necessary to have a firm 
grasp on bandwagoning as well. States may bandwagon with a rising power to 
protect themselves from that power (Walt 1985; 1987), to obtain spoils in return 
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for assisting that power’s rise (Schweller 1994), or to obtain both protection and 
spoils. The book derives three ancillary hypotheses about factors which makes 
states more or less likely to bandwagon.
First, states which are geographically isolated from other potential balancers and 
alliance partners are more likely to bandwagon than those that are geographically 
proximate to their potential allies and other balancers. This is taken from Walt 
(1985; 1987) who makes the same argument when developing his Balance of Threat 
theory which argues that states often bandwagon to protect themselves from threats. 
Geographically isolated states are more apt to bandwagon because balancing is less 
likely to be effective as they would have difficulty pooling their efforts with those of 
another state and also because if they get into a war with the rising challenger, they 
would likely be unable to receive outside military help (Rothstein 1968; Walt 1987; 
Waltz 1979). Such isolation is more problematic for relatively weak states than it is 
for great powers, but it should matter to some extent for all states.
Second, the book argues that shared membership in multilateral international 
organizations with other potential balancers can reduce the appeal of bandwagoning. 
In arguing this, we are building off a significant amount of neo-liberal institutional 
theory.15 We argue that intergovernmental organizations matter because such 
institutions can act as fora for communicating and coordinating with other states 
which face the same security challenges. Thus, institutions help reduce the diplomatic 
isolation that can prompt security seeking states to see bandwagoning as the best 
strategy to protect themselves. States can find reassurance that they will not be alone 
in opposing the rising challenger nor the only one missing out on potential spoils 
of bandwagoning. Also, such organizations can help mediate and resolve existing 
tensions between potential balancers, allowing them to more easily cooperate with 
one another. Finally, institutions can act as a credible check on the aspirations of the 
rising state by reducing the odds that the state would be able to provide significant 
spoils to states which bandwagon with it, meaning that even revisionist states 
seeking spoils should be less likely to bandwagon due to the presence of powerful 
multilateral organizations. Given that such revisionist states make up much of the 
pool of states which bandwagon (Schweller 1994), this effect of institutions is 
empirically important. Taken together, these independent effects of institutions add 
up to a considerable factor in determining whether states bandwagon.
Third, states which are economically dependent on the rising state and which 
lack credible substitutes for their economic relationships with the rising state – 
including trade, investment, and aid – are more likely to bandwagon with the rising 
challenger than are states which have a variety of important international economic 
connections, are economically interdependent rather than unidirectionally 
dependent upon the challenger, or have plausible substitutes for their economic ties 
with the challenger should those ties be severed (Hirschman 1980). In effect, states 
which have multilateral economic ties and which are interdependent with a variety 
of states rather than dependent on the rising challenger are less constrained and 
have more foreign policy options available to them. Thus, they are freer to balance.
We develop these ancillary hypotheses in Chapter 4 and apply them to 
bandwagoning in East Central Europe in the 1930s. We also apply these concepts, 
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along with the previously developed hypotheses on balancing, to the contemporary 
case of states in Southeast Asia in Chapter 7 to determine if those states are likely to 
balance, bandwagon, hide, or do something else entirely. A summary of the work’s 
hypotheses discussed in the preceding sections can be found in Tables 0.1 to 0.3.
Table 0.1 Core hypotheses: uncertainty and balancing
Hypothesis Empirical evaluation
1. Commitment problems and balancing
Chapter 1
All balancing results from commitment 
problems. In the absence of such 
problems, states would be able to strike 
bargains to avoid the costs of balancing 
and being balanced against.
Chapters 3, 5, and 7
Germany posed a commitment problem 
for Britain, France, and Poland in the 
1930s and China poses a commitment 
problem for Vietnam and the Philippines 
today.
2. Uncertainty of capabilities vs. intentions
Chapter 2
Uncertainty about the rising state’s 
capabilities is more problematic for 
potential balancers than uncertainty about 
the rising state’s intentions.
Chapter 3
In the 1930s Britain and France were 
largely convinced of Hitler’s revisionist 
goals but they were uncertain about how 
much he had been able to build up his 
capabilities.
3. Uncertainty of timing (value of delay)
Chapter 2
States are more likely to delay balancing 
to the future than to pass the buck to 
another state.
Chapter 3
In the 1930s Britain and France were more 
apt to pass off balancing to the future (in 
order to rearm) rather than to each other.
Table 0.2 Ancillary hypotheses I: nature of the challenge
Hypothesis Empirical evaluation
4. Degree of offensive advantage
Chapters 1 and 2
The offensive value of the challenger’s 
move influences the likelihood of 
balancing.
Chapters 3 and 7
France and Britain discounted the 
offensive value of the German occupation 
of the Rhineland and Sudetenland in the 
1930s. Chinese installations in the South 
China Sea do little to alter the military 
equation today.
5. Relational vs. intrinsic value
Chapters 1 and 2
The degree to which the challenger’s 
move is motivated by a desire to revise 
the distribution of power as opposed 
to the intrinsic value of the move itself 
affects both the propensity to balance 
and potential balancers’ ability to find 
accommodation with the challenger.
Chapters 3 and 7
Germany valued the Rhineland and 
Sudetenland for both relational and 
intrinsic reasons. China has strong 
intrinsic and more limited relational 
reasons for valuing establishing sovereign 
control over the South China Sea.
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Outline of the book
The rest of the book is laid out as follows. Chapter 1 constructs a formal model 
in order to demonstrate that balancing is not only a response to power shifts as 
argued within much of the realist literature, but that in order for balancing to occur 
the power shift in turn must create a commitment problem. Thus, commitment 
problems are a prerequisite to all balancing. We argue that whether or not a 
commitment problem exists depends on the nature of the challenge16 being made 
by the revisionist state as well as the relative power of the states. The chapter also 
explores what types of revisionist states are willing to risk being balanced against. 
Specifically, we argue that states which are less revisionist are more willing to risk 
being balanced against.
Chapter 2 relaxes some of the assumptions of the model in Chapter 1 
by developing a multiplayer, dynamic model which explores the impact of 
uncertainty about the challenger’s type, the pre-crisis balance of power, the 




States which are geographically isolated 
from other potential balancers and alliance 
partners are more likely to bandwagon 
than those that are geographically 
proximate to their potential allies and 
other balancers (Walt 1985; 1987).
Chapters 5 and 7
In the 1930s, the states of East Central 
Europe were geographically cut off from 
their great power allies, while the sea 
gives the maritime states of Southeast 
Asia access to American aid today.
7. International organizations
Chapter 4
Membership in multilateral international 
organizations with other potential 
balancers can reduce the appeal of 
bandwagoning.
Chapters 5 and 7
In the 1930s, regional organizations were 
collapsing in East Central Europe and 
the League of Nations was ineffective. 
Today, ASEAN offers a regional forum 
for addressing issues in the South 
China Sea and there are also relevant 
global organizations to which states can 
turn, such as the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration and the United Nations.
8. Economic dependence
Chapter 4
States which are economically dependent 
on the rising state and which lack 
credible substitutes for their economic 
relationships with the rising state are 
more likely to bandwagon with the rising 
challenger (Hirshman 1980).
Chapters 5 and 7
In the 1930s, many of the states of East 
Central Europe were unidirectionally 
dependent on Germany as trading 
partner. Today, while Southeast Asian 
states have important economic ties to 
China, the pattern is one of multilateral 
interdependence.
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nature of the challenge to the status quo, and the value of delay on the prospects 
for balancing. In contrast to the model in Chapter 1, the model in Chapter 2 
allows for buck-passing and for players to defer balancing to the future. We 
conclude that uncertainty about capabilities is more problematic for effective 
balancing than uncertainty about intentions. In addition, uncertainty about the 
pre-crisis balance of power is more difficult to resolve than uncertainty about the 
strategic impact of the challenge on the balance of power, though the latter is still 
more important than uncertainty over intentions. Also, delay is shown to be more 
seductive than buck-passing.
Chapter 3 explores the model’s findings through a case study of German and 
Allied behavior prior to World War II, from the German militarization of the 
Rhineland in 1936 through the Sudetenland crisis of 1938. We find that Britain and 
France focused primarily on the relative balances of forces and to a lesser extent 
on the nature of the German challenge. However, the latter still figured more 
prominently in their calculation than German intentions. Ultimately, uncertainty 
about the reliability of third parties and the conviction that delay was valuable 
swayed Britain and France toward appeasement.
Chapter 4 takes the concepts developed in the models in Chapters 1 and 2 
and applies them to the behaviors of smaller states which may be more inclined 
to bandwagon or hide than more powerful states would be. In particular, the 
chapter examines how states trade off potential spoils versus security. All of 
this is again done considering uncertainty over the nature of the challenge, the 
balance of power, and the actions of other states. Chapter 5 examines the foreign 
policies of Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary – cases which have been 
given insufficient attention in the international relations literature – in light of the 
concepts developed in Chapter 4.
We selected the pre-World War II era in Chapters 3 and 5 to develop our 
argument for two reasons. First, it is an important case on its own merits as World 
War II and the alignment decisions leading up to it affected the international 
system for decades. Second, the case, at least as it pertains to Britain and France, 
is well known, allowing us to illustrate and test our ideas using the behaviors of 
states which will be familiar to most readers. Given that the actions of Britain 
and France have been used by other international relations scholars to make 
different arguments about balancing, it also provides a fairly difficult hurdle for 
our explanations. Thus, the case is important, accessible, and provides a difficult 
challenge for our hypotheses.
Chapter 6 looks at balancing and bandwagoning behavior after war breaks 
out. It draws connections between the motives for militarily intervening in a war 
(balancing or bandwagoning) and the likely timing of such interventions. It also 
argues that the spoils bandwagoners are seeking (territory versus other forms 
of spoils) should affect the timing of intervention. Additionally, the likelihood 
of a state ending up on the winning side of a war should be influenced by both 
its motives and the timing of its entry. The various arguments are examined by 
looking at all military interveners in the Correlates of War Interstate War dataset 
version 4.0 (1816–2007). In general, once the role of alliances is accounted for, 
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bandwagoners should join later than balancers and later bandwagoners should 
be more likely to win than earlier bandwagoners. Also, states joining for non-
territorial spoils should be less careful about picking the winning side. The rate 
of balancing versus bandwagoning is also considered as is the success rate of 
these strategies.
Chapter 7 examines whether states near or bordering the South China Sea – 
specifically Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam 
– are likely to bandwagon with, balance against, or respond in another fashion 
to a rising China. To answer this question, the chapter contrasts these states’ 
geographic, institutional, and economic positions with those of the European 
states in the 1930s discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The chapter also examines the 
behavior of these Southeast Asian states in light of the models in the preceding 
chapters. This chapter concludes that while China is less of a threat than Germany 
was in both territorial and ideological terms, there are significant differences in 
each of the areas listed above between the present and the 1930s, indicating that 
neither balancing nor bandwagoning are likely to occur in Southeast Asia today, 
unlike in 1930s Europe when many states bandwagoned with Germany. We have 
chosen the South China Sea case for its relevance to contemporary international 
relations and especially US foreign policy today. Growing Chinese power and 
assertiveness have prompted intense debates about two related but distinct 
questions. What sort of foreign policies should states adopt and what policies are 
states likely to adopt? We hope that by applying our theories to this case we will 
shed light on these questions and make a useful contribution to contemporary 
foreign policy debates.
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes and brings together the findings from the 
previous chapters. It also makes policy recommendations based on these findings. 
In particular, it offers suggestions about alliance management, intelligence 
gathering, and how challengers can avoid being balanced against.
How states respond to potential threats is an important theoretical and 
policy question. Building on existing realist, liberal, and rationalist work, this 
book advances several new claims about what types of uncertainty are most 
problematic for the creation of effective strategies and which situations are most 
likely to produce balancing, bandwagoning, hiding, or some other behavior. In 
order to do this, we will begin in Chapter 1 by reviewing previous explanations 
of balancing and demonstrating that all balancing occurs as a response to a 
commitment problem.
Notes
 1 Throughout the book we use the terms balance of power, balance of forces, and 
balance of capabilities interchangeably.
 2 Elman (1995) and Whitaker (2010) both make this exact point and are rare examples 
of works that focus on balancing behavior among smaller powers. For examples of 
works which focus solely on great powers in relation to balancing, see He (2012), 
Levy and Thompson (2005; 2010), Lieber and Alexander (2005), Mearsheimer 
(2001), Pape (2005), and Paul (2005).
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 3 For instance see Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006).
 4 Paul (2005, 47) defines soft balancing as states forming “limited diplomatic coalitions 
or ententes, especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading 
their alliances if the [potential challenger] goes beyond its stated goals.” Asymmetric 
balancing refers to balancing against non-state actors or balancing by non-state actors 
against states (Paul 2004, 3).
 5 Rationalists argue that since war is costly, states would prefer ex post to have arrived 
at the post-war settlement without having had to pay the costs. Thus, war is a highly 
inefficient dispute resolution mechanism and why states would rationally engage 
in it is an important question. Rationalists have concluded that given unitary actors 
wars are caused by uncertainty resulting from private information, commitment 
problems, or indivisibility. The first of these, uncertainty due to private information, 
makes it impossible for the two sides to agree upon the probable outcome of the war. 
Second, commitment problems make it impossible for states to commit to not revise 
a settlement after they become more powerful, meaning that their opponents may 
prefer to fight them now rather than settle only to have to fight later when the odds are 
longer. Finally, indivisibility makes striking a bargain impossible as the stake itself is 
not divisible and thus must either be conceded in its entirety or fought for. Incentives 
arising out of domestic politics can also rationally lead to war (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2004; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Croco 2011; Stanley 2009).
 6 Iran can commit to refrain from using nuclear weapons in an offensive manner as 
existing nuclear retaliatory threats are credible and overwhelming. In other words, 
unless one believes that the Iranian government is suicidal or that for some reason 
Iranian nuclear strikes would not bring about swift and massive retaliation, then it 
should be quite possible to deter Iran from using its nuclear weapons offensively, 
just as every other nuclear power has been deterred since the United States lost its 
nuclear monopoly in 1949. However, the protection from invasion by the United 
States that the possession of a nuclear arsenal would afford Iran should allow it to 
behave more aggressively using conventional forces within the Middle East as Iran 
would be protected from the worst potential repercussions of such adventurism. This 
is the stability–instability paradox. See Liddell Hart (1960), Rauchhaus (2009), and 
Snyder (1965).
 7 Both motives are likely at work here since Iran is not a monolith. Like any other 
government it is composed of various factions with different strategic outlooks and 
goals.
 8 The P5+1 consist of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) plus 
Germany.
 9 One promising sign is the victory of more moderate candidates in the February 2016 
elections for both the Iranian Parliament and the Assembly of Experts. The latter is 
an assembly of mujtahid (religious experts) who chose and supervise the Supreme 
Leader of Iran.
 10 Rationalists argue that commitment problems can only be eliminated through major 
power shifts, regime change, outside guarantors, or substantial destruction of the good 
at stake (Powell 2006; Reiter 2009; Weisiger 2013).
 11 For instance see Glaser (1997) and Taliaferro (2001).
 12 This is one reason why intelligence gathering was so crucial during the Cold War even 
though East and West were fairly sure of the other side’s hostile intent once the Cold 
War was well underway. Of course, if benign intent is certain, the problem disappears.
 13 This would also allow the state to avoid Jervis’ (1978) security spiral: the unnecessary 
triggering of a costly arms race due to uncertainty.
 14 Such actions could include building closer military alliances between the United 
States and Israel or Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf region. This general logic is 
Introduction  15
similar but not identical to Davis (2001) who examines when threats work better than 
appeasement and vice versa. He argues threats work against aggressive states and 
appeasement works with security seeking states.
 15 For instance see Keohane (1986), Keohane and Martin (1995), Kupchan and Kupchan 
(1995), Lake (2001), Oneal (1990), Ostrom (1990), Oye (1986), Rafferty (2003), and 
Weber (1997).
 16 Throughout the book we use the terms nature of the challenge, nature of the move, and 
nature of the opportunity interchangeably.
1 Balancing as a commitment 
problem
As discussed in the introduction, a major trend in the study of international relations 
in the last decade has been an increasing focus on the roles that strategic interaction 
and information play in influencing state behavior in the international system.1 This 
trend has been quite fruitful, yet concepts from older schools of thought remain 
important to our understanding of international relations. In this chapter, we take an 
older concept, that of balancing, and place it within a new framework of commitment 
problems and informational asymmetries. Specifically, in this chapter using a formal 
model we will argue that commitment problems are a necessary, but not sufficient, 
cause of all balancing. While this general conclusion is perhaps unsurprising, the 
model goes further. It shows that whether uncertainties about intentions lead to 
balancing or not depends upon two factors: first, the relative power differences 
between the challenger of the status quo and the potential balancer; and second, the 
long-run advantage that a specific challenge to the status quo creates for a revisionist 
state (such as beneficial tactical positions for future military offensives). It further 
argues that while informational asymmetries are important they are not a necessary 
part of balancing because under some circumstance balancing would happen even 
with perfect information about intentions.
In arguing this, we are attempting to improve on Walt’s (1985) conception 
of balancing against threats as well as taking up Schweller’s (1997) call for 
scholars to state the conditions under which their propositions hold. To this end, 
we distinguish between commitment and information problems and analyze how 
these two aspects of balancing influence each other. Additionally, the model 
departs from the standard literature by breaking the revisionist state’s benefits 
from challenging the status quo into two components: the action’s intrinsic value 
and any relative gains vis-à-vis potential balancers.
The first section of the chapter will examine the concept and definition of 
balancing. The second will examine the role that commitment and informational 
problems play in balancing behavior. The third outlines the basic structure of the 
game-theoretic model used to analyze the role that commitment problems play in 
balancing behavior. The chapter then examines the implications of this model under 
complete information, while the fifth section introduces informational asymmetries. 
The sixth section discusses the implications of our model for balancing behavior. 
The final section concludes and summarizes the chapter’s findings.
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What is balancing?
Though balancing has long been an accepted concept in the study of international 
relations and is a core principle of the realist framework, its definition is somewhat 
nebulous. In large part, this is because of its association with the term “balance 
of power” and with balance of power theory. The concept of the “balance of 
power” is used in a sufficiently wide variety of ways that its meaning has become 
unclear (Gulick 1955). Haas (1953) claims there are eight distinct meanings in 
the literature for the term “balance of power” and Wright (1965) finds nine. Even 
Morgenthau (1973) admits he uses the term in four distinct ways. Claude (1962) 
finds that balance of power is used to describe the current distribution of power, to 
identify a particular type of policy, and as a symbol of realpolitik. However, even 
within these broad categories it is often used in distinct and even contradictory 
ways. Thus, it might seem that balancing as a concept is hopelessly muddled and 
should be discarded. This, however, is not the case. Rather, it is the concept of the 
balance of power and not balancing that has many meanings, is ill defined, and 
empirically suspect (Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007; Nexon 2009; Vasquez 
and Elman 2002). Additionally, the vast majority of international relations scholars 
see balancing as a distinct type of state behavior. This is true even of scholars that 
do not support balance of power theory or the realist framework.2 Thus, it should 
be possible to form a clear definition of balancing.
A key role in defining balancing is played by the concept of threat perception. 
Walt (1985, 12) argues that balancing is a response to a threat and that states balance 
“to avoid domination by stronger powers.” In particular, aggressive behavior will 
prompt balancing. Wolfers (1962, 125) sees balancing as the response of a status 
quo power to a threat.3 Similarly, Schweller (1994) and Schroeder (1994) see 
balancing as a response to a threat, though Schroeder argues that balancing is only 
one of a number of possible responses, along with bandwagoning, hiding, and 
transcending (Schroeder 1994, 111 and 116–17).4 Lieber and Alexander state that 
balancing is “motivated by some perception of threat” and is not a “general desire 
for influence or the pursuit of power” (Art et al. 2006, 192).5 Both Schweller and 
Walt agree that not all threatened states will balance,6 but none of the balancing 
scholarship argues that states that are not threatened will balance.
Equally important is that balancing is a response to a threat that has yet to be 
actualized, rather than a response to an actual attack (Levy 2002, 135; Schweller 
1994, 83). Responding with force to an invasion or some other military attack 
is defense, not balancing. Belgium and the Netherlands entered World War II 
not to balance against Nazi Germany, but because they had been invaded. To 
conflate their reasons for acting against Germany with those of France and Britain 
would be misleading and would obscure the rich variety of state behavior that 
exists in the security realm. Finally, balancing need not be directed at a hegemon, 
but may be directed at a regional or minor power (Art et al. 2006, 184). For 
example, in the nineteenth century Argentina balanced against Brazil and Bolivia 
balanced against Chile. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, balancing will be 
defined as the arraying of power by a state or states against a perceived future 
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threat. Balancing may be either internal – building up one’s own military forces 
– or external – forming alliances to counter the perceived threat (Waltz 1979). 
Successful balancing will manage to array sufficient power against the threat to 
either defeat or deter it. Of course, not all balancing will be successful.
Some might argue that this definition is flawed as it ignores balancing as 
described by defensive realists such Waltz and Layne. Waltz (1979; 2000) and 
Layne (1993; 2006) argue that states balance against power, not threat.7 However, 
this claim is not actually in opposition to the idea that states balance against 
threats. Waltz argues that states balance against states capable of being a threat 
because they can never be sure when or if that potential threat will become 
real (Morgenthau 1973; Vasquez 1997, 904). In determining whether another 
state poses a threat, leaders look at two aspects of that state, its capabilities 
and intentions. Waltz is essentially arguing that intentions cannot be discerned, 
therefore, capabilities are inherently threats and should be balanced against. In 
essence, this makes all balancing the result of the inherent commitment problems 
found in any power imbalance. Many classical realists, however, concede that 
intentions can be discerned to some extent and that estimates about intentions do 
factor into threat perception (Claude 1962, 64–5). Some neo-realists, such as Walt 
(1985), also argue that intentions matter to threat perception and that states balance 
against threat, not power. Certainly, constructivists and neo-liberals believe that 
intentions matter and can be discerned to some degree.8 Walt, however, connects 
the view that power is an implicit threat with the view that intentions matter in 
threat perception. He states that, “To ally with the dominant power means placing 
one’s trust in its continued benevolence” (Walt 1985, 5). Thus, power is a threat, 
but only if the state’s continued benevolence is unlikely. If the dominant power 
(or any other power), however, could credibly commit to remaining benevolent 
there would be no need to balance against it.9 Thus, this definition of balancing is 
consistent with the literature at large and the apparent disagreement between our 
definition and certain strains of realism is simply the result of some realists seeing 
all capabilities as threats. The disagreement also highlights that commitment 
problems play a central role in balancing.
Additionally, Waltz (1979) suggests balancing is automatic, thereby implying 
that balancing is not a conscious choice made by individual states. Waltz, however, 
is careful to point out that his theory is one of international politics, not foreign 
policy. He argues that the system as a whole will tend to balance; thus it seems 
that balances form automatically, even though individual states may choose not 
to balance.10 Many others concur that balancing is not automatic, certainly not 
for states and perhaps not for the system as a whole either (Levy and Thompson 
2005; Lieber and Alexander 2005; Paul 2005). Whether or not Waltz is correct 
that balancing is the predominant behavior, and there are reasons to think he is 
not (Cusack and Stoll 1991; Rosecrance and Lo 1996; Schroeder 1994; Schweller 
1994; 1997; Vasquez 1997),11 is unimportant for our argument. What is important 
is that even Waltz recognizes that individual states must choose whether or not 
they should balance. Viewing balancing as a conscious decision by a state is 
in line with an older school of realism. Wolfers (1962) concludes that though 
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balancing may appear to be automatic, it is in fact the result of conscious decisions 
by individual states (Wolfers 1962, 122–4). Morgenthau (1973) certainly does 
not see balancing as automatic and frequently encouraged status quo states to 
balance.12 Similarly, Rosecrance and Lo (1996) argue that for systemic balancing 
to occur, collective action problems must be overcome and the “buck-passing” 
described in Christensen and Snyder (1990) must be avoided. This implies that 
the decision to balance is up to individual states. Thus, there is no conflict between 
the way realists traditionally use the concept of balancing and defining balancing 
within the framework of strategic interaction and individual state choice.
A final, possible criticism of the definition of balancing advanced herein is that 
balancing requires states to join the weaker side and that this should be explicit 
within any definition of balancing (Schroeder 1994; Schweller 1994; Waltz 1979). 
This implies that joining the stronger side is bandwagoning. However, many of the 
examples of balancing given by political scientists do not fit within this restriction. 
The United States was more powerful than the Soviet Union, yet the formation 
of NATO is generally described as an act of balancing on the part of the United 
States and the Western European states.13 Additionally, any coalition that wishes 
to deter a threat does not wish to simply achieve parity with that threat, but rather 
wants to achieve supremacy over it. As Claude (1962, 59) notes, “Balance of power 
theorists tend to put more stock in defeating aggressors by preponderant power than 
in deterring them by equivalent power.” Finally, it is not always clear what the true 
distribution of power is. Thus, states may join what they believe to be the weaker 
side, but what is in fact the more powerful. Would such an act be balancing under 
the restrictions suggested by Schweller and Schroeder? The answer is not clear. It is 
far clearer and more consistent with the literature to define balancing as the arraying 
of force against a perceived threat rather than attempting to define it in terms of 
whether a state is joining the stronger or weaker side. Thus, while the relative power 
of the challenger and potential balancer will be important, it need not be true that 
the challenger is more powerful than the potential balancer. With these definitional 
issues addressed we can now turn to examining the causes of balancing.
Balancing and commitment problems
In this section and in the rest of this chapter we will refer to revisionist states (or 
challengers to the status quo) and balancers (or status quo states) not in absolute 
terms but only in the context of a particular case of balancing. Thus, a state may be 
revisionist on some issues and a status quo state on other issues. In fact, it is hard 
to imagine any state which would not wish to change some aspect of the current 
international system and maintain the status quo in others (Mearsheimer 2001). 
We will also refer to potential aggressors as those revisionist states which cannot 
credibly commit to not using the change in the status quo to their advantage at 
some point in the future.14 Finally, we refer to potential balancers as those states 
that can respond to the challenger but which have not yet done so.15
It is our contention that commitment problems are a necessary cause of all 
balancing. Commitment problems are in fact an important rational explanation of 
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conflict in the international system.16 Fearon (1995) demonstrates that commitment 
problems, along with private information and problems of indivisibility, are one 
of the few empirically significant rational causes of war.17 Bueno de Mesquita, 
Morrow, and Zorick (1997) extend Fearon’s logic and show that these same 
conditions must exist for crises to occur. This is because crises, like war, are a form 
of costly bargaining and if each side knew how the crisis was going to end, they 
would simply agree to that outcome ex ante without paying the costs of a crisis.18 
Thus, states will only engage in costly conflict if their dispute is irresolvable for 
the reasons stated in Fearon (1995).
Balancing is clearly a form of interstate bargaining, albeit often tacit. The state 
or states engaged in balancing hope that by mobilizing resources and forming 
alliances against the perceived threat, the threatening state or coalition of states 
will be deterred from attacking and ultimately desist from attempting to overturn 
the status quo. Failing this, the balancer aims to aggregate sufficient power to 
defeat the revisionist state in either a defensive or preventive war.
Like wars and crises, balancing is costly. It is generally seen as being more 
costly in the short term than other behaviors such as bandwagoning, though 
often it is less costly in the long term, hence the tension about whether to balance 
(Rosecrance and Lo 1996; Schroeder 1994; Schweller 1997). Balancing often 
requires significant increases in armament expenditures or settling with former 
rivals in order to create alliances. Such settlements are costly since they require 
sacrificing claims and potential advantages in order to bring about the alliance.19 
Additionally, all balancing runs the risk of war with the state or coalition being 
balanced against.
Given that balancing is costly and that it is not a response to a direct attack (thus 
not immediately necessary for a state’s survival) states must consider whether the 
benefits of balancing are worth the costs. Such costs include not only the risk of 
war, the military expenditures necessary to oppose the threatening state, and the 
sacrifices necessary to bring about alliances, but also the forgone spoils that might 
have been available had the state bandwagoned with the revisionist state instead of 
having balanced against it. Why would a state undertake such a costly action and 
forgo potential benefits? A state would only balance if it believed that it would be 
cheaper or more effective to address a potential threat now rather than at some future 
point when it may or may not materialize. In other words, balancing entails assuming 
definite short-term costs to avoid greater expected, but uncertain, long-term costs.
Also, it must be the case that no cheaper alternative to balancing, such as 
buck-passing or accommodation, exists. This is crucial. No state wants to be the 
target of balancing as this threatens its security and autonomy in the international 
system. Further, if the state is truly revisionist, hostile balancing limits its long-
term ability to change the status quo. Thus states which face potential balancers 
have incentives to come to some sort of accommodation in order to prevent 
balancing. This is true regardless of whether or not the revisionist state plans on 
attacking the potential balancer’s interests in the future. Thus, states perceived as 
potential aggressors should be willing to come to terms with potential balancers, 
even if this is merely to ensure that when they are ready to strike they can do so 
Balancing as a commitment problem  21
with minimal cost. Also, given the high cost of balancing, potential balancers 
should find an agreement with potential aggressors’ appealing, provided of course 
they can somehow ensure the potential aggressor will not exploit the agreement 
to challenge their interests in the future.
So why do potential balancers and revisionist states sometimes fail to come to 
an agreement, tacit or otherwise? The answer, as alluded to above, is commitment 
problems. It is often difficult for revisionist states to credibly commit to limit 
themselves to the immediate and localized changes to the status quo they are 
proposing. This is because potential aggressors often seek agreement with potential 
balancers so that they can isolate and defeat their opponents in a piecemeal fashion. 
Alternatively they may seek to use the time gained to strengthen themselves relative 
to the potential balancers, striking only when they are confident of success. It is 
this inability of a revisionist state to bind itself in the future, and thus commit itself 
never to use its relative power gain against the potential balancer, which results 
in balancing behavior. Asymmetric information is chiefly responsible for these 
commitment problems. If the future intentions of the revisionist state were known to 
potential balancers, the decision to balance or not would be quite simple. Potential 
balancers could focus solely on the subset of revisionist states which had malevolent 
intentions for the future (i.e., potential aggressors). By analyzing the nature of the 
moves and power of the challenger, potential balancers could determine if balancing 
was necessary or not. However, both aggressive and benign challengers of the status 
quo (from the potential balancers’ point of view) have incentives to declare that 
they do not harbor future hostile intentions toward the potential balancers (and 
thus avoid being balanced against). It can be difficult for balancers to determine 
which revisionists they need to concern themselves with based on intentions. 
While balancers may be able to discern the intentions of some aggressors based on 
their behavior and capabilities, often the balancer will remain uncertain about the 
challenger’s type. The decision to balance or not also depends on the nature of the 
challenge to the status quo. There are some changes that simply do not constitute 
enough of a threat no matter what the intentions behind them are. Thus, there may 
also be uncertainty about the nature of the challenge to the status quo. The model 
below helps illustrate these points.
Basic structure of the model
Our basic contention – that for balancing to occur, the existence of a commitment 
problem is a necessary but not sufficient condition – is not particularly controversial. 
However, clearly identifying those commitment problems and showing how they 
lead to balancing is a useful contribution to our understanding of balancing. As 
Powell (2006, 180) notes in his discussion of the role of commitment problems 
in war, unless this is done commitment problems become nothing more than a 
“catch-all” label that provides little insight. This section sets up the simple game-
theoretic model we use to do this.
The first step is to realize that the traditional explanation for balancing – 
changes in capabilities and threat perception – are both insufficient and vague. The 
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decision to engage in balancing by one state is not simply a response to a change 
in the capabilities of another. If this were so, then annual economic growth or 
any type of government action that improves the stability or well-being of a state 
would be grounds for balancing behavior. This would make the scope of balancing 
ridiculously large. We also cannot simply reduce balancing to threat perception. 
If this were the case, then a state could one day simply “wake up” to find itself 
being balanced against without it having in any way tried to change the balance 
of power vis-à-vis the other state. Such “preemptive balancing” also stretches 
the scope of the problem too far. Rather, for balancing to occur, both a change 
in capabilities and a perception that this change threatens a potential balancer 
are necessary. This fits with the widely accepted view that threat perception is a 
function of both capabilities and intentions. In essence, the change in capabilities 
will produce a threat if the state that is changing the status quo cannot credibly 
commit that this shift in power is not a threat to the potential balancer.
The game consists of two states: a challenger and a respondent/potential 
balancer. The challenger is a revisionist state that wishes to change the state quo 
in a particular area. The respondent is a potential balancer who prefers the status 
quo. As noted above, it is important to keep in mind that these labels (“status 
quo power” and “revisionist power”) are not used in the absolute sense that the 
respondent does not want to change anything about the international system. 
Rather, these labels refer to the specific context in which the states find themselves 
in relation to a given issue.20 Thus on any given issue and at any given time, certain 
states will favor the status quo while others would like to see a revision of it.
The basic version of the game consists of two decisions. First, the challenger 
must decide whether to change the status quo by taking advantage of some 
opportunity (e.g., engaging in an arms buildup, seizing a strategic territory, etc.) 
or not. The challenger benefits from the move in two ways. First, the challenger 
would receive a benefit from the move itself. In other words there is some sort 
of intrinsic, absolute benefit to building more armaments, occupying a territory, 
etc. The second benefit from such a move is that it may enhance the challenger’s 
position relative to the respondent.21 The key provision here is that the challenger’s 
decision does not directly threaten the integrity or existence of the respondent or 
his core interests. As noted above, responding to such an act would be a case of 
defending against an actual aggressor, not balancing against a potential one. If 
the challenger decides not to make a challenge, then the status quo remains in 
effect. Otherwise, the respondent must decide whether to react to the challenge 
by balancing or allowing the balance of power to be revised by the challenger. 
This model investigates not only when balancing occurs, but also under what 
conditions the initial challenge to the status quo will be made. Thus we have three 
possible outcomes: the status quo (SQ), unopposed challenge (UC), and balancing 
(BE). See Figure 1.1.
The challenger’s payoff is:
SQ: 0
UC: v + r – cc
BE: v – cc
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where:
v is the intrinsic value of the action the challenger undertook, v +∈ ;
r is the relative value of the challenge, that is the shift in the balance of power in 
favor of the challenger; and
cc is the cost of undertaking the action.





r is the same as for the challenger, reflecting that this is the measure of the 
relative power swing; and
cr is the cost to the respondent of balancing against the challenger’s actions.
Game with perfect information
However, this is not the entire picture, as the relative advantage of making an 
unopposed revision to the status quo in a particular situation will vary according 
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to three factors. Each of these are important in order to understand how a change 
to the status quo becomes threatening to the potential balancer; a simple change 
in capabilities is not enough. These three factors are:
1 Intentions of the challenger: i.e., the respondent’s beliefs about the 
challenger;
2 Relative difference in power: i.e., the balance of power between the 
challenger and the respondent under the status quo; and
3 Type of opportunity the challenger is responding to: i.e., its offensive 
value.
The first factor, the intentions of the challenger, is perhaps the most important 
factor in assessing threat. It is not merely the change in the relative balance 
between the challenger and the respondent that worries the respondent, but what 
the challenger intends to do with this relative gain. Two important facts about the 
challenger’s type must be recognized. First, it is not so much the challenger’s type 
itself that matters but rather the respondent’s belief about the challenger’s type. 
Second, the relevance of the challenger’s type is strongly tied to the other two 
factors: the opportunity type and the power differential between challenger and 
respondent.
This is illustrated by the often-cited example that the United States found 
Iraq, but not Britain, threatening despite the fact that the Britain not only has 
vastly greater capabilities than Iraq, but also has a nuclear arsenal. Thus, the mere 
possibility that Iraq may have had a WMD program was threatening enough 
to the United States to impose sanctions and eventually invade Iraq. Not only 
did the United States not find Britain’s nuclear weapons program threatening, 
they actively helped and encouraged its development during the 1950s. Clearly, 
intentions matter in threat perception.
In order to operationalize this aspect of threat perception the concept 
of perceived challenger types is used. In this model there are two types of 
challengers: “aggressive” and “non-aggressive.” Of course, these are simply ideal 
types each representing an extreme on a continuum α ∈ ℝ+, where α = 0 is the 
least aggressive type and α → +∞ is the most aggressive type. The implications of 
this for the value of r will be discussed below.22
The second factor affecting how a respondent will react to an attempt to change 
the status quo is the relative balance of power between the challenger and the 
respondent under the status quo. The impact of the change will directly depend 
on the magnitude of the change compared with the original balance of power. 
Imagine three cases. In the first, the respondent is assumed to be much stronger 
than the challenger. Here the challenger’s gain will not warrant the costly balancing 
response by the respondent, provided it does not greatly diminish the respondent’s 
autonomy on a given issue. For example, if Luxembourg decided to spend a very 
large portion of its GDP on increasing its armed forces it is hard to imagine that 
it could pose a threat to any of its neighbors, let alone to any great power.23 In 
the second case, the challenger is assumed to be dominant. Any challenge it 
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makes that is not directed at the territorial integrity of the respondent will not 
make much difference to the balance of power between them. Furthermore, as 
the power disparity increases, it becomes increasingly harder for the respondent 
to effectively balance against the challenger or even be motivated to try. Where 
challenging the status quo really matters is the third case: when the relative power 
of challenger and respondent are near parity. It is under this condition that even 
small changes to the balance between two states matters most. Thus, during the 
Cold War balancing appeared to be nearly automatic.
This factor is operationalized as the power differential β ∈ ℝ, where:
β → 0 the relative power of challenger and respondent are near parity;
β → +∞   the relative power of the respondent is greater; and
β → –∞   the relative power of the challenger is greater.
The final factor is the strategic character of the opportunity presented to the 
challenger. This is important because certain changes to the status quo are simply 
more threatening than others. Of course, no action that changes the status quo is 
inherently defensive or offensive in nature. Even the most defensive capabilities 
can give an offensive advantage: securing your frontiers will make it easier for 
you to attack your neighbors without worrying about your core power base. And 
even the most offensive capabilities can be used in a purely defensive way: e.g., if 
a state has a second strike capability, then it can use nuclear weapons in a purely 
defensive way. However, the offensive capabilities of opportunities will vary from 
case to case.
In order to illustrate this it is useful to compare two instances: France building 
the Maginot Line (and the less famous Alpine and Corsican extension in the 
1930s) and the satellite states the Soviet Union set up in Eastern Europe after 
World War II. Both had very similar motives. After the experience of World War 
One, France sought a ready-made defensive line to protect itself from future 
German aggression. Similarly, the Soviet Union was primarily motivated by a 
desire to create buffer states that would protect it in case of an attack like the 
ones it faced in World War One and World War II. However, despite similar 
intentions these actions were perceived very differently, in part because of the 
nature of each defensive solution.24 Aside from the massive cost of the line, it 
soon became apparent that it would be very difficult for France to use the Maginot 
Line offensively. The mobile strategic reserve the line was supposed to produce 
proved illusionary since it was realized that manning the line would take up a large 
portion of France’s military manpower.25 On the other hand, the Soviets could 
easily use their satellites as staging areas for an attack on Western Europe once the 
Soviet Union recovered from its losses. Furthermore, the satellite states were not 
just buffers, but potentially provided the Soviets with manpower and resources to 
augment their power.26 Thus, there are some capabilities that cause commitment 
problems regardless of the immediate intentions of the challenger, because even 
though the challenger does not want to use this advantage aggressively in the 
short run, it cannot credibly commit to never doing so in the long run.
26 Balancing as a commitment problem
This is operationalized in a similar way as the challenger type. Conceptually we 
can use the notion of two extreme types of opportunities: one “offensive” and one 
“defensive.” The parameter γ ∈ ℝ+ is such that if γ = 0 the opportunity is defensive 
in nature and if γ → +∞ the opportunity is offensive in nature. Thus, the relative 
value of the action is given by r(α, β, γ) such that r is an increasing function of α, 
the challenger’s type, and γ, the opportunity’s type – and a decreasing function 
of the absolute value of β (i.e., r decreases as |β| → +∞) – the relative balance of 
power between challenger and respondent in the status quo.
Thus, we have broken down the commitment problem that leads to balancing 
into three components. It is useful to think of the first two – the respondent’s 
perception of the challenger’s intention/type and the balance of power between 
challenger and respondent – as the context for the third component, the opportunity 
type. In turn, we can think of the opportunity type as the commitment problem 
proper. The context is important for two reasons. First, intentions and relative 
power differentials determine the significance of the commitment problem proper. 
Second, this context is generally fixed during balancing. That is, given the short 
time horizon, the respondent’s perception and the balance of power are unlikely to 
shift dramatically. This means that the commitment problem proper – the strategic 
value of the opportunity the challenger is trying to capitalize on – is actually 
where the bargaining, explicit or tacit, will take place. Of course, the nature of 
the opportunity cannot be changed, but it can be rendered less threatening by 
the challenger (by taking a unilateral step to diminish its offensive value), by 
the respondent (by balancing), or by both (through a negotiated settlement). This 
approach differs from that of Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006), both of whom 
make the balance of power an integral part of commitment problems. Separating 
the two, however, provides useful conceptual and modeling leverage over the 
problem of balancing.
Outcomes with perfect information
If both players have perfect information about the strategic situation, then the 
outcomes depend on the payoffs. For the respondent, the decision is between 
balancing against the challenge or doing nothing and depends on the cost of 
balancing compared with the cost of ignoring the actions of the challenger. 
Obviously, if the cost of balancing is less than or equal to the relative value of the 
challenge, the respondent will balance, while if it is greater, the respondent will 
ignore the threat.27 This leads to the critical value *r rr c= . The respondent will 
balance against any threat that is equal or greater than *rr  and will ignore all other 
threats. See Figure 1.2.
This means that the challenger’s potential payoff of acting will be equal to v + 
r if *rr r> , and v if 
*
rr r≤ . The challenger’s choice of action will depend on his 
net payoff, which means that there are three cost ranges that affect the outcome:
*
c rc v r≥ + : There is no level of r for which it is worthwhile to make a challenge 
so the only possible equilibrium is the status quo. See Figure 1.3.
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cc v≤ : It is always worthwhile to make a challenge and there are two possible 
equilibria. See Figure 1.4:
*
rr r<  unopposed challenge (UC)
*
rr r≥  balancing equilibrium (BE)
*
c rv c v r≤ ≤ + : The challenger will challenge only if cv r c+ ≥ .
This leads to a second critical value *c cr v c= + . If 
*
cr r≥ , a challenge will be 
made, but if *cr r< , it will not. This leads to three possible equilibria (see Figure 
1.5):
*
cr r<  status quo (SQ)
* *
c rr r r≤ <  unopposed challenge (UC)
*








Figure 1.2 Potential balancer’s action rule with certainty
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Game with uncertainty arising from asymmetric information
Uncertainty is introduced into the model through the challenger type parameter. 
As we discussed in section three, all three types of uncertainty are important. 
However, the uncertainty surrounding the type of challenger is the most common 
concern in theoretical discussions of balancing. The model does not consider 
uncertainty with respect to the type of opportunity or the balance of power 
between states as these are left to the next chapter.
However, before looking at the effect of uncertainty it is important to determine 
when uncertainty about intentions will have an effect. This depends on the values 
of β (the power difference between the two states) and γ (the offensive value of 
an opportunity). Remember that r is assumed to be a decreasing function of the 







cc > v + rr
Figure 1.3 Case of unique equilibrium: status quo (SQ)
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|β| → +∞ or |γ| → +∞, the effect of challenger type becomes irrelevant. Thus, 
if the balance of power between states is so great that the power disturbance 
between them is relatively insignificant, then the intentions of the challenger will 
not matter. In this case, the more powerful state, whether it is the challenger or 
the respondent, will simply ignore the actions of the weaker state. Similarly, if the 
offensive potential of an opportunity is so great that it dramatically strengthens 
the challenger with respect to the respondent, then type will not matter. The 
respondent will always balance regardless of the short-term intentions of the 
challenger as even a less aggressive challenger would not be able to credibly 









Figure 1.4 Case of two possible equilibria: status quo (SQ) or balanced equilibrium (BE)
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matter the offensive value of the challenge cannot be too high nor can the relative 
power difference between the challenger and potential balancer be too great. For 
the rest of this discussion we will assume that β and γ are held at values that do 
not make challenger type α irrelevant.
We have so far assumed that α is a continuous parameter such that α ∈ ℝ+, 
however, for the respondent what matters is not the level of α itself but the 
relationship between the relative gain of the challenger, r(α), and the cost of 
balancing cr. As was noted above this gives us the critical value for the potential 
balancer *r rr c= , such that it will only respond to relative gains of the challenger 










Figure 1.5 Case of three possible equilibria: status quo (SQ), unchallenged revision of the 
status quo (UC), or balanced equilibrium (BE)
Balancing as a commitment problem  31
value of the challenger type, α* (for given levels of β and γ) which gives us *rr . 
Thus, challenger type only matters to the extent that α > α*. Therefore, challenger 
type is categorized into two discreet categories: aggressive (where α > α*) and 
non-aggressive (where α < α*).29
It is further assumed that the respondent does not observe α but rather a signal 
sent by nature a. This signal is assumed to be related to the underlying challenger 
type but with an error or noise ε, such that a = α + ε. It is further assumed that the 
respondent knows the value of the error term. The challenger of course knows his 
type, i.e., how aggressive his intentions are, but does not know the exact value 
of the signal, a, sent by nature. As we noted above for the respondent, the exact 
level of α is not as important as the relationship of r(α) to his cost of balancing 
cr. What matters is whether ( )* *r rr r c= =  and challenger type matters to the 
extent that his level of aggressiveness is above the threshold level, i.e., α > α*. 
Since the respondent receives a signal, a = α +ε, its value will be important to the 
extent that it is related to α*. This means that the upper limit of “safe signals,” 
i.e., those for which *r rr r c≤ = , will be asafe < α
* – ε; and the lower limit of the 
“danger signal,” i.e., those for which *r rr r c≥ = , will be adanger > α
* – ε. This gives 
the action rule for the respondent. See Figure 1.6.
a ∈ [0, α*  – ε) or r(α) < r*(a* – ε)  never balance
a ∈ [α* – ε, α* + ε]  uncertain
a ∈ (α* + ε, +∞) or r(a) > r*(α* – ε)  always balance.
Since the potential balancer always balances for α > α*, under conditions of 
uncertainty the balancer will lower his threshold and always balance against 
a challenge if r(a) > r*(α* – ε). This will reduce the challenger’s payoff from 
v + r – cc to v – cc in the range a ∈ [α* –ε, α*). Thus, with uncertainty the 
challenger and the respondent will be made worse off in the range a ∈ [α* – ε, α*), 
since the respondent will be bearing a cost cr to meet a threat r(α) when cr  > r(α), 
where a ∈ [α* –ε, α*).
Discussion
A number of interesting implications come out of our model. The first is that 
even with perfect information about the three relevant parameters that produce 
the commitment problems that lead to balancing – challenger type, the balance of 
power, and the opportunity type – balancing can still take place despite the fact 
that balancing is costly. This is driven by the fact that in our model the challenger 
is motivated by both the intrinsic value of the opportunity (i.e., absolute gains) 
and the relative advantage it confers (i.e., relative gains). Thus, under perfect 
information, balancing will occur if the challenger finds the intrinsic value of the 
opportunity high enough to act, despite the prospect of being balanced against, 
and the respondent finds the change in the balance of power threatening enough 
that it justifies the cost of responding.
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It is also significant that this would not change even if we allow for negotiation 
between challenger and respondent. In this situation the challenger knows that the 
respondent will balance, so he knows he cannot hold on to any relative gains.30 
The only way to prevent balancing would be to voluntarily give up the relative 
gains of the opportunity. This is because no tacit understanding or treaty can 
remove this commitment problem unless it restores the balance of power prior 
to the challenger action. If we assume that such an action is costly, all else being 
equal, the challenger is better off letting the respondent bear the cost of restoring 
the balance of power.
It could be argued that such a refusal to negotiate by the challenger would 
negatively impact the respondent’s perception of the threat posed by the 











Figure 1.6 Potential balancer’s action rule with uncertainty
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the challenger’s type. However, this will only happen if the offensive value of 
the opportunity is very great. Even in this situation, the challenger may still be 
better off inviting the respondent to balance rather than trying to bear the cost of 
restoring the balance of power himself. If the challenger and balancer are already 
rivals, then the challenger has little incentive to make any such efforts especially 
as aggressive behavior will likely merely confirm the balancer’s view of his rival, 
rather than change his perception.
This means private information is not necessary for balancing. Under certain 
circumstances the ultimate goal of the challenger will be to gain the intrinsic value 
of an action and not the relative advantage it confers. In this case, the disruption in 
the balance of power is an externality which the challenger cannot take advantage 
of, due to the respondent’s reaction. Furthermore, if we assume that removing 
the externality is costly, then, just as in the case of dealing with pollution, the 
producer of the externality (i.e., the challenger) will not benefit from neutralizing 
it. Thus, the problem falls to the respondent, for whom this externality is of course 
negative and must be considered.
Another counterintuitive finding is that a credible balancing response is more 
likely to deter an aggressive (i.e., power-seeking) challenger than a non-aggressive 
one. Given that we assume a self-help system, we can redefine a state as aggressive 
if it places more value on the relative gains resulting from the opportunity (i.e., r) 
than on the intrinsic value of the opportunity (i.e., v). In the extremes, the most 
aggressive states will derive their entire benefit from the relative power gain of the 
opportunity (i.e., r > 0 and v = 0) and the least aggressive states will derive their 
entire benefit from the intrinsic value of the opportunity (i.e., r = 0 and v > 0). 
Thus, when facing a credible threat of balancing the expected payoff of the most 
aggressive state will be a net loss of v – cc = –cc < 0. This means that as long as 
the respondent balances (which in our model happens when r > cc) an aggressive 
challenger will not initiate the challenge in the first place. On the other hand the 
least aggressive state will face an expected payoff of v – cc. As long as v – cc < 0 it 
will have an incentive to challenge the status quo no matter what the respondent 
does.
Thus, all else being equal, an aggressive challenger is more likely to be 
deterred by a credible threat of balancing than a non-aggressive challenger would 
be. For an aggressive challenger, strategic interaction plays an important part 
in their calculations because they place a great deal of importance on relative 
gains, which are dependent on the response of the potential balancer. Since non-
aggressive challengers are less, if at all, concerned about relative gains, they are 
in effect able to act non-strategically. This result, of course, depends in part on 
the fact that in our model balancing is a one-shot game and does not incorporate 
the possibility of balancing escalating into all-out war. However, even with the 
possibility of escalation, the finding that non-aggressive challengers are more 
likely to act unilaterally can still hold. Because an aggressive challenger wants to 
gain a relative advantage over the potential balancer they are even less likely to 
act if their challenge is likely to not only produce balancing but also escalate into 
a conflict with the potential rival sooner than the aggressive challenger is ready. 
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On the other hand, because the non-aggressive challenger is more interested 
in the absolute gains of the challenge, it will be willing to face balancing and 
even escalation of the crisis up to the point where the cost of doing so outweighs 
the intrinsic value of the revision it wants to achieve. Thus, the possibility of 
escalation will make the non-aggressive challenger more mindful of the potential 
balancer’s reaction, but it will still be more willing than an aggressive challenger 
to ignore the respondent.
This finding has a couple of interesting implications. First, while it is intuitive 
to assume that a challenger who does not back down when faced with a credible 
threat of balancing is aggressive, this is not necessarily the case. In our model, 
standing firm in the face of balancing is in fact a very costly signal that the 
challenger is not interested in changing the balance of power but only in gaining 
the intrinsic value of the opportunity. This is something an aggressive challenger, 
i.e., one focused on the relative gains the challenge would bring, would not do. 
Second, this means that aggressive challengers are more likely to opt for small 
revisions to the status quo that are too small to merit a response but are still 
worthwhile (i.e., when the relative gains in power are higher than the costs of 
challenging the status quo but smaller than the costs of balancing, cr ≥ r ≥ cc). As 
long as such actions are not perceived as threatening, they may accumulate into 
a long-term advantage.31 On the other hand, non-aggressive challengers are more 
likely to make large, individual revisions to the status quo if their inherent value is 
greater than the cost of undertaking them. Finally, when dealing with an aggressive 
challenger, balancing should happen only if the challenger underestimates the 
balancer’s resolve.
Given that balancing happens under perfect information, what impact does 
introducing uncertainty have in our model? As indicated in Figure 1.6, uncertainty 
produces a gray area where it is harder for the respondent to gauge the risks they 
are facing against the cost of responding to them. Assuming risk aversion, this 
will lead to a lowering of the threshold for the balancing response and increase 
the number of cases in which balancing will occur. Thus, introducing asymmetric 
information into our model does not dramatically change the nature of balancing; 
rather it lowers the threshold at which the respondent will balance.
Introducing uncertainty increases the stakes for an aggressive challenger. Since 
they are more likely to face a balancing response they are less likely to make a 
challenge in the first place. Of course, in keeping with our previous argument, 
non-aggressive challengers will not change their behavior and will still act non-
strategically (i.e., without seriously considering the respondent’s actions). Thus 
with the introduction of uncertainty, we are closer to the realist worldview where 
all challenges to the balance of power must be responded to (Morgenthau 1973; 
Waltz 1979; Wolfers 1962). But interestingly, the most common challengers to the 
balance of power will still be those states that are not really interested in grand 
revisions (i.e., revisions that would impact the system as a whole, rather than 
minor changes to some aspect of it).
Of course, the model does not capture all the complexity of balancing and 
there are a number of interesting extensions to the model that may prove fruitful. 
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Of these the most promising are: 1) exploring in more detail the implication of 
our three types of uncertainties and how they interact, 2) making an iterated 
rather than a one-shot game, and 3) increasing the number of players. All three 
refinements will be taken up in Chapter 2.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that commitment problems play a central role in balancing. 
These commitment problems classically are conceptualized as arising out of 
uncertainty about the challenger’s intentions (i.e., type) but other factors such 
as the relative balance of power and the opportunity available to the challenger 
play crucial roles in the creation of commitment problems. We find that due to 
incentives to misrepresent intentions, even challengers that do not plan to later 
harm potential balancers cannot easily resolve problems arising from asymmetric 
information. Under certain conditions such challengers are more likely to face 
balancing because they are less likely to back down in the face of credible threats. 
Most importantly, the model shows that uncertainties about the challenger’s 
intentions are not sufficient in themselves to bring about balancing; the nature of 
the challenge and the relative power of the states involved must be considered. The 
model presented here, of course, does not address all facets of balancing behavior. 
Specifically, the model only has one potential balancer and does not allow states 
to delay balancing to the future, both of which are important considerations in 
real-world balancing. Chapter 2, therefore, builds a more complex model to 
further explore these facets of balancing. The implications of both that model and 
the model presented in this chapter are examined in a case on British and French 
behavior in response to the growing German threat in the 1930s in Chapter 3.
Notes
 1 This chapter is reprinted with minor changes and the publisher’s gracious permission 
from Savic and Shirkey (2009).
 2 For example see Nye (2002) and Huth and Russett (1984).
 3 It should be noted, however, that the archetypes of “status quo” and “revisionist” 
states are problematic. States often favor the status quo in one issue area, but are 
revisionist in another. Therefore, even a state that is primarily revisionist can engage 
in balancing. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.
 4 Schweller (1994) argues that states may bandwagon for reasons other than as a response 
to a threat, most notably to fulfill revisionist aims and to acquire spoils. Also arguing 
balancing is a response to threat are Glaser (2011); He (2012); Levy and Thompson 
(2005); Pape (2005); Paul (2005); Schweller (2006; 2011); and Taliaferro (2001).
 5 Gulick (1955) and Taliaferro (2001) also see threat perception as motivating balancing.
 6 This may be due to a belief that balancing would be too costly, that it would be 
ineffective, or that superior strategies exist. It may also be due to internal divisions in 
the threatened state (Schweller 2006).
 7 They are not alone in this contention. For instance see Hume (1898); Jones (1994); 
and Mattingly (1988).
 8 In certain cases it may be easier to determine another state’s intentions than capabilities. 
For example, leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States arguably had 
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less difficulty in determining Iraq’s intentions toward the United States than Iraq’s 
capabilities.
 9 This point is discussed at length in the next section.
 10 According to Waltz, they do so at their own peril.
 11 Jones (1994) and to a lesser extent Levy and Thompson (2005), however, find support 
for Waltz.
 12 See Claude (1962, 29–30 and 36–7) and Vasquez (1997, 903) for a discussion of 
Morgenthau’s arguments on balancing.
 13 Arguably, the relative proximity of the Soviet Union to Western Europe and the 
distance of the United States made the Soviet Union the stronger of the two from 
the perspective of Europe. However, given the US military presence in Europe, its 
economic strength, and the long recovery the Soviets faced, it is more reasonable to 
view the United States as the stronger state in 1949. See Kennedy (1989, 460–5).
 14 Thus, the category “potential aggressor” includes both actual aggressors (those that 
want to use the change in the status quo as a means for further revisions) and non-
aggressive revisionist states (those that do not). Therefore, the aggressiveness of 
the revisionist can be discussed in two ways. First, in terms of the status quo states’ 
perception of the revisionist’s intentions (this is the primary usage in the fourth and 
fifth sections below where we discuss the model). Second, in terms of the value 
that revisionist states place on the absolute gain from changing the status quo vs. 
the relative gain vis-à-vis the status quo state (this is the primary usage in the sixth 
section, where we discuss the implications of the model).
 15 This will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
 16 The term “rational” is used in the same way as it is commonly used in rational choice 
theory approaches and denotes explanations distinct from psychological and other 
non-rational explanations of conflict.
 17 There are other ways to rationally get to war with unitary actors such as very high 
costs to peace, very high risk acceptance, or coordination problems but these have not 
been found to be empirically significant (Weisiger 2013).
 18 Costs associated with crises include the possibility of lost prestige, the material costs 
associated with mobilization, and the possibility that the crisis may escalate into a 
war.
 19 This is not to say that there will never be side benefits to balancing. The alliances 
formed and weapons built may have other uses and benefits. Weapons procurements, 
however, always have a clear monetary cost. Smith (1995) argues that alliance 
formation is always costly and it is states’ willingness to pay these costs which makes 
their alliance commitments credible. Additionally, if the side benefits of balancing 
outweigh the costs then these actions would have been taken before the threat 
emerged. Of course, balancing could help a leader overcome domestic or international 
opposition to building up armaments or creating alliances, but in this case the leader 
is not really engaged in balancing but is using it as a pretext.
 20 For example, in the case of the Cuban Revolution and the Missile Crisis that followed 
it, the Soviet Union was a revisionist power and the United States was a status quo 
power. This does not mean that on other issues, such as regime change in Hungary in 
1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union was not in favor of the status quo 
or the United States did not want to revise it.
 21 Here we are not trying to rehash the old debate surrounding relative vs. absolute gains 
but rather build on the conclusion of that debate: that the relative importance of each 
type of gain depends on the strategic context.
 22 Conceptually, one could also argue that respondents have types: a fearful respondent 
will increase his valuation of the relative gain achieved by the challenger (r) and 
a more trusting one would decrease the value of r. However, the “fearfulness” or 
“trustfulness” of the respondent should be based on the three above-mentioned 
factors: the challenger’s type, the offensive value of the opportunity, and power 
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difference between the two players. Also, it is not the challenger’s actual type but 
how he is perceived by the respondent that really matters. Therefore, in our model, 
the challenger’s type incorporates the respondent’s type because it depends on his 
perception. Under perfect information adding a respondent type would not make a 
difference. Under uncertainty, which will be examined in the next section, the level 
of fear will be reflected by the latter two factors and the signal that the respondent 
receives about the challenger’s type.
 23 Of course, this is assuming that the respondent has no intentions of attacking the 
challenger in the near future. Since we have defined the respondent as the status quo 
power in the context of the game this case is not possible in the framework of the 
game.
 24 Obviously, the character of the French and Soviet regimes played a role in how 
their actions were perceived. However, it would be a mistake to paint one regime 
as inherently interested in the status quo and the other as inherently revisionist. For 
example, the original aims of Clemenceau at the 1919 Paris Conference included the 
French annexation of the Saar and the creation of independent Rhineland states under 
permanent allied occupation. France only gave these up in exchange for security 
guarantees from Britain and the United States and the promise of German reparations 
payments. See Graham (1996, 40).
While Stalin and the Bolsheviks were interested in expansion in the long run, in 
the late 1940s the Soviet Union was in no position to plan further conquests. It was 
much weaker than other states realized – a fact it actively tried to hide. The Soviets did 
see themselves as global players, but their initial priority was rebuilding their strength, 
not further expansion. See Kennedy (1989, 467–70). Stalin even refused Marshal Plan 
aid, which was theoretically available to him, because revealing the extent of recovery 
needs was a condition of receiving American aid. See Gaddis (1997, 41–3).
 25 Despite the conventional wisdom that the Maginot Line was a financial white 
elephant and a strategic disaster there is still disagreement about the value of France’s 
fortifications during World War II. The French did overcommit their field divisions 
to supporting the line. However, this may have less to do with the inherent weakness 
of the line and more to do with a failure of French strategic planning. See Kaufmann 
(1988, 74).
 26 These benefits tended to be short run in nature. A reasonable argument can be made 
that over the long run, Soviet satellite states were actually a net drain on Moscow’s 
resources.
 27 It may at first seem a bit odd that the potential balancer will ignore a threat if the costs 
of balancing are too high, but this makes sense if you consider the fact that it would 
be a waste of resources to do so and this would be dangerous in a self-help system.
 28 For example, historically it was a major tenet of British foreign policy that the Low 
Countries (especially the Southern Netherlands, i.e., modern Belgium) should not be 
controlled by any great power, no matter what its intentions, because it was a perfect 
staging ground for an attack on Britain. The one exception to this rule was Austria, 
which held the territory from 1713 to 1794. Britain did not oppose Austrian control 
because Austria’s base of power lay in Central and South-Central Europe and Austria 
had virtually no navy. In fact, the British insisted Austria take over the territory in 
1713, as Austrian control was seen as the way to prevent the more dangerous prospect 
of French control. In essence, like a minor power, the Austrians lacked the capability to 
exploit the possession of the Southern Netherlands in a fashion that was threatening to 
Britain. Thus, it was the Austrians’ lack of naval capabilities and not their supposedly 
benign intentions that mattered. See McKay and Scott (1995, 63–6).
 29 It may seem as if the challenger’s perceived type is defined endogenously in this model, 
however, the underlying aggressiveness of the challenger is determined exogenously 
by nature. It is only the level of the challenger’s aggressiveness as perceived by the 
potential balancer that is in part determined endogenously.
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 30 This is because in a self-help system a relevant change in the balance of power between 
two states will lead to a commitment problem. In other words, the challenger cannot 
credibility commit not to use the change in the balance of power to his advantage at 
some future date.
 31 This is analogous to Schelling’s (1966) concern about salami-slicing tactics.
2 Balancing and buck-passing I
A dynamic model with uncertainty
Whether to balance is often a difficult decision. While some scholars argue 
that great powers almost always balance (Parent and Rosato 2015), most agree 
that for individual states, balancing is not automatic (Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 
1979; Rosecrance and Lo 1996; Wolfers 1962; Vasquez 1997).1 So why do states 
sometimes choose to balance against threats while at other times they ignore 
or appease states making such threats? The previous chapter began to answer 
this question by looking at the role of commitment problems. Specifically, 
Chapter 1 argued that commitment problems can prompt balancing provided the 
costs of doing so are tolerable, but that uncertainty about states’ intentions, the 
type of opportunity presented by the challenger’s move, and the relative balance 
of power all complicate the picture and could potentially cause states to make poor 
decisions about whether or not to balance. However, the model in Chapter 1 has 
several important limitations. It left unaddressed which of these types of uncertainty 
is most problematic for states facing decisions about whether to balance.2 Also, 
the model has only one potential balancer and lacks an extended time horizon. 
These are both unrealistic assumptions which prevented the possibilities of buck-
passing and strategic delay from arising. This chapter develops a more realistic 
model which allows for tradeoffs between current versus future balancing and 
for buck-passing. The implications of this more realistic model are explored in 
Chapter 3 through a case study of the Rhineland and Sudetenland crises of 1936 
and 1938.
When do states balance?
In determining whether another state poses a threat which should be balanced 
against, leaders look at two aspects of that state: its capabilities and intentions. 
Realists disagree about the extent to which intentions can be discerned. Mearsheimer 
in particular argues that others’ intentions are opaque. He states “Intentions are 
ultimately unknowable, so states … must make worse case assumptions … In 
short, great powers balance against capabilities, not intentions” (Mearsheimer 
2001, 45). Similarly, using 1930s Germany as an example, Schweller (2006) 
argues that it is very hard to infer intentions from behavior without the benefit 
of hindsight. This is especially troubling as he believes the key to successfully 
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dealing with a rising dissatisfied state is understanding its intentions. Only then, 
he claims, is it clear whether the state will be satisfied by limited concessions. 
Not surprisingly then, while he acknowledges that uncertainty over capabilities 
is real and matters, Schweller spends most of his discourse on the challenges to 
determining threat by focusing on the difficulties of inferring intentions. Edelstein 
(2002) argues that this view is the norm among offensive realists.
Such a view, however, is not limited to offensive realists. Many defensive 
realists have focused their explanations for conflict on uncertainty about 
intentions (Claude 1962; Glaser 1992; 1997; Jervis 1978; Kydd 1997a; 1997b; 
Morgenthau 1973; Walt 1985; Waltz 1979). Rationalists have also examined the 
role of uncertainty about intentions, though not necessarily to the exclusion of 
uncertainty over capabilities. For example, Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and 
Zorick (1997) argue that uncertainties about both capabilities and intentions play 
important roles in crisis escalation and that uncertainty around either variable can 
never be entirely eliminated during crises. Likewise Gartzke (1999) focuses on 
the role of intentions in causing commitment problems which in turn make war 
unpredictable. Similarly, constructivists and neoliberals believe that intentions 
matter when it comes to alignment decisions. All of this leads Edelstein to conclude 
that the key to successful balancing is understanding other states’ intentions. He 
states that, “Where states are confident that another state has either benign or 
malign intentions, formulating appropriate strategies is straightforward” but that 
uncertainty over intentions leads to mistakes (Edelstein 2002, 12). This view that 
uncertainty over the intentions of the revisionist state is the most problematic 
aspect of balancing decisions is common (Danilovic 2001; Mearsheimer 2001; 
2010; Parent and Rosato 2015; Waltz 1979).
We disagree. In this chapter, we show that uncertainty over the specific nature 
of the change to the balance of power coupled with uncertainty about the relative 
balance of forces, including uncertainty over the behavior of potential third party 
allies, is more problematic than uncertainty over intentions. In doing so we agree with 
Powell (2012) who conceives of commitment problems as arising from expected 
shifts in the future balance of power. He stresses that they will exist even if there is 
absolute certainty about the challenger’s intentions, though such certainty should 
prompt balancing. Thus, it is not uncertainty over the future power shift which 
leads to conflict, but rather the shared understanding that these shifts in power will 
occur.3 This is consistent with our model in Chapter 1 which argued that uncertainty 
about the challenger’s intentions is not sufficient to bring about balancing. It showed 
that the nature of the challenge, in particular the offensive value of the move and 
the relative power of the states involved, must be considered. It also showed that 
balancing can happen even with perfect information about the challenger’s type, 
the balance of power, and the opportunity type provided two conditions are met: 
the challenger finds the intrinsic value of the opportunity high enough to act despite 
the prospect of being balanced against and the respondent finds the change in the 
balance of power threatening enough that it justifies the cost of responding.
We now expand on the findings of that model by creating a new model which 
allows for multiple time periods and multiple potential balancers. In doing so, we 
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shed light on the relative importance of three types of uncertainty as they relate 
to balancing: the challenger’s type, the relative balance of power, and the relative 
value (i.e., strategic implications) of the challenger’s move. Also discussed, but 
not formally modeled, are two additional sources of uncertainty that arise from 
the dynamic multiplayer environment: uncertainty about whether the balancers’ 
benefit from delaying their decision to balance and uncertainty about the 
commitment of allies. However, as discussed in more detail below, these sources 
of uncertainty can be understood as special cases of uncertainty about the relative 
balance of power.
A model of balancing with multiple time periods and players
There are N players: states that must decide whether to respond to a challenge 
by a revisionist state. The revisionist state is treated as a non-strategic player. 
This is potentially unsatisfying because it means the loss of some of the strategic 
possibilities, but it is necessary in order to make the dynamic multiplayer model 
manageable. It is also justifiable in light of the fact that we are primarily interested 
in balancing behavior and not in the decision to challenge the status quo. The 
potential balancers are not sure whether the challenge to the status quo warrants 
balancing due to uncertainty about one of three parameters: the intentions of 
the challenger, the existing balance of power, or the nature of the change to the 
balance of power. Nature decides the value of each parameter for the duration of 
the game in period t = 0.
It is further assumed that there is a fixed numbered of periods, T, in which 
the players can make an irrevocable decision to balance. Although the number 
of periods is somewhat arbitrary, most international crises have relatively short 
time horizons, making a limited number of moves a reasonable assumption. The 
assumption that the decision to balance can only be made once reflects the fact 
that for balancing to be meaningful it requires a costly mobilization of material, 
political, and diplomatic resources which cannot be easily undone. Otherwise, we 
are dealing with the threat of balancing and not balancing itself.
At the end of the crisis, i.e., at time T + 1, uncertainty is resolved and the 
potential balancers get the following payoff:
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These payoffs can be broken down into three components:
( )Tn x
N
 Benefit from common defense: the payoff from the creation of a 
balancing coalition. This is operationalized as the proportion of 





 multiplied by the contribution of each balancer’s response 
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(x). For simplicity, this model assumes an equal distribution of power 
between the potential balancers. Thus, each state can contribute 
equally to a common defense. The value, nr, is the number of states 
that have joined the balancing coalition. This will increase each time 
states decide to make the irrevocable decision to balance. States 
benefit from the common defense whether they join the coalition or 
not. This captures the free rider problem of collective balancing.
(x – c)δt–1 Benefit from national defense: the payoff to an individual state that 
decides to balance, regardless of what other states do. The response, 
x, is modified by two parameters: the cost of balancing c (such that 0 < 
c < 1) and the timing of the decision to balance δt–1 (where 0 ≤ δ ≤  1). 
This model assumes that the sooner governments are able to mobilize 
against the challenger the better.4 These two parameters do not appear 
in the common defense payoff because states only bear the cost of 
their own balancing and because the value of the coalition is only 
realized once the final size of the coalition is known at time T + 1.
 α(β +γ) Cost from the challenge: the threat that the challenge to the status 
quo represents to the system (see below).
This means that there is a minimal necessary coalition that can meet the 
new threat: one that exactly balances against the new threat ( ) ( )Tn xN = +  




. This will be 
important when discussing the implications of uncertainty. The strategic threat 
to the system breaks down into three parameters. The first is α, which represents 
the challenger’s type; specifically how aggressively revisionist the challenger is. 
Of course, it can be argued that any state would revise the status quo given a 
favorable opportunity. Here aggressiveness means actively pursuing a revision 
of the status quo. The more aggressive the state, the more it values changing 
the status quo. This parameter can take a value in the range 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. As α → 
0 the aggressiveness of the challenger diminishes (when α = 0 the state is only 
concerned in the absolute not the relative gains). As α → 1 the aggressiveness of 
the challenger increases (when α = 1 the state completely values the relative gains 
of its actions). The second parameter, β, represents the challenger’s power relative 
to all other states in the system – whether that system is regional or global. Thus, 
0 < β ≤ 1, and the combined power of all the potential balancers is equal to 1– β. 
Therefore, as β → 0 the less relevant is the challenger to the balance of power 
and the more likely the challenge will be ignored. On the other hand as β → 1 
the more powerful the challenger is and the less likely a coalition will be able to 
balance against it. Where balancing matters most is as β → 0.5 since it is around 
this midpoint that challenges to the balance matter most. Finally, γ represents the 
value of the strategic opportunity that the challenger is taking advantage of, i.e., 
how much the challenge disrupts the balance of power. Therefore, the pre-crisis 
balance is determined by the parameter, β, and the value of the opportunity, γ, is 
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the change in this balance. This means that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1– β; as γ → 0 the challenge 
to the system becomes irrelevant and as γ → 1 – β the opportunity transforms the 
challenger into a hegemon.
Before introducing uncertainty a few general points should be made. First, 
under full information the likelihood of balancing will depend on the parameters 
α, β and γ as outlined above. Second, while there is a potential for collective 
action problems among the balancers the extent to which this problem matters 
will depend entirely on two parameters: N, the number of states in the system, 
and 1 – β, the balance of power they represent. Thus, the smaller N is and the 
closer 1 – β is to 0.5, the less likely are problems of buck-passing.
Variation I: Uncertainty over the challenger type (α)
We first assume the challenger’s type is unknown. Before the first period, nature 
decides randomly and for the duration of the game the challenger’s type by 
choosing the value of α ∈ {α0, α1}, such that α0 < α1. Without loss of generality, 
the values are set as:
α1 = 1  Power seeking (revisionist) state: balancing is appropriate
α0 = 0 Security seeking state: balancing is a waste of resources.
The value of α is not perfectly observable, rather at the beginning of the 
first period each government is given a onetime private signal (i.e., private 
information) about the challenger’s type which is not observed by the other states. 
Each country uses its signal along with some common knowledge about the 
challenger to form its private belief, μi, which is that government’s probability 
assessment of the necessity of balancing. The initial distribution of private beliefs 
is defined by a cumulative distribution function ( )1F  .5 Thus, in the first period 
the distribution of beliefs is supported by the bounds ( )1 1,  . These bounds 
can be infinity but must be independent of θ. The distribution must satisfy the 
condition of compatibility with the Bayesian framework.6 If it does, then they 
satisfy the assumption of first order stochastic dominance.
For the rest of the game, nature gives no new information and states update 
their beliefs by observing the actions of others. In each period, a government can 
make a onetime irreversible decision to respond. This decision is based on the 
government’s updated beliefs for that period which consist of the beliefs at the 
beginning of the last period and an update based on observed balancing made by 
other governments in that period. Thus, in each period the government knows 
its initial beliefs (based on the signal it received and common knowledge) and 
the history, ht = (x1, …, xt+1), where xk is the number of governments that decided 
to balance in period k.
The only decision that the government can make in each period is whether 
to balance. For simplicity, only symmetric equilibria and pure strategies will be 
considered. Given the initial distribution of beliefs, ( )1F  , and the history, ht, a 
strategy in period t is defined by the decision set, lt (ht), of beliefs of all states that 
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balanced. Thus, a government balances in period t if and only if μt ∈ It (ht), where 
μt is that government’s belief at the beginning of that period.
At the end of a given period of the game, t, governments observe nt: the total 
number of governments that have balanced. Updating of beliefs by individual 
governments transforms the distribution of belief from tF
 to 1tF +
 . At the 
beginning of the next period the governments that have not balanced, N – nt, use 
their private information and the equilibrium strategies of all agents for any future 
date and future history to choose a strategy that maximizes their expected payoff. 
A government decides to balance if and only if the potential payoff of this decision 
is greater than doing nothing. If a government is indifferent between balancing 
and not balancing the model assumes that it will do nothing. The model focuses 
only on symmetric sub-game perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Suppose now that governments have the option to share their private 
information through diplomacy. Specifically, suppose that during the first period 
after they have received their private signal about α, governments have the options 
of sharing their signal by sending a message, mi. For simplicity it is assumed 
that governments reveal their private signal about the challenger’s intentions α, 
mt (st) ∈ {0, 1}. If we assume that diplomatic talks take place at time t then each 
government’s log likelihood ratio will be updated as follows:





























Ht is the set of truth-telling conditions and
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Consequently, two key questions arise. First, will potential balancers tell the 
truth? Second, will they delay their decision to exchange information or their 
decision to balance once the information is revealed? The answers are that the 
likelihood of truth-telling will depend on the cost of balancing and the threat that 
the challenger poses and that states do not have an incentive to delay truth-telling 
because of the cost of postponing the decision.
Variation II: Uncertainty over the balance of power (β)
What if countries are certain about the value of α, but are uncertain about the 
balance of power? Assuming that the challenger is known to be aggressive, as 
otherwise there is no need to balance regardless of the uncertainty over the value 
of β, then α = 1 and the payoffs for potential balancers become:
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If they decided to balance:  ( ) ( ) ( )1tTn x x c
N
−+ − − +  
If they decided not to balance: ( ) ( )Tn x
N
− + 
The problem becomes determining the size of the coalition necessary 
to effectively balance against the challenger. As noted above, the size of 
the minimal coalition that can defend against the challenger is given by 
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  . Since in the first version of the model 
the values of both β and γ were known, the minimal necessary balancing coalition 
was a known value, which we will refer to as nT. By introducing uncertainty in the 
balance of power or the nature of the challenge, the size of the minimal coalition 
becomes unknown.
We will first explore uncertainty about the balance of power β. As noted above, 
the pre-crisis balance of power is assumed to be continuous in the range 0 < β ≤ 1. 
Thus, each state will receive a signal b = β ± ε. The outcome of this variation 
is similar to the first with one important difference. Namely, because states are 
uncertain about the balance of capabilities, they cannot easily determine the exact 
coalition needed to effectively balance against the challenger.
Variation III: Uncertainty over the opportunity type (γ)
Finally, there can be uncertainty about the impact of the challenge on the status 
quo (i.e., the value of γ). This situation is similar to the previous variant with 
one key difference: since the pre-crisis balance of power is unknown, so is the 
lower limit of the possible coalition that is necessary to balance. That is, given a 




. Thus the uncertainty comes down to the question of whether a larger 
than minimal coalition is necessary.
Discussion
Incorporating multiple players and multiple periods leads to some interesting 
results. Generally, the arguments presented in Chapter 1 hold true in this 
framework. The biggest contribution of the new model is that it allows for the 
exploration of different sources of uncertainty leading to the following conclusions. 
First, uncertainty about capabilities is more problematic than uncertainty about 
intentions.7 When capabilities are known (i.e., both the pre-crisis balance and the 
potential change in that balance) states know the size of the coalition that will be 
able to deter or defend against the challenger. In this situation, states can form a 
balancing coalition and wait for intentions to be revealed. However, if intentions 
are known but there is uncertainty about capabilities, then the necessary size of 
the balancing coalition cannot be easily determined. This opens the door to well-
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known problems associated with balancing, especially buck-passing. States in 
this situation are more likely to miscalculate and gamble that they can shift the 
burden of balancing onto others. In addition, this also leads to the possibility that 
states will conclude that balancing is less likely to work and as a result they may 
choose to either hide or bandwagon with the challenger in the hopes of ensuring 
their security or of picking up spoils.
Second, uncertainty about the initial balance of power is more difficult to deal 
with than uncertainty about the opportunity the challenger has seized. However, 
the latter is still more of a challenge to balancing than uncertainty over intentions. 
Thus, when states are uncertain about the nature of the opportunity at least they 
know what the minimal balancing coalition would be. In addition, for certain pre-
crisis balances, specifically those where the challenger is powerful enough that 
any disturbance of the status quo is dangerous to the potential balancer, then the 
nature of the challenge is largely irrelevant.
Finally, two further sources of uncertainty exist: the timing of balancing (δ) and 




 Before discussing them in detail, it is important to 
systematically categorize the different sources of uncertainty we have discussed. 
They fall into one of two broad categories: intentions and capabilities. Uncertainty 
about intentions includes both the challenger’s intentions (referred to above as α) and 
the intentions of other potential balancers (which we have not discussed). Uncertainty 
about capabilities takes four forms, namely uncertainty about the current balance of 





. To put it another way:
β: balance of power
δ : expected change in the balance over time
γ: change in the balance of power without balancing
Tn
N
: minimal coalition necessary for balancing.
Turning first to timing, in the basic setup of the model it was assumed that 
the discount rate of the decision to balance was 0 < δ ≤ 1. As δ → 0 the cost 
of delaying the decision to balance is low. But as δ → 1 the cost of delaying 
the decision to balance increases and potential balancers will be more likely to 
err on the side of caution. This in turn will affect how quickly the coalition is 
likely to form. However, it is possible that delaying balancing could be beneficial. 
For example, domestic politics could make it difficult to respond immediately. 
Alternatively, a state may be in the process of modernizing its military capacity. 
In these situations, delay could be beneficial since the later the state responds the 
more able it will be to neutralize the challenge. Of course, here the value of δ will 
depend on the positions of both the potential balancers and the challenger, thus 
creating uncertainty. If potential balancers are uncertain of the value of δ they will 
have problems coordinating their actions. In the case of coalition size, Tn
N
, the 
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uncertainty rests on questions about the final size of the coalition. In particular, the 
uncertainty would rest on the ability of states to observe the behavior of potential 
balancing partners. Thus, this comes down to the old issue of the reliability of 
external balancing and the problem of defection once a crisis comes to a head.
The insights from the model are supported by the case of British and French 
responses to the rise of Germany in the 1930s in the next chapter. Many members of 
both the French and British governments were largely alive to the nature of Hitler’s 
regime. While there was some uncertainty over Hitler’s intentions, this was not the 
fundamental obstacle to forming a balancing coalition. Rather, the key problem was 
uncertainty about whether a sufficiently large balancing coalition could be formed. 
This was due to both worries about buck-passing and uncertainty over the relative 
balance of power. This led France to doubt its ability to successfully balance and led 
to defeatism and essentially hiding behavior. Additionally, both France and Britain 
had doubts about whether changes to the status of the Rhineland and Sudetenland 
were sufficiently threatening to warrant fighting a major war before they were ready. 
In other words, uncertainty about the nature of the opportunity also played a role. 
Finally, both Britain and France believed that the balance of power would be more 
favorable in the future and hoped to delay war until a later date. Each of these 
factors will be examined in depth in Chapter 3.
Notes
 1 In particular Parent and Rosato (2015) argue that bandwagoning and buck-passing 
are very poor options for great powers and thus rarely employed as strategies by great 
powers. Whether or not this is true in general, the 1930s fit poorly with such a view as 
the Soviets bandwagoned with the Germans and the British and French buck-passed 
– albeit to the future rather than to one another.
 2 A potential problem with focusing on the role of uncertainty arising from private 
information in balancing is, as Fey and Ramsay (2007) argue, that mutual optimism arising 
from private information should never result in war. This is because a state’s willingness 
to fight should cause the other state to reconsider its own willingness. Slantchev and Tarar 
(2011), however, show that this result depends entirely on the unrealistic assumption 
that a state can unilaterally impose peace on the dyad. Once this assumption is relaxed, 
mutual optimism arising from private information again becomes a cause of war.
 3 Powell (2004) finds that offers during crises reveal information about states’ cost 
tolerances, but not about their relative capabilities and concludes that uncertainty over 
capabilities is more likely to result in war than uncertainty over costs. This hints that 
uncertainty over capabilities may be worse than uncertainty over intentions. However, 
a state’s tolerance for cost, though a component of its intentions, is not the sum of them.
 4 The impact of relaxing this assumption is explored in the last subsection of the model.
 5 For simplicity and without loss of generality it is assumed that the cumulative 
distribution function is differentiable.
 6 For example, if private beliefs have density f 1 and f 0 in α1 = 1 and α0 = 0 then 
f  1 (μ) / μ = f  0 (μ) / (1 – μ).
 7 This differs from the realist contention that determining intentions is more problematic 
than observing capabilities. We are not claiming which sort of uncertainty is more 
likely, only that uncertainty about capabilities, when it does arise, is more problematic 
than uncertainty about intentions.
3 Balancing and buck-passing II
 Western Europe in the 1930s
The situation in Europe from the Rhineland crisis of 1936 to the Sudetenland crisis 
of 1938 closely resembles the conditions outlined in Chapter 2: multiple actors 
must make balancing decisions under conditions of uncertainty about intentions, 
capabilities, the reliability of allies, and the benefits of delay. Germany threatened 
to overturn the status quo and change the relative balance of power between it 
and the other great powers of Europe, notably Britain and France. One exception 
to this relatively good fit is that while the primary balancers, Britain and France, 
were roughly equal in power as assumed by the model, Britain’s military was 
disproportionately focused on naval assets. This meant that in the short run France 
was the much more powerful potential balancer when it came to land forces. Also, 
given France’s shared land border with Germany, it was likely to be subjected to 
the brunt of the German attack, though of course Britain would be immediately 
vulnerable to air attack.1 This disparity in short-run land power and the likelihood 
of bearing costs played an important role in both crises as will be seen below.
The Rhineland crisis, 1936
The first crisis began on March 7, 1936 when Germany remilitarized the 
Rhineland. The Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to maintain troops or build 
fortifications in the area. By moving troops into the Rhineland, Germany would 
be in a better position to both threaten France and defend against a French attack, 
thereby shifting the balancing of power. However, German remilitarization was 
also motivated by a desire to restore national pride, creating some uncertainty over 
long-run German intentions. Thus, while in retrospect Hitler’s actions seem clear, 
during the crisis there was legitimate uncertainty about whether Hitler wanted to 
remilitarize the Rhineland as a first step in a program of broader revision to the 
European system or simply a means of reassertion of national sovereignty.2 For 
their part, the French ultimately did not oppose the remilitarization. This was not 
a result of uncertainty regarding German intentions. Rather Paris acted the way 
it did because of its beliefs about the significance of the German move and their 
beliefs about the relative balance of forces in 1936.
First, the French did not believe the move itself did much to alter the relative 
balance with Germany. Paris had begun to devalue the Rhineland as a defensive 
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buffer prior to the remilitarization and was not particularly surprised by Germany’s 
actions (Adamthwaite 1977, 37; Alexander 1992, 76; Young 1996, 25). In fact, 
Hitler had already partially violated the demilitarization. Prior to the crisis, there 
were 200,000 men in Sturmabteilung, Schutzstaffel, and labor service battalions 
in the territory rebuilding roads and railways, plus another 22,000 regular infantry 
and one air regiment, all of which were dubiously classified as police (Schuker 
1986, 308–9).3 Additionally, modern military equipment, especially planes and 
tanks, had increased military mobility. This meant the Germans could move 
through the zone much more rapidly in the 1930s than in the 1920s. Simply 
keeping the zone demilitarized no longer bought France as much time as it did 
when the Treaty of Versailles was signed (Schuker 1986, 303; Young 1996, 25).
While keeping the Rhineland demilitarized was not without value to France 
– militarization would strengthen Germany’s rail network and provide security 
for factories used in rearmament (Schuker 1986, 303–19) – in many ways the 
Rhineland was more important to the security of Poland and Czechoslovakia 
than to France (Young 1996, 25).4 The zone’s main value was in preventing 
Germany from fortifying the Rhine, thereby keeping Germany vulnerable to a 
French offensive if Germany moved east against either Poland or Czechoslovakia. 
Paris’ alliances with these states rested on this offensive possibility (Kaufman 
1992, 430).5 In fact, this was the only thing that offset the defensive posture of the 
French army in Polish eyes (Sakwa 1973, 129–30).6
Furthermore, the weakness of France’s offensive capabilities reduced the value 
of the Rhineland to Paris. French military planning in the 1930s assumed any 
European conflict involving France, including one over the Rhineland, would 
be a general war involving full mobilization and that France would remain on 
the defensive (Kaufman 1992, 422–3; Sakwa 1973, 137; Shirer 1984, 240–8). 
Broader diplomatic opinion agreed with this (Parker 1956, 305). For this reason, 
no force capable of undertaking a small-scale attack existed (Parker 1956, 363–
4). In particular, the equipment possessed by the French army was ill-suited for 
an offensive. The French military lacked many modern weapons, especially 
rapidly mobile vehicles. French armor consisted of 200 poorly constructed light 
tanks which were designed to meet a colonial emergency and were incapable 
of undertaking an offensive in Europe (Sakwa 1973, 137; Schuker 1986, 304–
16). France simply had not been building the necessary military equipment for 
aggressive action in part because of financial concerns (Steiner 2011, 139). The 
budget for weapons procurement had fallen by 17 percent from 1930 to 1934 due 
to the cost of the Maginot Line and the severity of the Great Depression reaching 
its nadir for the interwar period in 1935 (Steiner 2011, 138). The standing forces 
France did have available, even when supplemented by the couverture (a limited 
initial mobilization), were simply designed to hold the line in the east against the 
Germans for 17 days until a general mobilization could be completed (Parker 1956, 
362–4). Therefore, a conflict with Berlin would likely require a full mobilization 
and British aid (Alexander 1992, 258–9; Schuker 1986, 304–16). Particularly 
worrisome was that any attempt to use the forces immediately available for 
an offensive would make any subsequent full-scale mobilization very difficult 
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logistically (Parker 1956, 362–4). This meant that if the German army continued 
to fight after the initial offensive, France would be poorly positioned to carry 
on the war. Thus, any attempt by France to utilize the offensive potential of the 
demilitarized Rhineland would have harmed France’s defensive position.
Second, the French military was in no condition to fight even a defensive war. 
In 1935, France had no anti-tank weaponry, very little modern heavy and medium 
artillery, and most of France’s 1,847 planes were still made of canvas. General 
Maurice Gamelin, head of the French General Staff, knew the French military 
equipment was badly outdated and that because of the decline of the French 
armaments industry, rectifying this deficiency would take years (Alexander 
1992, 34–6, 62, and 128–30). The gradual rearmament that had only just begun 
left France in no position for war in 1936 (Alexander 1992, 76; Steiner 2011, 
138; Young 1996, 28). Budget constraints were so tight that France had been 
unable to engage in full field maneuvers. Thus while France nominally had 
651,000 soldiers, only 195,000 had been properly trained (Schuker 1986, 320–
1). Depending on what forces on each side were counted as part of the standing 
military, and there were disagreements as to what were equivalent forces, France’s 
peacetime army was only half the size of Germany’s (Sakwa 1973, 133). Gamelin 
assumed that any military action against Germany would lead to a full-blown war 
– a war which he believed would result in initial deadlock and long-run defeat for 
France (Schuker 1986, 330). This attitude was broadly held by the French general 
staff and prompted it to oppose a military response to the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland. The military’s attitude was a crucial factor in dissuading the French 
government from acting (Adamthwaite 1977, 37; Steiner 2011, 137).
At the cabinet meeting on March 7, right after German troops had entered the 
Rhineland, Gamelin presented the worse-case war scenario to the French cabinet. He 
overestimated the Germans’ strength, refused to include Polish and Czechoslovak 
divisions in his analysis, and insisted that a full mobilization was necessary if any 
action was to be taken (Kaufman 1992, 429; Steiner 2011, 138).7 He and the rest 
of the French military discouraged the politicians from acting. Albert Sarraut, 
the French Prime Minister, was also worried about whether Britain would aid 
France (Adamthwaite 1977, 37–9; Parker 1956, 362; Schuker 1986, 328–31). In 
the end, the cabinet did call out the couverture, but declined to issue orders for 
further mobilization. This amounted to a decision not to act. In the end, the French 
government threatened sanctions and passed the matter on to the League of Nations 
which in turn did nothing (Parker 1956, 358–60; Schuker 1986, 310). Indeed, even 
in denouncing the German move in parliament, Sarraut strongly indicated that the 
French would have accepted the remilitarization had it been done via negotiation 
and in accordance with international law (Great Britain 1990 v. 22, 145–8).8 Thus, 
the French believed the value of the opportunity was low enough to not justify the 
costs of war and were sufficiently uncertain about the relative balance of forces 
to fear that France could not effectively balance the German threat. Both factors 
combined to convince the French to not oppose the German move.
Additionally, as suggested briefly above, the French decision rested in part 
on a belief that it would have had to confront Germany singlehandedly. Was 
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this realistic? What of France’s allies? In fact, Paris was correct to doubt that 
it would have had support in a fight over the Rhineland. The conflict between 
Italy and Britain over Ethiopia had forced France to choose between the two 
and the choice of Britain meant Italy would not oppose Germany. The United 
States was also unlikely to do anything. Washington still favored appeasement 
in 1936. Not only did the United States fail to condemn the remilitarization, but 
also Eleanor Roosevelt actually wrote an editorial supporting it (Marks 1985, 
970–1). Likewise, the Belgians were strongly neutralist and had just denounced 
their 1920 military convention with France on March 6. Even had Brussels been 
inclined to act, it could not have done much. Belgian air defenses were a shambles 
and the army was in such poor shape that it was even unable to occupy some 
of its critical fortresses (Schuker 1986, 309–311; Thomas 1999, 136). Last, the 
Poles and the Czechoslovaks had no reason to fight if France was not going to 
launch an offensive. In such circumstances, they would bear the full burden of the 
war and likely be overrun. Because of this, Paris was uncertain whether Warsaw 
or Prague would act (Wandycz 1988b, 430). In the end, Belgium, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia all declared fidelity to France during the crisis, but essentially 
waited for France to move (Sakwa 1973, 139).
That left Britain, but the British were unlikely to act even though as early 
as February 1936 they had anticipated the Rhineland would be Hitler’s next 
move. British reluctance stemmed primarily from their position of perceived 
military weakness (Kaufman 1992, 431–33). Robert Vansittart, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, warned that Britain was “in the matter 
of most armaments and all munitions, already weaker than Germany. … [I]t is 
now inevitable that Germany will be ready for aggression long before we and the 
League can be ready for defense” (Ripsman and Levy 2008, 164). To this was 
added a report by the armed services committee which concluded that “the air 
position was deplorable” (Ripsman and Levy 2008, 165). Repeated intelligence 
from the British military attaché in Berlin emphasized the superiority of German 
equipment and rapid rearmament, especially in armored formations and aircraft 
(Great Britain 1990 v. 47, 220, 224, 292, 318, and 382–3). Thus, Vansittart 
warned that Britain would be unable to fulfill the request for aid in opposing the 
remilitarization that France would surely make. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin 
was afraid any action against Germany would anger the working classes in Britain 
and play into Labour’s hands in the upcoming election. Conservative losses in 
this election would undermine the support Baldwin was trying to build in the 
House of Commons for his rearmament plan. For this reason, he had informed the 
French government in February that the Rhineland was not a vital British interest 
(Schuker 1986, 312). This was in line with recommendations by Anthony Eden, the 
British Foreign Minister, who favored buying time for rearmament by appeasing 
Germany and hoped the Germans would move eastward (Adamthwaite 1977, 
38; Sakwa 1973, 131–2). The British were willing to concede remilitarization 
because of doubts that it in any way reduced British security. In a document that 
was otherwise quite hostile in tone towards the Germans and which warned that 
Hitler would repudiate any treaty whenever it suited him, Eden argued that,
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The German government, by the reoccupation of the zone effected on the 
morning of the 7th March, have thus not by that action produced a result, so 
far as the demilitarized zone itself is concerned, which we were not prepared 
to ultimately contemplate. It is the manner of their action … which we deplore. 
(Great Britain 1990 v. 47, 77)
As suggested by Eden’s warning above that Germany would repudiate treaties 
at will, Britain’s unwillingness to start a conflict with Germany in 1936 was not a 
result of underestimating the German threat. The British government was keenly 
aware that Germany posed a serious threat to British security, though not until 
Germany occupied the rump of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939 was it clear 
that Germany had essentially unlimited aims (Kaufman 1992, 431; Layne 2008, 
427). Still, as early as 1933 Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
was warning that Hitler’s administration was “very dangerous” and would build 
up in a way that seriously threatened French security, making “the number of 
years for which real hostilities can be staved off … doubtful” (Ripsman and Levy 
2008, 159–60). In this view, Simon was strongly supported by Lord Viscount 
Hailsham, Secretary of State for War, and more generally by most of the other 
relevant officials and members of the government, including Eden and Neville 
Chamberlain. The British cabinet knew by late 1934 that Germany had over 
300,000 men in military training and was creating an air force which would be 
capable of challenging Britain’s (Ripsman and Levy, 160–6).
Given that British officials were not naïve about the German threat (Hughes 
1988), why was Britain not more assertive? The answer is the Empire was badly 
overstretched and the Cabinet felt they lacked the economic and military resources, 
as well as allies, to act more aggressively (Kaufman 1992, 427–8). Understanding 
Britain’s strategic position is crucial for grasping London’s behavior during 
these crises. With a small military, a global empire to protect, multiple potential 
enemies – Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Pacific 
– Britain was seriously overextended. The Defense Requirements Committee was 
initially unable to determine whether Germany or Japan was the greater threat. 
The treasury made it clear that it was financially impossible to deal adequately 
with both threats (Layne 2008, 404–5). This ultimately led to a prioritization 
of the Nazi threat, in part because the British government believed Japan and 
Italy would attack as bandwagoners only after Britain became engaged in a war 
with Germany. The Defense Requirements Committee stated as much: “Japan 
may yield to the sudden temptation of a favourable opportunity arising from 
complications elsewhere. And elsewhere means Europe, and the danger to us in 
Europe will come only from Germany” (Layne 2008, 412). Thus, Britain opted 
to do nothing primarily because of beliefs about the balance of power rather than 
uncertainty over German intentions. This fits well with the model which predicts 
uncertainty over capabilities rather than intentions will be more problematic.
British officials also believed that it would be easier to oppose Germany in 
the future than in 1936. Britain’s financial situation in the mid-1930s made it 
challenging to deal with the German threat. Chamberlain, both as Chancellor of 
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the Exchequer and later as Prime Minister, believed the economy was sufficiently 
fragile that it was impossible to rearm rapidly without causing further economic 
collapse. This has led Ripsman and Levy (2008, 167–9) to conclude that London 
tried to appease Berlin in the 1930s in order to buy time for rearmament.9 The 
financial situation was so tenuous that Chamberlain felt the British had to trade 
off current rearmament in favor of later rearmament (Layne 2008). In essence, 
if the British rearmed too rapidly, their finances would be exhausted, preventing 
them from building or maintaining an adequate military later when the threat 
materialized. Thus, timing rearmament just right became crucial. Certainly, 
the British did begin to rearm in earnest in 1936 and rearmament was rapidly 
accelerated in 1938 (Layne 2008, 429–35; Ripsman and Levy 2008, 176). In 
essence, there was significant uncertainty around the discount rate, δ, which the 
British and the French believed to be negative (i.e., that time was on their side). 
This is exactly the sort of behavior the discussion about the discount rate in the 
model predicts.10
Because of these beliefs, throughout both the Rhineland and Sudetenland 
crises London’s main concern was to avoid being dragged into an ill-timed war 
by France over issues which in London’s eyes did not threaten British security. 
Thus, during the Rhineland crisis, Eden’s main worry was French overreaction. 
He argued that,
We must discourage any military action by France against Germany … The 
essential thing will be to involve or cajole France to accept [a new Locarno]. 
The trouble is that we are in a bad position to browbeat her into what we think 
reasonableness. 
(Great Britain 1990 v. 47, 81–2)
Eden need not have been so worried in 1936. Paris never formally asked Britain 
for support, likely out of a desire to avoid war until France’s remilitarization was 
complete. Rather than using the crisis to draw Britain into war, it was hoped, 
especially by Gamelin, to use the crisis to gain British aid for French rearmament. 
This strategy proved to be a failure in the years between the remilitarization and 
the Sudetenland crisis (Adamthwaite 1977, 40; Alexander 1992, 259–69).
The Sudetenland crisis, 1938
While France and Britain struggled with rearmament, in 1938 Germany continued 
to alter the strategic balance by annexing Austria in the Anschluss.11 Though this 
certainly concerned the French government, Paris felt popular support in Austria 
for unification with Germany justified inaction and London felt passivity was 
the best way to ensure German accommodation (Adamthwaite 1977, 79–81; 
Kaufman 1992, 432; Young 1996, 29). Also, since there was no chance Austria 
would fight, the crisis never contained the danger of a general European war, 
further encouraging British passivity (Newman 1978, 377–85). By this time the 
British had come to consider East Central Europe as outside their sphere of vital 
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interests (Newman 1978, 372–3; Harinder 1983, 234). Essentially the British 
downgraded their view of the nature of the challenge, while staying concerned 
about Hitler’s aggressiveness. They remained hard pressed to maintain their 
empire and particularly worried about the Japanese making a move in the Pacific 
(Adamthwaite 1977, 229). However, given that the Japanese were tied down in 
the Hanchow campaign in 1938, it is not clear that Tokyo was an immediate threat 
to British interests (Beck 1989, 175–8).12
The issue which did carry the risk of war was the Sudetenland crisis. The 
Sudetenland was an area of Czechoslovakia bordering Germany. It contained 
many ethnic Germans who had legitimate grievances against the Czechoslovak 
government. Bringing these ethnic Germans within Hitler’s Reich had a strong 
appeal for the German people. Also, the region would add important heavy and light 
industries to the German economy, though it would increase the needs for food and 
raw material imports (Science Letter 1938, 213). More importantly the region was 
vital to Czechoslovak defensive preparations as it contained the Škoda munitions 
works and because the Czechoslovaks had fortified the mountains in the region in 
anticipation of war. The defense of Czechoslovakia would be nearly impossible if the 
Sudetenland was surrendered. To allow the Germans to occupy the Sudetenland was 
to write off France’s alliance with Czechoslovakia and weaken ties with the Poles, 
who would then have little reason to trust French guarantees. Given the attractiveness 
of obtaining the Sudetenland, Hitler urged Konrad Henlein, the head of the Sudeten 
German party, to be as provocative as possible so as to bring about a pretext which 
Hitler could exploit (Craig 1950, 27). These provocations created a crisis in March 
1938 which stewed through the summer until its autumn resolution at Munich.
Initially, the French stood firmly behind the Czechoslovaks and, in part due to 
the warnings of their ambassador in Prague, understood that the Sudeten Germans’ 
demands were being orchestrated by Berlin in order to provide a pretext to threaten 
Czechoslovakia (Adamthwaite 1977, 61). In April, the French Prime Minister, 
Édouard Daladier, told the British that Hitler meant to destroy Czechoslovakia and 
that was but the first step. Chamberlain, now Britain’s Prime Minister, remained 
unconvinced (Adamthwaite 1977, 180; Harinder 1983, 239; Lacaze 1998, 216; 
Steiner 2011, 565–6). The problem for the French was that they feared they could 
not win alone (Kaufman 1992, 423 and 433). A Secréteriat Général de la Défense 
Nationale memo emphasized French air and demographic weaknesses and raised 
the possibility of a war against both Germany and Italy. The memo observed that 
“France cannot resist forces three times as numerous” and concluded that in event 
of such a war “British support would be essential” (Steiner 2011, 566). Georges 
Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, was particularly pessimistic (Young 1996, 
30). In April, he had told the American ambassador that France could only expect 
“defeat and dismemberment” in a war with Germany (Haight 1960, 340–1). The 
chief of the French air force shared this assessment, warning that “French planes 
will be annihilated in fifteen days” after the onset of war (Haight 1960, 334).
Because of this, over the summer Bonnet sought aid in confronting Germany 
from the United States, Britain, Romania, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and 
Poland.13 Most remained non-committal at best in part because Paris’ earlier 
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capitulations made them doubt France’s resolve and offensive capabilities 
(Adamthwaite 1977, 197; Thomas 1999, 130–2). As noted by the French military 
attaché in Vienna, “[T]he prestige of France in Central Europe, already gravely 
damaged by the events of 7 March 1936, has emerged from the Austrian affair … 
almost completely annihilated” (Adamthwaite 1977, 77). The Romanian foreign 
minister drove this point home, telling the French in reference to the occupation 
of the Rhineland that “If on 7 March you could not defend yourself, how will you 
defend us against an aggressor?” (Steiner 2011, 160). Not surprisingly, throughout 
the crisis Paris had no confidence that it would receive assistance from Romania 
(Steiner 2011, 603). Of the leaders Bonnet pressed for assistance only Józef Beck, 
the Polish Foreign Minister, promised Bonnet he would go to war with Germany 
if France did (Cienciala 1999, 59).14 The French were not convinced (Steiner 
2011, 596). The US Ambassador to France, William Bullitt, was also skeptical of 
the Polish pledge. He argued that,
“Poland would offer no resistance, either physical or diplomatic, to a German 
attack on Czechoslovakia” and would be glad “to see Germany control 
Austria and Bohemia, and to see Hungary walk off with Slovakia, while 
Poland got ‘frontier rectifications’ in the Teschen district.” 
(Wandycz 1988b, 426)15
Such skepticism was warranted as Beck did not believe France would fight 
for Czechoslovakia and thus planned to use the crisis to extract exactly what 
Bullitt predicted (Steiner 2011, 572). Essentially, the Poles had concluded that an 
effective balancing coalition would not form against Germany and thus instead 
opted to bandwagon (see Chapter 5).
The Americans and Soviets were not much help either. Washington wavered 
between urging appeasement in March, followed by arguing that France should 
hold steadfast in June – though without offering actual support – and finally stating 
in July that it would not aid France (Adamthwaite 1977, 209; Marks 1985, 974–
5; Offner 1977). Likewise, Moscow issued a series of non-committal statements 
over the course of 1938, leading the French to correctly conclude that the Soviets 
would remain aloof (Steiner 2011, 596). Prague had no better luck eliciting Soviet 
support. Moscow evaded requests for aid from Edvard Beneš, the Prime Minister 
of Czechoslovakia, on September 19 and 20 (Lukes 1999, 17–21). By September 
21, the day the Sudetenland was essentially conceded, Moscow had still not made 
a definite commitment (Steiner 2011, 619–22). Though the Soviets ultimately 
mobilized over 40 divisions, the mobilization was kept secret until September 25 
(Jukes 1991, 197–204). The Soviets did not offer unconditional aid until October 3 
– after the Germans had already occupied the Czechoslovak defenses (Lukes 1999, 
20). Presumably Moscow knew its offer was useless at such a late date and expected 
it to be refused. Even had the Soviets committed earlier, their ground forces would 
have had to move through Poland or Romania. Warsaw, worried the Soviets might 
occupy territory Poland had taken in 1919 and 1920, mobilized specifically to 
prevent the Soviets from moving through Poland (Cienciala 1999, 61; Jukes 1991, 
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199 and 205).16 Going through Romania was no more practical (Kaufman 1992, 
433). Its road and rail networks were in poor shape, making it difficult to transit with 
any speed (Thomas 1999, 147).17 Furthermore, although the Romanian general staff 
had approved Russian overflights provided the planes had Czechoslovak markings, 
King Carol II had vetoed the plan (Jukes 1991, 199–200).18
By September this lack of support from France’s potential allies, along with 
fears that Italy and Spain would bandwagon with Germany, caused Bonnet to favor 
peace at any price.19 He told the British ambassador as much (Adamthwaite 1977, 
207; Great Britain 1990 v. 49, 272; Haight 1960, 348). The French essentially 
ceded the diplomatic initiative to the British and agreed that the Czechoslovaks 
must make some concessions (Adamthwaite 1977, 67–70).
The lack of British support was particularly troubling to the French. Britain 
was inclined to appease rather than oppose Hitler and during the spring crisis Lord 
Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, wired Paris that London would not go to war 
over Czechoslovakia and that Czechoslovakia was indefensible (Adamthwaite 
1977, 190; Steiner 2011, 654–5). Even when the crisis reached a boiling point in 
September 1938, the most the French ambassador could get out of Halifax was 
a statement that if France was forced to act that British public opinion would 
wish “[we] do our best to help” though Halifax was also keen to point out he did 
not believe “public opinion would be prepared … to enter upon hostilities with 
Germany” (Adamthwaite 1977, 208). This fit with Bonnet’s impression based 
on conversations with the British ambassador over the summer “that in no case 
will the [British government] allow itself to be presented with a fait accompli” 
(Adamthwaite 1977, 197).
As in 1936, Britain’s desire to avoid war derived in part from the need to buy 
time for rearmament (Hughes 1988, 866–7) and because London did not see the 
territory in question as crucial to its security. Certainly, as of late 1937, London 
still saw the military balance as decidedly unfavorable. A review by the British 
cabinet concluded that France’s military was not yet ready for war and came down 
quite harshly on Britain’s own readiness, stating that,
Our Naval, Military, and Air Forces … are still far from sufficient to meet our 
defensive commitments … We cannot, therefore, exaggerate the importance, 
from the view of the Imperial defense, of any political or international action 
that can be taken to reduce the number of our potential enemies. 
(Adamthwaite 1981, 198)
Come September 1938 at the peak of the Sudetenland crisis, the War Office was 
still arguing that Britain needed to buy time for rearmament (Steiner 2011, 609).
Additionally, British diplomats worried that Hungary, Poland, and Italy would 
bandwagon with Germany or at least extend benevolent neutrality toward Berlin 
(Great Britain 1990 v. 49, 290–1). Consistent with these concerns, the Foreign Policy 
Committee was against a commitment to Czechoslovakia which it characterized 
as a “highly artificial” creation that caused instability and was beyond Britain’s 
power to save anyway, especially after the Anschluss exposed Czechoslovakia’s 
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southern flank (Adamthwaite 1977, 86). Chamberlain concurred that the Anschluss 
had undermined Czechoslovakia’s defenses (Hughes 1988, 866).
Also, throughout the crisis the Dominions were against war and during its 
final stage in September the Dominion high commissioners as well as the prime 
ministers of Australia and South Africa urged appeasement (Beck 1989, 174–5; 
Fry 1999; Weinberg 1999, 6–7). Even had they favored a more aggressive line, 
the Dominions had only just begun to rearm and were still quite poorly equipped 
(Fry 1999, 295). On August 30, the British cabinet unanimously voted to not fight 
for Czechoslovakia if Germany invaded. The British were willing to keep Berlin 
guessing as to their position in the hopes that Prague might get a better deal, but 
that was as far as London was prepared to go (Steiner 2011, 591). Britain’s main 
worry, as seen by Halifax and Lord Stanley, the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, was that France might defend Czechoslovakia, compelling Britain to aid 
France (Harinder 1983, 234–5). From the British view, the key was not containing 
Hitler, but restraining France.
As in 1936, British policy was based on the belief that Germany’s military 
was superior to its own. The British estimated that the Germans had 38 regular, 
18 reserve, 24 Landwehr, and 9 Austrian divisions, for a total of 89 divisions all 
available for frontline deployment, while the allies had only around 60 divisions 
– 2 British, 53 French, but only 30 to 40 actually available in the field, and 21 
Czechoslovakian divisions (Ben-Arie, 1990, 431–2). Especially important was 
that, due to the small size of the British army, Chamberlain was convinced Britain 
could not affect the military situation in East Central Europe (Goldstein, 1999, 
286–7). He wrote to Beneš claiming that “[Resistance] must result in Bohemia 
being overrun and nothing that any other Power can do will prevent this fate” 
(Great Britain 1990 v. 49, 296). Chamberlain was not alone in this assessment. 
Shortly after the Anschluss the British Foreign Office had concluded that “neither 
we nor the French possess the offensive power to prevent Germany from working 
her will in Central Europe” (Hughes 1988, 866). Geography made aiding 
Czechoslovakia even harder. As Chamberlain wrote in his diary,
You have only to look at the map to see nothing that France or we could do 
could possibly save Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the Germans, if 
they wanted to do it. The Austrian frontier is practically open; the Skoda [sic] 
munition works are within easy bombing distance of the German aerodromes, 
the railways all pass though German territory, Russia is 100 miles away. 
(Beck 1989, 183)
Nor was Chamberlain alone in these beliefs. So gloomy was the military’s view of 
the situation that the British Chiefs of Staff had concluded that,
No pressure that we and our possible allies can bring to bear, either by sea, 
on land, or in the air, could prevent Germany from invading and overrunning 
Bohemia and from inflicting a decisive defeat on the Czechoslovakian army. 
 (Beck 1989, 182)
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The British cabinet was fully persuaded by the Chiefs’ views. Lord Halifax called 
the entire report “an extremely melancholy document” and Alexander Cadogan, 
the permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, concluded: “We must not 
precipitate conflict now. We shall be smashed” (Beck 1989, 183).
This despair rested in no small part on pessimism in regards to the relative 
balance of air forces. Throughout the late 1930s London was always more focused 
on home air defense – both in strategy and rearmament priorities – than in the 
military balance on the Continent (Steiner 2011, 604–7). This made the sad state 
of British air defenses all the more troubling and convinced Chamberlain that, 
even if the British army had been larger, it would not reach France rapidly enough 
to matter as German air superiority would quickly compel Britain to capitulate 
(Hughes 1988, 858). Britain had only 10 percent of the necessary antiaircraft 
artillery, and lacked sufficient water pumps, barrage balloons, and searchlights. 
Only one squadron of modern Spitfire fighters was in service (Steiner 2011, 
607). Even Winston Churchill, then outside of the government and one of the 
most hawkish British politicians, believed the Germans had achieved parity with 
Britain in the air by 1935 and had then quickly surpassed the British (Churchill 
1948, vol. 1). The British government believed itself to be outnumbered 3,200 to 
1,606 in first line aircraft (Beck 1989, 184).20 Nor did London expect much from 
the French air force as Gamelin had admitted to them in 1937 the even poorer 
state of France’s air defenses (Alexander 1992, 161). These deficiencies were 
especially disheartening as the British government had spent much of the 1930s 
being truly frightened by the prospect of aerial bombardment. Chamberlain and 
many others in the British government and military believed the next war would 
be won in the air.21 Baldwin had believed bombing to be nearly impossible to stop, 
claiming there was “no power on earth that can protect [the man in the street] 
from being bombed” (Freedman 2013, 126). Likewise, in 1937 Air Chief Marshal 
Hugh Dowdling, commander of RAF Fighter Command, had claimed that the 
bombing of London would cause such panic as to lead to defeat “in a fortnight or 
less” (Freedman 2013, 126–7). Years later Harold MacMillan, who was a Member 
of Parliament during the crisis, remembered that during the 1930s the British had 
“thought of air warfare rather as people think of nuclear warfare today” and that 
as late as June 1940 “the Prime Minister’s office was comforting itself with the 
calculation that there might only be 18,000 deaths per day when the bombing of 
cities began” (Orange 2006, 1014). These beliefs fundamentally shaped British 
strategy in the late 1930s (Hughes 1988).
The French military also overestimated German strength (Ben-Arie 1990, 
434). They assessed available German strength at 116 divisions and 2,760 first 
line aircraft of which 85 percent were of modern design with an ability to produce 
1,000 planes per month. In fact the Germans had 72 divisions, 1,669 first line 
aircraft (out of a total of 3,267 planes, though with only enough pilots to fly 1,080 
of them) of which only 50 percent were of modern design and only 450 planes 
per month could be produced (Ben-Arie 1990, 439–40; Jackson 1998, 236–7).22 
Certainly, a number of German generals did not share London’s and Paris’ view 
that any war would be a German walkover. Werner von Blomberg, the German 
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War Minister, Werner von Fritsch, the Commander in Chief of the German Army, 
and Ludwig Beck, the German Army Chief of Staff, all repeatedly warned Hitler 
in August and September 1938 that his actions were risking a serious defeat (Press 
2005, 152–5). They pointed out that the planned invasion of the Sudetenland left 
only ten German divisions in the West to face 56 French divisions and that only 
1,000 of the 10,000 planned bunkers of the Westwall were completed (Press 2005, 
151). Yet, Paris seemed oblivious to these German weaknesses and rather focused 
on the French military’s deficiencies.
The overinflated estimate of the Luftwaffe’s abilities was particularly disturbing 
in light of the warnings from General Joseph Vuillemin, chief of staff of the French 
air force, that France had no bombers, that only 700 of its 1,126 planes were 
operational, and of those only 27 were “modern” (Steiner 2011, 597). Gamelin 
also deplored the state of French aviation, warning that it would be of little use 
after the war’s initial stages due to “wastage”. The supposed air discrepancy 
particularly worried the French cabinet which believed it needed at least 18 months 
of rearmament to close the gap (Alexander 1992, 165; Thomas 1999, 140–3).23 
Every war scare led to a financial panic which contracted lending further (Steiner 
2011, 601; Thomas 1999, 122–39). Given the French believed time was on their 
side, but only if they could get the necessary loans for rearmament, avoiding 
war or even a crisis in 1938 seemed imperative. The American announcement on 
September 16 that, due to the Neutrality Act, the United States would not deliver 
the 200 planes France had ordered if war broke out could only have added to 
French fears (Haight 1960, 350).
The apparent imbalance in war materiel was not the only source of French 
military worries. Gamelin believed that the German annexation of Austria, by 
adding a new southern front had essentially undone the Czechoslovak defenses 
(Thomas 1999, 125). Certainly, Czechoslovakia’s fortifications along the former 
Austrian frontier were weak (Steiner 2011, 596). Additionally, Gamelin argued 
that the decline of the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia’s alliance with Romania and 
Yugoslavia, meant that there was no way for Soviet aid to reach Czechoslovakia. 
He also pointed out the weakness of Czechoslovak air defenses and concluded that 
Czechoslovakia would only be able to resist for a few days or weeks (Steiner 2011, 
596–7). Further, France’s continued lack of a mobile strike force meant it was 
only capable of defensive operations and not in a position to aid Czechoslovakia. 
Gamelin suggested the most France could due to aid Czechoslovakia would be to 
launch a limited offensive (Great Britain 1990 v. 24, 179–80). This was actually 
an improvement on his views shortly after the Anschluss when he had declared 
that it was “impossible for France to give military assistance to Czechoslovakia” 
(Steiner 2011, 596). Nor was Gamelin alone in the assessment. The Army 
Operations Bureau reflected a broadly held view within the French military when 
it concluded France was incapable of undertaking a swift offensive without “a 
complete reorganization of our army and the restructuring of our military policy” 
(Steiner 2011, 599).
On top of this, Gamelin correctly believed British military planning had not 
focused on how it could aid France, but had rather focused on aviation and naval 
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needs, partially in response to Chamberlain’s preferences (Alexander 1992, 246–
8 and 271). British ground forces available to be deployed to France in the mid 
to late 1930s were estimated to be significantly smaller than those that had been 
sent in 1914 (Alexander 1992, 251–4). Indeed, during a Franco-British summit in 
April 1938, the British has insisted they would only send two divisions to France. 
Though Daladier knew the British were intentionally understating what they could 
contribute, it reinforced the existing French belief that the British army would be 
of little use if it came to war (Adamthwaite 1977, 230–1). Finally, the French 
were convinced that the still incomplete Westwall was a major obstacle which 
would hold up any French offensive designed to aid Czechoslovakia, though 
in fact it did little to slow Allied forces in 1944 when the wall was complete 
(Adamthwaite 1977, 234; Thomas 1999, 127–37). Thus, little could be done to 
aid Czechoslovakia and Gamelin expected its resistance to be brief (Adamthwaite 
1977, 87–8 and 228; Alexander 1992, 281; Great Britain 1990 v. 49, 296). Daladier 
accepted Gamelin’s analysis and repeated concerns about French aviation and 
Czechoslovakia’s weakness to the American ambassador (Adamthwaite 1977, 
231; Alexander 1992, 110–20 and 132).
The balance of forces, however, was much closer than the British and the 
French assumed (Overy 1999, 207). Less than a year later, France fielded 110 
divisions, making the British estimate of 53 divisions seem almost deliberately low 
as France could not have created so many new divisions in such a short time. The 
estimates of German strength were equally suspect. The Landwehr and Reserve 
divisions were of poor quality and few of them were deployed. This left only 45 
German divisions, three of which were to be deployed in East Prussia leaving 
only five assigned to the French frontier. Similarly, given that Czechoslovakia 
alone had 520 planes, the air war would not have been the walkover the French 
air marshals feared (Ben-Arie 1990, 434–40). Both the French and the British 
consistently overestimated how many planes Germany could keep operational 
and tended to look at their air forces in isolation against Germany rather than 
comparing the combined air forces of France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia against 
that of the Third Reich (Steiner 2011, 598 and 607).
However, it is not clear that France would have wanted to fight had they 
believed the military situation to be more sanguine. Daladier told the British at 
an April 1938 meeting that “the military situation was really determined by the 
political situation” rather than the other way around and in May, Bullitt observed,
French and British action … will be based on the assumption that the ultimate 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia is inevitable and that the best that can be hoped 
for is that such dissolution will take place without bloodshed in such a way as 
to save the face of France and England. 
 (Adamthwaite 1977, 243)
Indeed, the British ambassador to Czechoslovakia repeatedly stated the same thing 
in confidential dispatches to London and argued that it was better for both Britain 
and Czechoslovakia to resolve the situation sooner rather than later while some 
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sort of a deal could still be struck which might satisfy Germany and leave Prague 
in possession of most of Bohemia (Great Britain 1990 v. 49, 119–21). This belief 
as indicated above was shared by London and goes a long way to explain why 
over the summer of 1938 London focused more on convincing Prague to make 
concessions rather on deterring the Germans – a strategy Bonnet and Daladier 
agreed with for similar reasons (Great Britain 1990 v. 49, 150–2, 179, 211–13 and 
216). In essence, much like with the Rhineland, both the British and the French 
saw the German move into the Sudetenland as both inevitable and not sufficiently 
harmful to their security to warrant fighting a major war to prevent its loss.
The crisis reached its boiling point in September. On September 7 the Germans 
rejected Czechoslovakia’s offer to accept all of Henlein’s demands and instead 
responded with increased demands and vulgar verbal attacks (Craig 1950, 31). 
Previously there had been hope in both France and Britain that the dispute could 
be mediated, especially if Prague was leaned on to make concessions, but the 
Germans simply upped their demands when concessions were made. Thus, it 
became clear that Hitler would not be content with any concessions short of the 
annexation of the Sudetenland. This behavior fit with intelligence reports the 
British cabinet had received in late August which claimed Germany intended to 
occupy the territory in four to six weeks (Walker and Watson 1994, 13).
Had France’s inclination towards appeasement been based on uncertainty 
about German intentions, the new German behavior would have encouraged 
the French to stand firmly behind their commitments to Czechoslovakia – 
commitments which they had restated publically as late as early September. While 
on September 8 Daladier did threaten that France would march, he ultimately 
backtracked (Adamthwaite 1977, 210). While he was attempting to appear firm, 
Paris asked London to clarify how it would respond in the event France went 
to war with Germany. London’s response was disheartening. On September 12 
Halifax telegrammed: “While His Majesty’s Government would never allow the 
security of France to be threatened, they are unable to make precise statements 
of the character of their future action, or the time at which it would be taken, 
in circumstances that they cannot at present foresee,” leading Bonnet to inform 
the British minister in Paris on September 14 that, “France would accept any 
solution of [the] Czechoslovak question to avoid war” (Craig 1950, 32). Further 
communication indicated that while Britain was prepared to use its air and sea 
assets to aid France, it was only willing to pledge two divisions and would not 
even promise to institute conscription (Adamthwaite 1977, 219). This led three 
members of Daladier’s cabinet, including Bonnet, to threaten to resign if Daladier 
continued to insist upon taking a hard line (Adamthwaite 1977, 220–1).
Thus, London and Paris decided to abandon Czechoslovakia to its fate and on 
September 19 convinced Prague in principle to cede the Sudetenland.24 Though 
there was a brief period when war again seemed possible due to Hitler demanding 
on September 20 that the Sudetenland be turned over by October 10 (Steiner 2011, 
616–24), the French and the British ultimately relented. During this period when 
war between France and Germany seemed possible Chamberlain made his personal 
intervention by bringing about a conference at Munich which he hoped would 
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give Germany “all the essentials without war and without delay” (Adamthwaite 
1977, 223). In reality, the game was up already as a French diplomatic demarche 
on September 27 showed France was willing to accept all of Hitler’s demands 
at Godesberg (Craig 1950, 36). It is not clear that the French ever seriously 
considered fighting for Czechoslovakia. Paris never held military staff talks with 
Prague and when, after the Munich conference, Daladier expressed his disgust 
at the outcome, his lament was not that the military situation had forced France 
to avoid a fight, but rather it had prevented France from striking a better bargain 
(Adamthwaite 1977, 234). He told Bullitt,
If I had a thousand bombers behind me … I would have been in a much 
stronger position at Munich to resist Hitler’s demands, and perhaps we would 
not have been forced to sign what we did sign. 
(Adamthwaite 1977, 243)
Ultimately, the French did not believe Hitler could be trusted, but they did 
not think they could win a war in 1938. Nor did they or the British think the 
Sudetenland was worth fighting for as neither saw Czechoslovakia as a particularly 
valuable ally. Daladier in particular was willing to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to 
help ensure that Britain would in fact be on France’s side when war came (Steiner 
2011, 603). There were hopes in some quarters that time was on France’s side, but 
Daladier’s dispirited view when he returned to cheering crowds in Paris suggests 
that he was not sure of even this. Without strong third party support France simply 
would not challenge Hitler until forced to do so. Given that Prague did not resist, 
Paris was able to delay war. London’s thinking was similar, though the British 
were more sanguine about the prospects of rearmament and even less convinced 
of the value of Czechoslovakia.
The case shows that it is possible to have multiple countries that largely 
understand that they face a real threat but through doubts about the probability of 
third party support, beliefs that the military balance will improve, and beliefs that 
the immediate issue at stake is not worth the cost of war, end up all essentially 
passing the buck – not to another state as is often argued (Christensen and Snyder 
1990), but to the future. France would have been more likely to fight if it believed 
it could count on robust British support, but the British consistently refused to 
make significant military commitments to France or allow French alliances to 
influence whether they would fight Germany. Prague may have been able to drag 
Paris to war had it insisted on armed resistance, though it is possible France would 
have abandoned Czechoslovakia to its fate. Given the irresolute commitments 
from London, Paris, and Moscow, Prague’s decision seems justifiable. The main 
problem was that France could not be sure of British support and that Britain did 
not believe it had vital interests in East Central Europe nor that it could materially 
affect the outcome in that theater. The French knew they had much at stake in 
East Central Europe, but they also knew that given their defensive posture and 
the previous occupation of the Rhineland, there was not much they could do to 
relieve pressure on Czechoslovakia. That would take a major offensive, which 
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as demonstrated by French inaction during the invasion of Poland in 1939, was 
something they had no intention of undertaking. Besides, Gamelin rated Poland 
far more highly than Czechoslovakia, so the loss of Czechoslovakia was less 
disconcerting. Ultimately, doubts that an effective balancing coalition could be 
formed in either 1936 or 1938 combined with doubts that either the Rhineland 
or Sudetenland was especially valuable led both Britain and France to favor 
appeasement over war.
Conclusion
Our theory predicts that uncertainty about capabilities is more of a problem 
in balancing calculations than is uncertainty about intentions. Furthermore, 
uncertainty about the actual balance of power is the most important and ultimately 
defines the importance of the other three uncertainties about capabilities: nature of 
the challenge; timing of balancing; and the necessary size of balancing coalitions. 
On the whole the case fits well with the model as uncertainty about capabilities, 
the impact of the changes to the status quo, and the value of strategic delay all 
played a role.
British and French reasons for not opposing Germany from 1936 to 1938 
primarily lay with uncertainty about both capabilities and the benefits of delay. 
Both powers correctly believed they were lagging in rearmament, though 
crucially there was significant uncertainty and miscalculation as to the balance 
of forces. Both hoped that with sufficient time for rearmament they could rectify 
the imbalance. As mobilizations drained the treasury and there was some hope 
the contest would be more even in the future, delaying a confrontation with the 
Germans made some sense. More importantly the French did not believe they 
could stop the Germans on their own and never felt certain that the British would 
support them. This fits well with the problems associated with uncertainty about 
capabilities and the size of effective coalitions discussed in the model. If the 
French had a different view of the balance of power between the Wehrmacht 
and their own military, they would have been far more likely to challenge 
Hitler. Given their beliefs about German power, opposing the Germans alone 
made no sense. Given French uncertainty about whether Britain would fight, 
the French thus opted to kick the can down the road. The behavior of Poland 
and Czechoslovakia can be explained by the same logic which means French 
irresoluteness also cost them allies among the smaller powers.
Interestingly, and crucially for the ultimate outcome of this case, both the 
British and the French had a tendency to look only at their own forces, not their 
combined forces, in relation to the Wehrmacht and concluded that the balance was 
decidedly against them. How much of this was due to both states’ uncertainty as 
to whether the other would join them in confronting Hitler or was due to leaders 
looking for reasons to justify inaction is debatable.
Likewise, the model also receives support in regard to its predictions about 
the importance of the nature of the move. Neither the British nor the French were 
convinced the relative gains at stake in each crisis were actually a threat to them 
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or that they would be worth the cost of opposing the Germans. In particular, the 
British were focused on the relative balance of air power, and the occupation of the 
Rhineland, Austria, and Sudetenland did little to alter this balance. Given the belief 
that the seized territories did little to undermine British security and bought time 
for rearmament, short-term appeasement appeared to have few costs. Similarly, 
the occupation of the Rhineland did little to reduce France’s security given the 
defensive posture of the French military and changes in military technology.
Finally, uncertainty about intentions played only a small role. Given the 
British were only willing to wage a war in Europe to save France and believed the 
Germans were focused on the east, the British had little reason to oppose German 
moves in the Rhineland, Austria, or Sudetenland. Indeed, to the extent they would 
further encourage the Germans to look east these outcomes were positive. Thus, 
there was some ambiguity about the strategic impact of German actions for the 
general European balance of power. The French viewed the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland similarly. Still, Paris largely saw the threat for what it was, and while 
there were some voices in Britain that argued Hitler was not a threat, most of the 
British government believed Germany was a long-term concern.
Of course, the case does not perfectly mirror the model. One element that does 
not fit is that both the British and the French took a middle approach to balancing. 
They opted to avoid provoking a war, but this is not the same as to claim they 
did nothing. Both were engaged in rearmament, though not at a full-bore rate 
until very late in the game. This differs from the model’s requirement that states 
either decide to balance or do nothing. However, this is a result of simplification 
in the model and as long as it is remembered that reality is always more complex 
than any model, it is not a serious flaw. Additionally, the French reaction to the 
Rhineland remilitarization shows that militaries’ preferred strategies need to be 
considered. The remilitarization strengthened German defenses and weakened 
French offensive options, but since France had ruled out an offensive this did not 
much matter and the territory did not make the Germans that much more of an 
offensive threat to France. Similarly, the case shows that domestic politics played 
a role; however, they are not included in our model. This was done not because 
we believe domestic politics to be unimportant, but rather so that we could focus 
on the role of uncertainty at the international level.
On the whole, the value of modeling and parsing out the various components of 
a threatening move is illustrated by the case. The model helps to better explain the 
dynamics of balancing and buck-passing. The model provides several insights into 
balancing and commitment problems and offers prospects for future developments 
in the research of balancing behavior. Of course, focusing solely on balancing 
leaves unanswered what states do when they do not balance. British and French 
behavior only partially answers that question. At times they both seemed to hide 
and hope the Germans would go east, but they never fully embraced this option. 
Rather they underbalanced rather than hid. Importantly, neither government ever 
considered bandwagoning with the Germans. Yet bandwagoning and hiding are 
real options for states. How states decide among these strategies will be explored 
in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Notes
 1 The Soviet Union was another important ‘land force’ based potential balancer. 
However, it was physically removed from these crises. The newly independent states 
of East Central Europe formed a barrier that made Soviet intervention, even if Stalin 
had been eager for such things, much more difficult. As we will see in this chapter 
and the next, this difficulty was exacerbated by the mistrust that these states had of 
Moscow. Of course, in addition to this physical distance, the ideological distance 
between Russia on the one hand and East Central Europe, Britain, and France also 
played a role (Haas 2014).
 2 A similar situation was created after the Crimean War by the 1856 Treaty of Paris 
which demilitarized the Black Sea and the Åland Islands in the Baltic. Russia found 
these provisions both humiliating and constraining. St Petersburg pushed for its right 
to remilitarize the Black Sea during the Franco-Prussian War. Ultimately, Russia was 
able to sign a convention in London with Prussia, Austria, Turkey, Britain, and Italy 
reversing the Black Sea provision of the treaty. Efforts to obtain diplomatic support 
for the remilitarization the Åland Islands met with much less success as Russia was 
only able to remilitarize them during World War One.
 3 The French army staff came up with an even higher number – 295,000 – and classified 
them all as fully trained soldiers, making the military balance appear far worse than it 
was (Alexander 1992, 259).
 4 Churchill noted that a fortified Rhineland meant the Germans would have a free hand 
in the east during the British debate on the crisis. He did this twice: first on March 26, 
1936 and again on April 6 (Churchill 1948, vol. 1, 204–5).
 5 Given that none of France’s East Central European allies were committed legally or in 
fact to aid France, maintaining their confidence in French strength was an important 
consideration (Young 1996, 18 and 66) and ultimately the remilitarization helped 
undo France’s eastern alliances (Adamthwaite 1977, 41). See Chapter 5.
 6 Since France preferred Germany to move east rather than west, allowing the 
remilitarization made some strategic sense (Sakwa 1973, 130).
 7 Throughout the crisis the French government was convinced of German military 
superiority despite reasonably accurate military intelligence to the contrary (Wandycz 
1988b, 434). The main intelligence breakdown lay in failing to identify crucial 
German shortages in war materiel which made a full German mobilization impossible 
(Steiner 2011, 138).
 8 Such negotiations could have been analogous to those conducted by Russia in the 
nineteenth century as discussed in note 2.
 9 Of course, one can question Chamberlain’s underlying economic assumptions. 
Keynesians would argue that increased government spending would have been 
just what the British economy needed in the 1930s. Certainly, rearmament was an 
important part of the Nazi economic recovery plans.
 10 The same is true for British and French concerns with upcoming elections in 1936. 
Both governments believed that delaying the start of rearmament until after the 
elections was the best way to ensure retaining political support for rearmament. These 
governments both feared that an earlier start to rearmament might cost the ruling 
governments seats in the 1936 elections or even lead to a change of government. This 
in turn would reduce support for rearmament within their respective parliaments.
 11 Austria, like the Rhineland, had intrinsic nationalistic value to the Germans as well as 
relative gains value.
 12 The belief that the Japanese were a medium-term threat was correct as evidenced by 
Japanese attacks on British possessions in Asia on December 8, 1941.
 13 More will be said of Romanian, Yugoslav, and Polish policies in Chapter 5.
 14 The US ambassador to Poland, Drexel Biddle, confirmed the existence of this promise 
to Washington.
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 15 Teschen is the German name for the city known in Czech as Těšín and Polish as 
Cieszyn.
 16 In fact, the Soviet mobilization was mainly aimed at deterring the Poles from attacking 
Czechoslovakia (Steiner 2011, 619–22; Thomas 1999, 148–9).
 17 Nicolae Petrescu-Comnène, the Romanian Foreign Minister, claimed somewhat 
unbelievably that the situation was so bad that no more than one Soviet division 
would be able to transit Romania every 20 days.
 18 However, there is still some debate as to whether the Romanian general staff actually 
authorized these flights (Ragsdale 1998).
 19 Hitler was not necessarily having much more success lining up his allies either. 
While the Hungarians coveted territory in Slovakia, they were not ready for war. 
Also, the Hungarians feared Yugoslavia and Romania would attack them if they 
attacked Czechoslovakia (Ádám 1999; Sakmyster 1973; Strang 1999, 167–8). Thus, 
the Hungarians were still hedging their bets (see Chapter 5). Italy, too, was not clearly 
committed. While Mussolini was fine with Hitler provoking a crisis, he was not ready 
to see Czechoslovakia entirely liquidated (Ádám 1999, 101; Strang 1999, 183). He did, 
however, pledge to fight with Germany if Britain declared war on Germany, though 
given the demands the Spanish Civil War was still placing on Italy, this promise was 
not worth very much (Strang 1999, 176 and 183).
 20 Another British estimate had the disparity at a similarly dispiriting 2,909 planes to 
1,550 (Steiner 2011, 607).
 21 This focus on the air power helps in part to explain Britain’s willingness to fight in 
1939. While the overall military balance between Germany and Britain had widened 
between 1938 and 1939, Britain had significantly narrowed the gap in air power 
(Kaufman 1992, 435).
 22 French estimates on the total number of German planes were reasonably accurate. 
It was the estimates of the planes’ quality and what percentage of the planes were 
operational that were badly overstated (Steiner 2011, 598).
 23 French industrial output in 1938 was at its lowest level since 1928 and was hamstrung 
by frequent strikes (Steiner 2011, 594).
 24 Vansittart had opposed Chamberlain going to Germany to negotiate these concessions, 
likening it to Emperor Henry IV’s trip to Canossa to submit to the Pope (Steiner 
2011, 592).
4 To bandwagon or hide I
A theoretical examination of the 
alternatives to balancing
The preceding chapters examined why and when states balance against challengers 
of the status quo. Left unaddressed was what states do if they opt not to balance. 
Realists have long seen bandwagoning – aligning oneself with the threat to the 
status quo – as the opposite side of the coin to balancing, but as pointed out 
in Chapter 1 other options, most notably hiding, exist.1 This chapter attempts to 
discern what factors makes states more likely to hide or to bandwagon if they opt 
not to balance. It does this by drawing inferences from the balancing models in 
the previous chapters. Specifically, the chapter will work through how uncertainty 
about the distribution of capabilities, the nature of the challenger, and the nature 
of the opportunity influence decisions to bandwagon or hide. Several new factors, 
including geography, institutions, economic ties, and the promise of spoils, will 
also be introduced.
In thinking about the implications of the model in Chapter 2 for whether states 
opt to bandwagon or hide, it will be assumed for the remainder of this section 
that states have already ruled out balancing. This is made for clarity and because 
the factors driving the decision to balance have already been thoroughly covered. 
Though such an order of decision-making may actually occur in some states, 
decisions about whether to balance, bandwagon, or hide are more likely reached 
as part of one ongoing process as will be evident from the cases below.
Before proceeding, it is important to recall that the literature posits two distinct 
types of bandwagoners. Walt (1985), in his Balance of Threat theory, argues states 
bandwagon primarily to protect themselves from a threat, while Schweller (1994) 
suggests states bandwagon because they are revisionist and bandwagoning offers 
them a chance to pick up spoils. These two ideal types of bandwagoners – in practice 
it may well be hard to sort out these various motives for at least some states – could 
value factors differently and therefore each type of bandwagoner as well as hiders 
will be considered. As will be seen below, despite their distinct motives the two 
types of bandwagoners should respond similarly to the various factors analyzed.
Role of material capabilities
The first factor to consider from the model presented in Chapter 2 is the benefit 
from common defense, n
N
xT ( ) , or more precisely the value of common defense 
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relative to the strength of the challenger 
n
N
xT ( ) − +( )α β γ . Obviously, once the 
decision to not balance is taken, no positive contribution to 
n
N
xT ( )  is made. Yet, 
decisions taken thereafter also matter. Hiding does not further alter the value of 
common defense. Whether hiders would prefer a higher or lower value for n
N
xT ( ) − +( )α β γ  is uncertain as it depends on whom they are hiding from: the 
balancers or the challenger. Presumably more revisionist states are more likely to 
be hiding from the balancers and more status quo states are more likely to hide 
from challengers. Of course, states may hide from both balancers and challengers 
hoping to avoid being entangled in a dispute that is not their own. Bandwagoning, 
as opposed to hiding, does alter the value of common defense relative to the 
challenger since bandwagoners contribute military assets to the revisionist side. 
For bandwagoners primarily driven by their own revisionism (Schwellerian 
bandwagoners) this is an unalloyed good. For bandwagoners driven primarily by 
fear of the challenger (Waltian bandwagoners) this is a mixed blessing. On the 
positive side of the ledger, it increases the odds that their side will win in any war 
between the balancers and the rising challenger, but on the negative side it also 
increases the bargaining position and threat posed by the rising challenger.
Despite these various preferences for the value of common defense, the effects 
on the likelihood of bandwagoning or hiding – once a decision to not balance has 
been made – all run in the same direction. The higher  
n
N
xT ( ) − +( )α β γ is the 
less attractive bandwagoning is and the more attracting hiding becomes. This is 
because the challenger is less likely to win any war and less likely to extract 
significant concessions from potential balancers to avoid war. Thus, the rewards 
of bandwagoning will be smaller and less certain while the risks of hiding from 
the challenger will be reduced.
The next material factor to consider is the benefit from national defense 
x cbal
t−( ) − 1 . As with balancing, states receive this regardless of what other 
states do. Its value should simply depend on the benefit of possessing those arms 
compared with the cost of acquiring them. The effect of this factor for both types 
of bandwagoners should be similar. Individual military strength should be useful 
for obtaining more spoils, being successful in any war with balancers, and 
protecting one’s self from the challenger.
The implications of the national defense variable are much more complicated 
for hiders as the cost of acquiring arms for them is not exclusively financial. 
One might argue that states which are hiding would unambiguously benefit from 
a strong national defense and could engage in a sort of armed neutrality. This 
presumably is true for states that are of roughly the same power as the states from 
which they are hiding. For small states hiding from great powers, however, this 
may not be true. To the extent that a balancer or the challenger sees the hiding 
state’s military buildup as a latent threat, the cost of acquiring said defense may 
not be worth it.2 Yet, this does not tell us whether a state will hide, only that a 
relatively weak hider may prefer to not build its military as any security gains 
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from greater capabilities would be more than offset by the greater animosity of 
its far more powerful potential enemies. Thus, while a higher value of common 
defense means states should be more likely to hide than bandwagon, a higher level 
of national defense does not affect the propensity to bandwagon or hide, though 
a preference for hiding could result in a weaker defense under certain conditions.
Nature of the challenger
Whether states opt to bandwagon or hide should also depend on their estimates 
of α, i.e., how revisionist the challenger is. At least initially, increasing estimates 
of revisionism in the challenger’s nature, α, should encourage bandwagoning, 
both for more status quo and more revisionist non-balancing states. A challenger 
with a very low level of revisionism should be easy to hide from and is unlikely 
to provide much in the way of spoils anyway. Thus, there should be no need 
for and few rewards from bandwagoning. As the challenger appears to be more 
revisionist, the threat it poses and potential rewards it offers grow.
At some point, however, this relationship should break down. While an 
incredibly revisionist state should make hiding very unattractive, one could imagine 
that bandwagoning with such a state would also be frightening, especially for 
more status quo, Waltian type states. Most likely, more status quo leaning states 
would ultimately be forced into balancing by an extremely revisionist state, thereby 
preempting the question whether they would be more likely to hide or bandwagon.3 
If such states had determined balancing was a lost cause and yet believed the 
challenger to be so revisionist as to make bandwagoning also impossible, they likely 
would find it best to hide until the last possible moment hoping something would 
turn up and when that failed, to rely on their own insufficiently prepared defenses.
Even revisionist, ‘jackal’ type states in Schweller’s framework might find 
partnering with such a state difficult and dangerous. Certainly, Hitler’s allies ran 
risks of being dismembered or otherwise harmed by Germany – yet, Hitler did have 
allies. The same is true of Napoleon and many other highly aggressive conquerors 
in history – provided those states appeared likely to win. Still, it seems as though 
there must be a point at which even revisionist states would opt not to bandwagon. 
Yet, what is their alternative? Hiding is a poor option in the face of a sufficiently 
powerful state with nearly unlimited aims. True, some might be encouraged to 
balance out of fear, but this too could be a path to destruction. Why risk defeat and 
dismemberment to uphold a status quo it wishes to significantly alter? Surely, it is 
better to take what rewards are available and hope that they will not be swallowed 
up once they are no longer useful. Besides, being eaten last is better than being 
eaten first. Thus, increasing revisionism for the most part should increase the rate of 
bandwagoning and decrease the rate of hiding despite the inherent dangers involved.
Nature of the opportunity
The nature of the opportunity, γ, should also matter. The more the challenger’s 
move threatens the status quo and is done for that purpose, rather than for the 
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intrinsic value of the move itself, the more this should push states to bandwagon 
rather than hide. Revisionist states will be encouraged to seek spoils by a move 
which threatens to undermine the prevailing status quo and heartened that the 
challenger is unlikely to settle for limited gains. Bandwagoning states need much 
of the existing order to be upset for them to obtain spoils. Thus, a challenge which 
does not appear likely to alter the status quo in dramatic ways does not hold out 
much hope for significant rewards for bandwagoning.
Likewise, a limited move is unlikely to threaten more status quo states. 
Remember, we are thinking about states that have already decided not to balance 
or defend, so presumably the move is not aimed directly at them. Thus, an 
opportunity that seems unlikely to upset the overall power structure or which 
is being done because the challenger intrinsically values the move should make 
hiding appear more attractive. This should be true both for more revisionist states 
and more security seeking states.
Expected value of promised spoils
An obvious factor in determining whether states bandwagon or hide is the 
expected value of the spoils being promised. This depends on several things. First, 
the raw scale of what is being offered matters. What is the size and productivity 
of the territory being promised? How much economic or military aid is being 
offered? How valuable are other concessions like recognition of a government or 
the promise of a defensive pact? For all of these factors the more being offered, 
the better as far as the likelihood of bandwagoning is concerned.
Second, how credible are these promises? Can and will the offering state 
deliver? The more credible the offers, the more likely states will bandwagon rather 
than hide. Most obviously this depends on how trustworthy the state offering the 
spoils is. Of course, this may be unknown, but states must make efforts to guess at 
the likelihood that a state will renege on its promises and will base such estimates 
in part on the reputation the promising state has for following through on similar 
promises in the past. Just as important is trying to figure out whether the state 
can deliver its promises. Perhaps the most crucial element of this is whether the 
promised spoils depend upon winning a war – something that is generally true 
of territorial spoils. This is so because states usually offer the territory of other 
states rather than their own as rewards, though there are exceptions to this.4 The 
outcome of the potential war of course almost always matters for states which are 
geographically proximate to the conflict as they risk being invaded. Such states, 
however, could conceivably be fairly confident of warding off attacks while being 
less sanguine about the prospects of conquering the promised territories. Yet, they 
may be able to retain territories given to them by their own allies regardless of 
the war’s outcome. Non-territorial promises may be even less dependent upon the 
outcome of a war. For instance, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines all 
joined the US war effort in Vietnam in large part due to promises of economic and 
military aid from the United States (Shirkey 2009, 186–93). These states knew 
that the aid was guaranteed to arrive regardless of the outcome of the war.
To bandwagon or hide I  71
The credibility of these promises is of course tied back to the relative power 
of the prospective coalitions. The more powerful the challenger’s coalition, the 
higher the odds it will win and the more able it will be to provide spoils. However, 
a very strong challenger would not need to provide spoils as it would not need 
to attract bandwagoners to its side in order to win. Thus, the expected size of 
spoils should have a curvilinear relationship with the challenger’s power, with 
the smallest expected spoils coming from either very weak or very powerful 
challengers.5
Other factors: The roles of geography, institutions, and economics
Three other factors merit consideration: geography, institutions, and economics. 
First, the geographic position of states should also have an impact on their 
decisions about hiding and bandwagoning. Smaller states that are geographically 
removed from potential aid from great powers have a harder time balancing 
against great power threats (Walt 1987). It is not just distance, but the nature 
of that distance. Is the great power challenger positioned such that it can block 
aid from reaching the smaller power? This was certainly true for the states of 
East Central Europe considered in Chapter 5. Germany was positioned between 
them and any potential assistance coming from Britain or France. This made their 
strategic environment fundamentally different from that of say Belgium. Thus, 
perhaps it is not surprising that few of these states opted to balance. Of course, 
a revisionist state could be in a similar predicament where it is cut off from aid 
coming from the challenger. Such a state would be unlikely to bandwagon out of 
fear of being isolated and defeated by balancers.
Yet as suggested above, simply knowing a state is unlikely to balance, does 
not answer the question of what policy that state will actually pursue. Geography 
again helps answer this question. The small European states which managed to 
hide successfully during World War II were all either on the periphery of Europe 
away from the most intense fighting (e.g., Sweden, Turkey, and Portugal) or 
were protected by extremely difficult, mountainous geography as in the case of 
Switzerland (Fox 1959).6 Also, none were the focus of revisionist territorial aims, 
unlike several of the states covered below. This is not to claim such distance 
is necessary. Denmark and the Netherlands for instance both managed to hide 
successfully during World War One and many proximate states tried to hide 
in World War II, albeit unsuccessfully. Nor is it sufficient. Despite being fairly 
removed from the heart of the conflict, states such as Norway, Iceland, and Iran 
were all occupied during the war, the latter two by the allies. Still, favorable 
geography should encourage hiding. Thus, states should be more likely to attempt 
to hide if they are protected by their geography and can reasonably believe the 
fighting will pass them by, whereas states which are cut off from potential sources 
of aid are less likely to align with the coalition from which they are isolated.
Second, international institutions should affect the likelihood states would 
balance. Including the role of institutions is important as international relations 
is an institutionalized domain (Keohane, Haftendorn, and Wallander 1999). Such 
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institutions could include not only multilateral international organizations, but 
also alliances.7 Institutions matter because they can act as fora for communicating 
and coordinating with other states which face the same security challenges. Such 
institutions help reduce the diplomatic isolation that can prompt security seeking 
states to bandwagon or hide. States can find reassurance that they will not be alone 
in opposing the rising challenger nor the only one missing out on potential spoils. 
Also, organizations can help facilitate balancing by mediating disputes between 
potential balancers, reducing transaction costs, facilitating side payments, and 
coercing norm-breakers (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1982; Keohane 
and Nye 1974; Russett and Oneal 2001; Wallander and Keohane 1999). This 
latter factor matters because rising challengers often buck existing norms. The 
upholding of norms, therefore, could facilitate balancing. Finally, such institutions 
can act as a credible check on the aspirations of the rising state by reducing the 
odds that state will be able to provide significant spoils to states which bandwagon 
with it. This means even revisionist states seeking spoils should be less likely 
to bandwagon due to the presence of powerful multilateral organizations. Given 
that such revisionist states make up much of the pool of states which bandwagon 
(Schweller 1994), this effect of institutions is empirically important. Taken 
together, these independent effects of institutions add up to a considerable factor 
in determining the likelihood of whether states balance, bandwagon, or hide.
Finally, states which are economically dependent on the challenger and which 
lack credible substitutes for their economic relationships with the rising state – 
including trade, investment, and aid – are more likely to bandwagon with the 
challenger than are states which have a variety of important international economic 
connections, are economically interdependent rather than unidirectionally 
dependent upon the challenger, or have plausible substitutes for their economic 
ties with the challenger should those ties be severed (Hirschman 1980). Even if 
such states are not compelled to bandwagon with the challenger, they may opt to 
hide rather than balance in hopes of preserving their economic relationships. In 
effect, states which have multilateral economic ties and which are interdependent 
with a variety of states rather than economically dependent on the rising challenger 
are less constrained and have more foreign policy options available to them.
Transcending: The outside option
So far all of the policy options considered have taken the conflict posed by the 
rising challenger as given. In the face of the conflict, states can choose a side or 
try to stay out of it by hiding, but is this a realistic set of options? Can nothing be 
done about the conflict itself? Schroeder (1994) suggests states have another, if 
difficult, option: transcending. Often, taking either side or hiding from the conflict 
will appear unattractive, impossible, or both. For instance, Greco-Turkish disputes 
during the Cold War posed difficult challenges for their fellow NATO members 
who did not want to see a conflict between members weaken the alliance. Taking 
a side or hiding would have done nothing to resolve this issue. Likewise, during 
the run up to the Crimean War, Austria was faced with its closest ally, Russia, 
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pursuing a policy in the Balkans that was highly inimical to Austrian interests. 
Neither opposing nor aiding Russia would help as either policy would weaken 
Austria’s strategic position. The former would mean the loss of an ally and the 
latter the loss of Austrian influence among its neighbors (Schroeder 1972). Hiding 
ran the risk of both alienating the Russians while still losing out in the Balkans. 
Thus, all of the policies considered so far would have proven disastrous.
In such situations and indeed even at times when another option may be 
palatable but well short of ideal, states may try to transcend the situation by 
solving the conflict or radically reorienting political alignments. Obviously, this 
is difficult. Were it easy, there would be peace in the Middle East, no dispute 
over Kashmir, and no frozen conflict zones in the Russian near abroad to cite just 
a few examples. Still, states do often try to find ways out of what appear to be 
unavoidable conflicts and even sometimes succeed. Presumably, such successes 
should be more likely for powerful states dealing with smaller states than for 
states dealing with peers or small states trying to resolve conflicts between great 
powers. Returning to the examples above, the United States, as both Greece’s and 
Turkey’s strongest ally, had many economic and political levers it could use to 
tamp down the conflict between those states, whereas ultimately Austria lacked 
the necessary leverage to find a way to transcend the dispute between Russia on 
the one side and Britain and France on the other. Given the enormous pressures 
and often poor options the states of East Central Europe faced prior to World 
War II, it would not be surprising if they made attempts to find a way out of the 
apparently intractable bind posed by Germany’s rise and Britain’s and France’s 
apparent weakness. Likewise, given these states’ limited leverage, any such efforts 
would most likely fail.
Putting it all together: What factors matter for bandwagoning and 
hiding
Thus, several things should matter for whether a state opts to bandwagon or hide: the 
relative distribution of material capabilities between the challenger’s coalition and 
any balancing coalition; the nature of the challenger; the nature of the opportunity; 
the expected value of promised spoils; international institutions; economic ties; 
and geographic position. The more favorable the distribution of capabilities is 
from the prospective of the challenger, the more likely bandwagoning is to occur. 
Likewise, the more disruptive to the status quo the nature of the opportunity is, 
the more likely bandwagoning is to occur. The nature of the challenger is more 
complex as an aggressive challenger is more likely to fully disrupt the status quo, 
but such aggression may be correlated with less believable commitments – both 
in regards to promised spoils and to not harming allies down the road. Still, it 
seems likely that a more aggressive and revisionist challenger should be more 
likely to prompt bandwagoning rather than hiding. Likewise, weak institutions 
should prompt bandwagoning. Finally, greater and more credible promises of 
spoils, greater geographic proximity to the challenger, and being economically 
dependent upon the challenger all increase the odds of bandwagoning.
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Of these, the model in Chapter 2 suggested the relative distribution of capabilities 
should be the most important factor when it comes to balancing. This should be true 
for bandwagoning as well. If there is reasonable certainty about the distribution 
of capabilities, potential bandwagoners can make fairly informed choices about 
the likelihood of success of a revisionist coalition. Given that any proffered spoils 
would likely depend on such success, the balance of capabilities drives that factor 
as well. It also potentially influences geography as a successful challenger could 
draw closer to a state which is considering hiding if the challenger defeats and 
annexes parts of its opponents that lie in between it and the potential hider. Finally, 
Chapter 2 showed that uncertainty over the distribution of capabilities was far more 
problematic for the formation of a balancing coalition than was uncertainty over 
other factors. The more likely the formation of an effective balancing coalition, 
the less attractive bandwagoning, and the more attractive hiding, becomes. This 
is yet another reason the distribution of capabilities is crucial for understanding 
decisions about bandwagoning and hiding. Ironically, for small states, since they 
can do little to influence the relative balance of forces, these calculations end up 
hinging as much on estimates of the intentions of potential balancers as they do 
on estimates of capabilities directly, though of course as argued above and in 
Chapter 2 the potential balancers’ intentions are driven in no small part by the 
balancers’ own estimates of relative capabilities. Thus, states are most likely to 
worry about uncertainty over the distribution of capabilities and change behavior 
as their estimates of capabilities change. This is not to suggest that changes in 
the other variables would have no effect on a state’s policy; they would. Rather 
it suggests that while changes in all of these variables would be reflected in the 
policies of states, the effects of changes in the relative distribution of capabilities 
would be the most pronounced. These hypotheses are explored in the next chapter 
in cases on Polish, Yugoslav, Romanian, and Hungarian foreign policy from the 
mid-1930s up to their entries into World War II.
Notes
 1 Schroeder (1994) suggests states often try to hide from or transcend threats instead of 
balancing against or bandwagoning with them.
 2 This is the central dynamic of the security dilemma (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978).
 3 See Chapters 1 and 2.
 4 For instance to induce Bulgaria to join the Central Powers in World War One, the 
Ottoman Empire ceded the Maritsa enclave to the Bulgarians (Holden 1976, 163–5). 
Despite being badly defeated in World War One, Bulgaria retained a small portion of 
the formerly Turkish Maritsa enclave.
 5 Though the relationship should be curvilinear, there is no reason to expect that the 
value of spoils would be normally distributed.
 6 Switzerland’s long history of neutrality probably played a role as well, though such a 
history did not protect the Netherlands from occupation.
 7 See Gelpi (1999); Richardson (1999); Tams (1999); and Tuschoff (1999) for examples 
of treating alliances as institutions.
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East Central Europe before  
World War II
The rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s placed the states of East Central Europe 
in a difficult spot. A strengthened, risk acceptant, and highly revisionist Germany 
necessarily altered the security environment of the region and presented the states 
therein with both serious dangers and new opportunities. This chapter examines the 
foreign policies of four of those states: Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. 
These states faced challenges and opportunities far different from those faced by 
Britain and France. They were far weaker vis-à-vis Germany, were in a quite 
different geographic position being sandwiched between two potentially hostile 
great powers,1 and several were revisionist in their outlook. Thus, international 
relations theory and our models from Chapters 1 and 2 suggest they should be less 
likely to balance than the great powers covered in Chapter 3. In actuality these 
states exhibited a wide range of behaviors including balancing, bandwagoning, 
and hiding. All of them struggled mightily with which policy or policies to adopt 
and often shifted from one approach to another in the hope of finding a strategy 
that would work. In the end, the problems they faced proved insolvable. Poland 
and Romania lost significant territory as the result of the war. Worse, all four states 
were occupied by hostile powers and their regimes permanently overthrown.2
While the four states examined do not provide a comprehensive survey of the 
states in the region – the policies of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and 
Greece are not examined – they are a reasonable sample. The four had a variety of 
relationships with the other states in the region, ranging from alliance to enmity. 
Likewise, their relations with France varied. Also, their proximity to and history with 
Germany differed. Finally, one of them was an early target of German revisionism, 
while the other three were potential allies of Germany. Two of the four did eventually 
become German allies, while the other two became victims of Hitler’s aggression. 
Yet, these outcomes with the possible exception of the invasion of Poland were not 
forgone conclusions in the mid-1930s. None of the states fully trusted the Nazi regime. 
All felt threatened by German power and yet at one point or another each cooperated 
with Berlin. In other words, these four states allow for a variety of initial conditions, 
goals, and geo-strategic positions to be explored. Also, their stance toward Germany 
and their proclivity to balance, bandwagon, or simply hide shifted over time. As will 
be seen, these shifts in foreign policy fit well with the above hypotheses. The states 
will be addressed one at a time, beginning with Poland.
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Poland
With the exception of small territorial disputes with Czechoslovakia, Poland in 
the 1930s was a status quo power, possessing significant territories which were 
claimed by the Germans and Soviets.3 Obviously, Poland was too weak to confront 
both Germany and the Soviet Union alone and thus had formed an alliance 
with France in the early 1920s. Events from the mid-1920s onward, however, 
had led Poland to question the value of the French alliance. First, the Treaty of 
Locarno in 1925 had raised the possibility of the revision of Germany’s eastern 
frontiers in return for an acceptance of its western frontiers (Sakwa 1973, 126). 
This, along with France’s refusal to define the nature of the cooperation required 
by the Franco-Polish alliance, weakened ties with France and convinced Józef 
Piłsudski, the leading political figure in interwar Poland until his death in 1935, 
and his ideological heir, foreign minister Józef Beck, of the need for closer ties 
with Germany (Cienciala 1992, 80–2). Worse from a Polish perspective, the lack 
of French reaction to the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany in 1936 
and the subsequent fortification of that region by the Germans raised questions 
both as to France’s willingness to resist German revisionism and also the ability of 
the French army to launch successful attacks into Germany to relieve pressure on 
the Poles in the event of an eastward German move (Sakwa 1973, 129; Wandycz 
1981, 560). The Polish ambassador to France, Alfred Chłapowski, argued that the 
remilitarization would force France to resign its
historic role as a participant in the shaping of the destinies of Europe … 
Central Europe and Poland would as a result of this be compelled to rely 
solely on their own strength; their position would be menaced as in spite of 
the manning of a defense line facing France, the Germans would still have 
enormous military units at their disposal which would be quite sufficient to 
attack other neighbours. 
 (Sakwa 1973, 129)
During the Rhineland crisis Poland, along with Belgium and Czechoslovakia, 
declared fidelity to France and waited for Paris to act. Beck also tried in vain to 
use the crisis to reinvigorate and strengthen the Franco-Polish alliance (Wandycz 
1988b, 435–44). When no action came, Franco-Polish relations suffered 
significantly (Sakwa 1973, 193).
After the remilitarization, Beck placed new emphasis on maintaining good 
relations with Germany. This did not reflect a naivety about German intentions. 
In a June 1938 conversation with the US Ambassador to Poland, Drexel Biddle, 
Beck expressed concerns that Berlin would seek to annex Gdańsk, the Polish 
Corridor, and Upper Silesia. He also expressed concerns about the effects of 
German control of Czechoslovakia should that come to pass. Rather, the emphasis 
on improving relations with Germany was a result of Beck’s fear of Germany. 
Given the reduced likelihood of France protecting Poland, perhaps the tensions 
with Germany could be resolved through diplomacy. Still, throughout 1938, Beck 
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remained willing to fight on the French side if it came to that. Biddle observed as 
much stating that,
Beck, moreover, is aware that the combined armies of Poland, her ally 
Romania, possibly Yugoslavia and Hungary, and even Czechoslovakia, 
would potentially present an effective resistance to a German eastward 
military action, provided the British and French forces simultaneously 
engaged the Germans on the German Western Front. Though Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, fighting side by side might form incongruous military 
bedmates, their geopolitical positions are at least vis-à-vis Germany similar, 
and an actual German aggression might conceivably throw them on the same 
side, particularly if Poland were assured of synchronous [sic] forceful action 
on the part of Britain and France in the West. Besides, in such an event, 
Poland would march not for Czechoslovakia, but against Germany. 
 (Cienciala 1992, 89)
If the French were unwilling to act, however, Beck saw no reason to further 
worsen relations with Berlin as this could only endanger Poland (Prazmowska 
1986, 855; Sakwa 1973, 133–4). Beck had noted to Biddle that he believed 
Britain would seek a peaceful resolution and France would be forced to follow 
suit (Cienciala 1992, 87–8). By the time the Munich crisis came around in 1938, 
Beck was convinced both by previous British and French inaction and by their 
leaders’ current statements that the western powers were unlikely to fight for 
Czechoslovakia (Sakmyster 1980, 153). Specifically, he was aware that Halifax 
had assured the Germans in November 1937 that Britain was not opposed to 
peaceful border changes in Central Europe – a position Chamberlain made public 
in March 1938 (Cienciala 1992, 84–5). He had also come to view the vacillating 
western powers with contempt (Wandycz 1988a, 25). Thus, he felt that he might 
as well use the crisis to extract territorial concessions from Czechoslovakia around 
the city of Těšín, especially as some of the territory Poland claimed was also 
claimed by Berlin and thus in danger of falling into German hands if Poland did not 
advance its claims. Beck did not present the Polish ultimatum to Czechoslovakia 
until after Britain and France conceded to German demands, thereby preserving 
Poland’s freedom of action to fight the Germans alongside the western powers 
and Prague if it came to that (Cienciala 1989, 687–8; 1992, 82). Indeed, a member 
of Beck’s staff told Sir Robert Vansittart, the British Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs explicitly that Poland would fight alongside Britain 
and France if they resisted, but otherwise would annex the area around Těšín 
(Hitchins 1994, 90–1).4 Similarly in April 1938, in a conversation with Léon 
Nöel, the French Ambassador to Poland, Beck had expressed both his worries 
about German expansionism after the Anschluss, his belief that only France could 
stop Germany, and his concerns that France would not act. Beck told Nöel that 
he believed there were three possible outcomes for the Sudetenland crisis. The 
best outcome would be for France and Britain to strongly back Czechoslovakia 
in which case Beck foresaw concessions to German and Polish minorities, but no 
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territorial changes. Barring strong western action, however, Beck feared that the 
worst outcome, de facto German control of all of Czechoslovakia, was a distinct 
possibility. The most likely outcome in Beck’s eyes was the total disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia, in which case Poland would attempt to obtain a common border 
with Hungary so as to coordinate with Hungary in containing Germany (Cienciala 
1992, 86–8).5 This desire for a common border with Hungary – a desire Budapest 
had long shared – led Poland to back Hungarian claims to the Carpatho-Ukraine,6 
though as discussed below in the Hungarian case nothing much came of this 
attempted coordination (Cienciala 1992, 83; Wandycz 1981, 556).
After Munich, Poland continued its attempts to resolve German claims on 
Gdańsk and the Polish Corridor through diplomacy, but with little success. The 
Poles offered to ease German transit across the corridor and to convert Gdańsk 
from a free city under the auspices of the League of Nations to a joint Polish–
German condominium. The Poles also hoped, with German encouragement, 
that when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany materialized, 
the Germans would find the Poles a ready and useful ally (Herman 1980, 581; 
Prazmowska 1986, 857–9). The attitude of Józef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador 
to Germany, was typical in remarking that “the highest bodies in the Third Reich 
are well aware that in resolving the future Russian problem the Germans will not 
be able to take action without us” (Prazmowska 1986, 858).
Certainly, the British were of little help to the Poles in late 1938 and early 
1939. London remained sympathetic to German aims of territorial revisions in 
the east. Beck correctly believed that Britain was trying to detach France from its 
Central European allies and hoped that Germany would move east rather than west 
(Prazmowska 1986, 860). Indeed, even after Britain guaranteed Polish territory 
on March 30, London still pressed Poland to negotiate over Gdańsk and refused to 
grant Poland a loan for rearmament (Prazmowska 1986, 867–8). The whole point 
of the guarantee seems to have been to encourage Berlin to negotiate rather than 
to actually contain the Germans (Cienciala 1989, 688). When newspapers owned 
by Lord Beaverbrook stated that the guarantee did not apply to Gdańsk or the 
Polish Corridor, the British Foreign Office rebutted the claim in only the weakest 
of terms, naturally infuriating Beck and casting further doubt on British resolve 
(Herman 1980, 589). Throughout the pre-invasion crisis, the British and French 
refused Polish offers of staff talks to coordinate military strategy and never would 
commit to attack the western German border (Prazmowska 1986, 869–70).7
Because of this noncommittal stance from Paris and London, as the crisis 
worsened over 1939 Beck seemed more intent to avoid angering the Germans 
than building up his alliances. Beck rebuffed the British suggestion of four-
power cooperation (Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union) out of fear any 
association with the Soviets would simply provoke Hitler (Prazmowska 1986, 
862–5; Strang 1996, 737). In the end, Beck refused to make territorial concessions 
to the Germans and hoped staunch resistance would force them to back down. He 
stated that, “I consider that in the event of any attempt to barter our interest I will 
decisively take action against Germany, against the League of Nations and finally 
against any allied power which would participate in the deal” (Prazmowska 
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1986, 871). He was not alone in his determination to resist. Polish notes from one 
conference with the Germans read as follows:
This enemy is a troublesome element, since it seems that he is losing the 
means of thinking and acting. He might recover that measure once he 
encounters determined opposition, which hitherto he has not met with. The 
mighty have been humble to him, and the weak have capitulated in advance, 
even at the cost of honour. The Germans are marching all across Europe with 
nine divisions; with such strength Poland would not be overcome. Hitler and 
his associates know that, so that the question of a political contest with us will 
not be like the others. 
(Prazmowska 1986, 863)
Thus, Poland moved from balancing against the German threat to limited 
bandwagoning as the odds of British and French aid diminished. Hiding was 
never much of an option due to geographic proximity and the fact Germany 
aimed to reacquire the Polish Corridor. Transcending was briefly attempted by 
suggesting the Germans focus on the Soviet Union which threatened both Poland 
and Germany. In bandwagoning, the Poles both hoped to satisfy limited revisionist 
aims and also to protect themselves from the German threat through a mixture of 
accommodation and making themselves useful to the Germans. When this too 
failed, the Poles fell back on grim resolve, poorly coordinated balancing, and 
ultimately a hopeless military defense. This failure to find a way out led to a half 
century of occupation – first by the Germans and then by the Soviets.
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia entered the mid-1930s with a diplomatic orientation that seemingly 
would have disposed it to balance against a rising Germany. It had been allied 
to France since late 1927 and along with Czechoslovakia and Romania was a 
member of the Little Entente, an alliance created in February 1934 to prevent 
Hungary from retaking the territories lost to its neighbors at the end of World War 
I (Mirkovich 1941, 131). Yugoslavia along with Greece, Turkey, and Romania was 
also a member of the Balkan Entente which strove to preserve the territorial status 
quo in the region.8 This pro-French, pro-status quo orientation was the preferred 
policy of King Alexander I. It was severely undermined by his assassination in 
Marseille on October 9, 1934 by the Bulgarian Vlado Chernozemski in league 
with Ustaše Croatian dissidents during a state visit to France.9
This involvement of a Bulgarian and Croats in the assassination was but the 
most visible sign of the ethnic divisions and regional tensions which weakened 
Yugoslavia in the pre-war period. Though the Serbs were strongly pro-French, the 
Croats and Slovenes were not. Even Croats and Slovenes loyal to the regime were 
far less willing to take risks in the name of confronting Germany and Italy than 
were the Serbs. Throughout the crises which led up to the German invasion in 
1941 the Yugoslav government was aware that if it leaned too far one direction or 
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the other, not only did it risk ruin at the international level, but it also risked civil 
war at worst or waging an interstate war without the support of half of its populace 
at best (Hoptner 1962; Mirkovich 1941, 141; Rothschild 1977, 264).
Alexander’s death led to foreign policy being directed by the Regent, Prince 
Paul, for the remainder of the interwar period. Between June 1935 and February 
1939 he was aided in this by Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović. Though political 
rivals, both Paul and Stojadinović favored a more neutral policy course than 
Alexander had pursued. However, they did so for slightly different reasons. While 
both were ultimately driven to this course by caution, Paul was favorably disposed 
to the Allies, and Stojadinović held a favorable view of Germany. Even before the 
Rhineland crisis, Stojadinović believed Yugoslavia was too weak to effectively 
oppose the rising revisionist powers in Europe. He told Paul on September 20, 
1935 that Yugoslavia needed to lay low and should be “as wise as serpents and 
as harmless as doves … So long as France does not decide which side it will go, 
we have no reason to run out ahead of the great powers” (Hoptner 1962, 36–7).
Both men perceived Italy as the greatest threat to Yugoslavia, but feared direct 
opposition to Mussolini would lead to ruin. For a time, Yugoslavia’s difficulties 
with Italy further undermined relations with France. This resulted from France’s 
efforts to build a Mediterranean coalition to oppose Germany. France attempted 
to mediate between Yugoslavia and Italy, but this resulted only in a growing 
distrust of France in Belgrade (Hoptner 1962, 24). This growing distrust was 
further reinforced by France’s weakness exhibited during the Rhineland crisis 
(Kaufman 1992, 433). Yugoslavia, along with the other members of the Little 
Entente, had encouraged Paris to resist the remilitarization to no avail (Hoptner 
1962, 44). The supine French behavior led Stojadinović to rebuff Leon Blum’s 
attempts to strengthen the Franco-Yugoslav accord, complaining that, “We are 
compelled to reckon with the German danger which you have permitted to grow 
and flourish” (Hoptner 1962, 90). This worsening of relations was not lost on 
Paris. Daladier, at that time serving as the French Minister of Defense, noted 
that the French “attitude to the events of 7 March had shaken the Little Entente” 
(Alexander 1992, 81).
Discussions with Britain were at least as discouraging. In May 1936, Boźidar 
Purić, the Yugoslav Ambassador to France, sounded out the British to see if they 
would be of more help in countering the Italian threat. The replies he got from 
Eden were so discouraging as to any role that Britain was likely to play in the 
coming struggle, he reported to Stojadinović that “certain circles in London have 
given up … and liquidated the agreement with France” (Hoptner 1962, 51).
This downgrading of French and British support led Belgrade to try to 
assume a more neutral stance.10 First, Stojadinović tried to reduce Yugoslavia’s 
commitments to Czechoslovakia – most noticeably by rebuffing Beneš’ attempts to 
turn the Little Entente into a general defense pact (Mirkovich 1941, 134). Second, 
hard on the heels of the Rhineland crisis, Yugoslavia and Italy signed several 
agreements in 1936 and 1937, including a non-aggression pact, a trade agreement, 
and a settlement of border disputes (Adamthwaite 1977, 46–7; Alexander 1992, 
220–1; Hoptner 1962, 57–82). Finally, Stojadinović turned to Berlin for help in 
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resisting the Italians. The Germans were eager to mediate the dispute and also 
offered an economic aid package. Stojadinović was relieved that aid could be 
found in Germany if needed, but declined the mediation for the present, preferring 
to chart a neutral course (Hoptner 1962, 46–7 and 87–8).11 Stojadinović justified 
this more neutral course in a conversation with Purić in March 1937 by stating that 
given France’s “lack of firmness in dealing with Germany on the question of the 
Rhineland … one can understand why we want to achieve a policy of equilibrium 
in relations with all the great powers. A relationship which will not blindly bind 
us to any one of them” (Hoptner 1962, 91). In other words, Stojadinović now 
lacked confidence that France would effectively oppose Germany, and therefore 
Yugoslavia could not rely solely on the French alliance but rather must have a 
more independent stance so that it could reposition itself diplomatically as needed. 
He was not seeking an alliance with Germany.
The Germans made several efforts to turn this movement toward neutrality 
into a pro-Axis stance. Berlin hoped to be able to weaken Yugoslavia’s ties to 
Czechoslovakia and France. As part of a diplomatic offensive in 1936 aimed 
mainly at winning over Romania, the Germans attempted to woo the Yugoslavs 
as well – even at the expense of German–Hungarian relations (Sakmyster 1980, 
72–5). Ultimately, the Germans shifted tactics and tried to undo the Little Entente 
by bringing about Hungarian–Yugoslav rapprochement. Hermann Göring went as 
far as visiting Yugoslavia in November 1937 (Sakmyster 1980, 109). The effort 
bore limited fruit as the Stojadinović regime insisted on remaining neutral.12
The Germans were even less successful in getting Belgrade to abandon Prague. 
Even though Stojadinović had opposed Beneš’ attempts to increase Yugoslavia’s 
commitment to Czechoslovakia, his government was in no way favorable to the 
destruction of Czechoslovakia. The potential dismembering of Czechoslovakia 
posed a serious threat to Yugoslavia. Not only would the already threatening 
power of Germany grow, but also a strong Czechoslovakia was key to keeping 
Hungarian revisionism in check. Indeed, Hungary could potentially benefit 
directly from the division of Czechoslovakia by annexing parts of Slovakia. Nor 
was this all; Yugoslavia imported much of its military equipment from the Škoda 
munition works in Czechoslovakia (Rothschild 1977, 263; Wandycz 1981, 554). 
Finally and most ominously, the fragmentation of an ethnic polyglot state like 
Czechoslovakia would set a dangerous precedent for the even more ethnically 
diverse Yugoslav state (Rothschild 1977, 259–63).
Thus, prior to the Sudetenland crisis, Yugoslavia was neutral at best from a 
German perspective. Berlin was no doubt pleased that Yugoslavia, much like 
Poland, Hungary, and Romania, did not oppose the Anschluss, even though it 
brought the Germans up to the Yugoslav border and weakened Czechoslovakia’s 
defensive position (Sakmyster 1980, 117–19). This equivocal stance on the 
Anschluss on Belgrade’s part was due more to the fact that it meant Italy’s influence 
in Austria was broken and the threat of a Habsburg restoration fully eliminated 
than to any skillful German diplomacy (Hoptner 1962, 110–12). The weakened 
Italian position led the Yugoslav General Staff to conclude that Germany and not 
Italy was now the biggest threat facing Yugoslavia (Hoptner 1962, 114).
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When the Sudetenland crisis first erupted in the spring of 1938, Belgrade 
initially indicated a willingness to back Prague. During the May phase of the 
crisis, Stojadinović assured Kamil Krofta, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, 
that Yugoslavia would hold Hungary in check (Sakmyster 1980, 168). Yet, 
the Yugoslavs apparently continued to play both sides, saying one thing to the 
Czechoslovaks and Romanians and another to the Italians and Germans (Sakmyster 
1980, 186). Contrary to Stojadinović’s reassurances to the Czechoslovaks, both 
Göring and Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, in an attempt 
to get the Hungarians to pressure Prague, insisted Stojadinović had told them 
that if war resulted Yugoslavia would remain neutral (Sakmyster 1980, 174). 
The main problem was that Paul did not see how Yugoslavia could do much to 
help Czechoslovakia without Italian neutrality and robust French and British 
action, conditions that seemed less and less likely to be fulfilled as the crisis 
unfolded (Hoptner 1962, 114–17). Ultimately, as it became clear in the autumn 
that Czechoslovakia would be forced to concede, Belgrade did what it could to 
minimize the damage. On September 20, 1938, along with the Romanians, the 
Yugoslavs agreed to moderate improvements in the treatment of ethnic Magyars 
in their territories in the hopes of preventing Hungary from being allowed to annex 
the entire Felvidék region of Slovakia (Hoptner 1962, 113–17; Sakmyster 1980, 
202–3). Even so, Belgrade never relented to Berlin’s insistence that it declare 
itself neutral in the event of a war over the Sudetenland (Hoptner 1962, 117). The 
policy of steering a middle course continued.
The signing of the Munich Pact in October 1938 eliminated Czechoslovakia 
as a military power and thus completely undid the Little Entente. With one of its 
potential allies hopelessly crippled and it clear that France would not intervene 
effectively in the affairs of East Central Europe, any hope for Yugoslavia being able 
to balance against the rising Fascist powers was permanently removed. Purić in 
particular was now convinced that all British and French promises were worthless, 
making it vital for Yugoslav policy to remain flexible (Hoptner 1962, 119).
Stojadinović’s instincts were to move closer to the Axis camp. In conjunction 
with the Romanians, he scrambled to make the Balkan Entente appear to be 
consistent with German aims (Mirkovich 1941, 135). Yugoslavia even slowed 
rearmament – in part because it no longer had a place to purchase arms from – but 
also out of fears that rearmament would provoke the Germans (Mirkovich 1941, 
131). These pro-Axis policies, combined with the proto-Fascist orientations 
of Stojadinović’s domestic supporters, led Paul to conclude Stojadinović was 
a danger that needed to be removed. Paul, therefore, replaced Stojadinović as 
Prime Minister with Dragiša Cvetković in February 1939 (Hoptner 1962, 120–2, 
128 and 229).13
The strategic situation continued to deteriorate over the course of 1939. Italy 
occupied Albania in April and by June Paul was convinced a European war was 
inevitable. Growing German influence in the Balkans resulted in Belgrade striking 
a trade and military aid agreement with Berlin on July 5 (Steiner 2011, 953). 
Despite these closer ties, Belgrade resisted German pressure to leave the League 
of Nations and join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Instead, Belgrade declared to all the 
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great powers that it would remain neutral and unarmed in any upcoming conflict 
(Hoptner 1962, 143 and 147).
Despite this professed neutrality, under Paul’s direction Belgrade continued to 
try to find ways to productively cooperate with the Allies. Right after the German 
invasion of Poland in September 1939, Paul asked the French to occupy Salonika 
in Greece to preserve Yugoslavia’s last remaining supply line to the West. The 
French declined, saying it would take three months to find the necessary troops, 
and the British opposed the move as they feared it would bring Italy into the war 
on the German side (Hoptner 1962, 170). Despite this setback, Belgrade continued 
inconclusive military talks with Paris right up to the French collapse in May 1940 
(Hoptner 1962, 171–80).14
France’s defeat was but the first of a series of events between May 1940 and 
March 1941 which made Belgrade’s position increasingly untenable. In June 
1940, the Soviet Union occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in Romania, 
pushing Romania toward the Axis camp and opening up the question of further 
territorial revisions in the Balkans. This was quickly followed in August by the 
Second Vienna Award in which Hungary received Transylvania from Romania 
through the arbitration of Germany and Italy. Bulgaria knuckled under to German 
pressure and acceded to the Tripartite Pact in September. October brought the 
Italian invasion of Greece from Albania, potentially threatening Salonika. The 
German military moved into Romania in January 1941 and then into Bulgaria 
in early March, completing Yugoslavia’s encirclement. The difficult position in 
which these events placed the Yugoslav government was aptly summarized by the 
Foreign Minister, Aleksandar Cincar-Marković:
From the moment of the military action of Soviet Russia and the annexation 
of Bessarabia the difficulties of the Royal Government became apparent. This 
led to open territorial requests by Bulgaria and Hungary. The situation became 
worse with the Vienna arbitration and the German military penetration of 
Rumania, upon which Italy’s war on Greece followed. It is clear that under 
those conditions we today are not in the position to lead any other policy but the 
policy of self-defense: our country is not in the position to carry on a war except 
in the case of foreign aggression. Our efforts to maintain peace in the Balkans 
were unsuccessful. Under present circumstances we are forced to find a solution 
bargaining with Germany on a diplomatic plan, a solution which will permit us 
to continue a policy of peace, safeguarding our vital national interests. 
(Mirkovich 1941, 136)
Yugoslavia’s bind was equally apparent to outsiders. After Paul had refused to 
meet with Eden in January 1941 out of fear of provoking the Germans, Churchill 
commented to Eden that “Prince Paul’s attitude looks like that of an unfortunate 
man in the cage with a tiger, hoping not to provoke him while steadily dinner-time 
approaches” (Churchill 1948, v.3, 158).
Given the increasingly deteriorating situation, much of the cabinet shared 
Cincar-Marković’s outlook and began to favor some sort of accommodation of 
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Germany, though Paul remained inclined to support Britain (Hoptner 1962, 183). 
This led to a two-track policy. On the one hand, Belgrade was secretly supplying 
the Greeks with arms to fight the Italians, while denying the Germans the ability 
to ship armaments through Yugoslavia to the hard-pressed Italians (Hoptner 1962, 
191–2). On the other hand, Belgrade initiated negotiations which appeared to be 
moving it toward the Axis camp. When pressured by Berlin to join the Tripartite 
Pact, rather than refusing outright Belgrade haggled over terms. In November 1940 
the Germans offered Salonika and a guarantee of Yugoslav borders in exchange for 
demilitarizing Dalmatia and joining the Tripartite Pact. After cutting off aviation 
supplies to Belgrade, the Germans repeated the offer in February 1941. Both 
times the Yugoslavs declined without ending the negotiations. Indeed, they even 
offered to mediate the Greco-Italian dispute (Hoptner 1962, 189–92 and 208–9; 
Mirkovich 1941, 137; Rothschild 1977, 263). Belgrade appears to have known 
that entering the Pact would have been the end its freedom of action and a threat to 
its independence. The Yugoslav government was particularly insistent that in no 
circumstance would it allow German troops to transit through the country on the 
way to Greece, a condition Hitler was willing to accept (Rothschild 1977, 263). 
Paul stated this condition directly to Hitler and Cvetković reassured the American 
ambassador that Yugoslavia would never allow the German military to transit 
(Hoptner 1962, 204). While these talks were ongoing, Yugoslavia successfully 
negotiated a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Hungary in December 
1940. The deal had the virtue of accommodating the Axis powers without actually 
conceding anything (Hoptner 1962, 192).
By March, negotiations had consciously become a way to stall for time while 
hoping the situation improved. Given that Belgrade had intelligence – which they 
passed along to the British – that the Germans planned to invade the Soviet Union 
in May, stalling offered some prospect of success (Hoptner 1962, 225). Given that 
Paul and much of his cabinet believed the Allies would win in the end, the key was 
managing to not be invaded and overrun before the Germans were forced to turn 
their attentions elsewhere (Hoptner 1962, 235).
Frankly, stalling was the only option. Repeated attempts to sound out the 
British as to whether they would be able to deploy more troops to Greece and 
the Balkans in the event Yugoslavia joined the war on the side of the Allies were 
met with silence.15 London promised financing and war materiel, but no troops, 
which given the speed with which and multiple direction from which Axis troops 
could pour into Yugoslavia was as good as promising nothing at all (Hoptner 
1962, 211 and 224; Mirkovich 1941, 144).16 The General Staff confirmed the grim 
situation in a report to an emergency session of the crown council on March 6. The 
military informed the gathered ministers that in the event of a German invasion 
the north of the country and major cities would be lost immediately. The army 
could retreat to the mountains in Bosnia, but had ammunition and provisions to 
last only six weeks. There was no hope of resupply. On top of this, the Croat and 
Slovene populations were known to favor concessions and were unlikely to resist 
except possibly against the most naked aggression. Rapid defeat was unavoidable 
(Hoptner 1962, 217 and 235).17
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Given this, the council decided to join the Tripartite Pact provided the Germans 
accepted several conditions. One, that Yugoslav territorial integrity would be 
respected. Two, no Axis troops would transit through Yugoslavia. Three, the 
Yugoslav forces would not have to participate in fighting the Greeks. And four, 
Yugoslavia would be guaranteed access to the Aegean via Salonika (Hoptner 
1962, 217). It was hoped that negotiations over these conditions would buy 
additional time, but the Germans derailed that hope by quickly agreeing to all four 
conditions on March 19 (Hoptner 1962, 233 and 240–1; Mirkovich 1941, 139).18 
Thus cornered, the government joined the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941.
This set off a chain of events which quickly and disastrously brought 
Yugoslavia into the war. The Pact was deeply unpopular amongst the Serbian 
portion of the population and on March 27 the predominately Serbian Air Force 
conducted a coup – ostensibly in the name of the young King Peter II – which 
brought to power a government headed by General Dušan Simović (Mirkovich 
1941, 138–40). The new government repudiated the Pact, though it still naively 
hoped to avoid war. It refused to mobilize the military out of fear of provoking the 
Germans, unaware that Hitler had authorized the invasion of Yugoslavia within 
hours of learning of the coup (Hoptner 1962, 265–7 and 274; Mirkovich 1941, 
144; Rothschild 1977, 266). The Simović government vainly looked for some 
formula to avoid war, even considering the policies of the previous government it 
had come to power in order to repudiate. Though it did manage to get the Soviets 
to sign a treaty of friendship (Hoptner 1962, 274 and 285), the die was already 
cast. The Axis powers invaded on April 6 and quickly routed the Yugoslav forces. 
The army unconditionally surrendered on April 17. As with Poland, Yugoslavia 
had failed to find a way to successfully navigate the shoals of the coming of World 
War II. Its government was overthrown never to return to power and its territory 
was occupied and divided amongst its enemies. Only after years of brutal guerilla 
warfare would Yugoslavia regain its independence albeit under a new regime.
Romania
Romania entered the 1930s as a status quo power. Having gained Transylvania 
from Hungary, Bessarabia from the Soviet Union, and southern Dobruja from 
Bulgaria between 1913 and 1919, Romanian officials simply hoped to hold onto 
what they already had. To this end, in the immediate post-war period Romania 
had formed the Little Entente with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which aimed 
at containing Hungarian revisionism, and had also developed close relations with 
France (Hitchins 1994, 427–8).19 Still, Romania was far from secure and given 
that changes to the status quo risked the loss of territory, Bucharest could only 
see the rise of Nazi Germany as a destabilizing threat. These fears increased when 
Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös began seeking closer relations with 
Germany in the early 1930s (Leitz 1997, 315). Officials in Bucharest were initially 
unsure how to react: King Carol II leaned towards improving relations with 
Germany to offset Hungarian influence while Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu 
favored strengthening the Little Entente and ties with France. Titulescu’s views 
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carried the day through 1934 (Leitz 1997, 314–15). Indeed, Romania backed 
the western powers in their confrontation with Italy over Ethiopia and Romania 
supported France during the crisis over the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 
1936 (Hitchins 1994, 429–30).
Romania also took steps to strengthen its alliances. Between 1931 and 
1934, Bucharest renewed its treaty with Poland aimed at the Soviet Union20 
and strengthened the Little Entente by transforming it into one trilateral treaty 
as opposed to three bilateral ones, though the opposition of Yugoslav Prime 
Minister Milan Stojadinović and the insuperable difficulties of getting military 
aid to Czechoslovakia in the event of a German invasion prevented Titulescu from 
turning the Little Entente into an anti-German alliance (Hitchins 1994, 430–3; 
Wandycz 1981, 561–2).21 Under Titulescu’s leadership, Romania also participated 
in the creation of the Balkan Entente which was aimed at curbing Bulgarian 
revisionism and consisted of Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey (Hitchins 
1994, 430–3). Additionally, Bucharest attempted to bring Poland into the Little 
Entente by mediation of Polish–Czechoslovak grievances, but ultimately both the 
mediation and the attempt to bring Poland into the alliance failed, in no small 
part due to Poland’s good relations with Hungary (Hitchins 1994, 430; Steiner 
2011, 744–5). Likewise, attempts to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviets at 
the urging of the French also ultimately failed (Hitchins 1994, 435).22 Still, these 
efforts show that through 1936, Romania was solidly in the camp of balancing 
states and was actively trying to improve the odds that balancing would succeed 
by attempting to transcend the obstacles to broader and more effective alliances in 
East Central Europe. What happened?
Bucharest was repeatedly disappointed by the lack of French resolve and 
continued concessions to Berlin. As early as the Treaty of Locarno in 1925, 
Britain and France had shown a willingness to make concessions to German 
revisionist aims, especially in the east. By the mid-1930s, France was also having 
difficulty meeting Romania’s armaments needs (Steiner 2011, 402). This, and 
even more so France’s supine behavior in the face of the remilitarizations of the 
Rhineland, caused Bucharest to drift away from France and toward Germany, 
ultimately resulting in the dismissal of the pro-French Titulescu (Alexander 
1992, 81; Hitchins 1994, 431 and 436–7; Rothschild 1977, 312). Whereas before 
Bucharest had sought to shore up alliances in the region, Carol now rebuffed 
Poland’s attempt in April 1937 to create a Polish, Romanian, Bulgarian, and 
Hungarian bloc (Hitchins 1994, 438–9).23 Additionally, a French effort to convert 
the Little Entente from an anti-Hungarian pact to a general defensive pact was 
rebuffed by all three members of the alliance (Adamthwaite 1977, 46–7). Still, 
Berlin’s attempts in 1937 to get Bucharest to definitively move from the French to 
the German camp failed (Sakmyster 1980, 76). Romania was still hedging its bets.
The Munich crisis greatly altered the Romanian position. During the crisis 
Romania wavered from allowing Soviet overflights to aid the Czechs to ultimately 
disallowing them out of fear of Germany (Adamthwaite 1977, 204; Hitchins 1994, 
439).24 Romania’s main concern, once it was clear Britain and France would not 
stand behind Czechoslovakia, was to limit any Hungarian gains in Slovakia.25 
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It was the effects of the crisis, however, which were vital. First, the German 
seizure of the Škoda munitions works removed the only serious alternative 
source of arms, making Romania dependent on Germany for armaments (Leitz 
1997, 321–2; Wandycz 1981, 554). Roughly 70 percent of Romanian military 
imports had come from Czechoslovakia and imports from France were very slow 
in arriving (Adamthwaite 1977, 64). Second, and more importantly, the loss of 
the Sudetenland effectively removed Czechoslovakia from the military board and 
thus undid the Little Entente, Romania’s surest protection against a revisionist 
Hungary. The Romanian general staff admitted as much on October 17, 1938, 
stating that while “the Little Entente is not officially dissolved, it is in practice now 
non-existent owing to the amputation of Czechoslovakia” (Leitz 1997, 322). Third, 
French influence in Romania in particular collapsed after Munich (Hoisington 
1971, 470). Carol’s visit to Paris and London in November 1938 did nothing 
to reassure Bucharest. It became clear neither western power would commit to 
military or economic aid for Romania. This in turn prompted Carol, who was now 
convinced only Germany could protect Romania, to make an unscheduled stop in 
Berlin on the way home, in hopes of improving relations and getting the Germans 
themselves to oppose Hungarian aims in the Carpatho-Ukraine. However, little 
came of the meeting and Romanian worries about the Carpatho-Ukraine only 
increased when Germany occupied the rump of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 
(Hitchins 1994, 440; Leitz 1997, 322–4).
This, combined with stiffening French and British resolve in the face of obvious 
German aggression – notably the territorial guarantee to Poland in late March – 
in turn prompted Carol to appoint the pro-Western Grigore Gafencu as Foreign 
Minister and to accept a French and British guarantee of Romanian territory on 
April 13, 1939 (Hitchins 1994, 440–3; Leitz 1997, 325). However, rather than 
attempting to balance in conjunction with France or members of the Little Entente 
as before, Romania simply attempted to hide from the coming storm. Crucially, 
the guarantees required nothing from Romania. Had Romania needed to take pro-
Western actions in return, it is unlikely that the Romanians would have accepted 
the guarantees. Neither Carol nor Gafencu believed the western powers could 
protect Romania but hoped the guarantees might increase Bucharest’s leverage 
in negotiating with the Germans (Steiner 2011, 744–5). Therefore, in addition 
to accepting guarantees from Britain and France, Bucharest also signed an 
economic treaty with Berlin on March 23, 1939 (Hitchins 1994, 441). The treaty 
guaranteed a market for Romanian oil and agricultural products and contained 
German promises to deliver armaments and invest in Romanian mines and oil 
fields (Steiner 2011, 729). As Carol informed the German ambassador, Wilhelm 
Fabricius, Bucharest intended to remain neutral in the event of war and Romania 
refused to promise aid to Poland in the event of war with Germany (Hitchins 1994, 
442–3; Leitz 1997, 325; Steiner 2011, 747). Additionally, Romania completed its 
abandonment of the Little Entente by signing a non-aggression pact with Hungary 
on August 24, 1939 (Hitchins 1994, 443).
Both German and Western protection proved illusory. The Molotov–Ribbentrop 
Pact shocked Bucharest and eliminated the chance Germany would protect 
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Romania from the Soviets (Hitchins 1994, 443). Likewise, the fall of Poland in 
September 1939 showed the impotence of French and British guarantees and 
removed yet another potential Romanian ally from the board. Worse, with the new 
German–Soviet coordination, Romania had nowhere to turn for allies as now all 
of the states which had revisionist claims on its territory had good relations with 
Germany (Leitz 1997, 327–8). The most the Romanians could hope for was that 
compliance with German wishes would convince Hitler to keep their enemies 
at bay. Thus, Bucharest increased oil exports to Germany in return for captured 
Polish war materiel, though the Romanians also let many Poles including members 
of the government flee into or through its territory (Leitz 1997, 328–30). Further, in 
December 1939, Romania adjusted its exchange rate with Germany so as to reduce 
the cost of its oil to the Germans (Hoisington 1971, 472). German successes over 
France in 1940 simply rammed home the obvious helplessness of the Romanian 
position and led to further increases in the amount of oil provided to the Germans 
(Hitchins 1994, 445). Still, Carol resisted joining the German camp.
Then on June 28, 1940 Hitler allowed the Soviets to occupy Bessarabia, as 
agreed to in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and northern Bukovina, which had 
not been agreed to.26 This loss of territory turned Romania into a revisionist 
state. Joining the Axis now seemed the best way to recover the lost territories, 
so Romania took a dramatic series of actions in July. Bucharest renounced the 
clearly worthless British and French guarantee on July 1, left the League of 
Nations on July 11, and publically indicated a desire to join the Axis on July 
13 (Rothschild 1977, 314). Yet, this did not prevent further dismemberment, 
this time by Germany’s Balkan allies. As a result of the Second Vienna Award, 
Hungary occupied much of Transylvania in August and Bulgaria obtained all of 
southern Dobruja in early September. Both territories were transferred as a result 
of German “mediation” and as with the loss of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, 
Romania failed to resist the transfers.
These territorial losses resulted in Carol being removed from power via a coup 
on September 6 and the installation of his son Michael as king. However, the real 
power lay in the hand of the military government of Ion Antonescu which quickly 
joined the Tripartite Pact on November 20, 1940 in hopes of currying favor with 
the Germans so that the lost territories could be won back (Hitchins 1994, 447–
50; Rothschild 1977, 315–16). From the outset of the Antonescu regime Hitler 
was certain of Romania’s allegiance as Antonescu had come to power to recover 
Romania’s lost territories or acquire new territories as compensation. His regime’s 
legitimacy and survival depended upon this and yet it could only be achieved if 
the Axis powers triumphed over the Soviet Union.27 Ultimately, Romania would 
send more troops to the Eastern Front than any other of Hitler’s allies and while 
the Germans were in ascendency over the Soviets, Bucharest did briefly recover 
Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and was awarded Transnistria as compensation 
for the concessions it had to make to other German allies.
Thus, the Romanians moved from attempting to balance against German, 
Soviet, and Hungarian revisionism to hiding and then finally to bandwagoning 
with the German threat. A deep desire to recover lost territory played a major role, 
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but by late 1940 all options other than suicidal military resistance were essentially 
eliminated. The shift occurred as it became clear the western powers lacked the 
resolve and then the ability to effectively balance. Romania attempted to hide for 
much of the period and never actively balanced after the Rhineland crisis, largely 
because British and French resistance to revisionism in East Central Europe was 
so weak. Certainly, after each display of weak resolve or military inaction by the 
western powers, Romania crept ever deeper into the German camp. Not being in 
any way territorial revisionist at the start of the 1930s, the Romanians did not 
actually bandwagon until after their territorial losses in the summer of 1940. Prior to 
that, bandwagoning offered little in the way of spoils as Romania was still a deeply 
status quo power. Western weakness ruled out balancing, but hiding remained more 
attractive than bandwagoning. Only after the severe territorial losses of 1940 did 
Bucharest decide to bandwagon. The hope was that allying with Germany would 
result in recovering territory not only from the Soviet Union via invasion, but also 
from Hungary as a result of German intercession. This latter hope was in vain 
and the territory recouped after the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union was gained 
only temporarily. The Romanians ultimately shared in the Germans’ total defeat. 
Bucharest once again lost Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union 
and the Romanian regime was overthrown.28 Bandwagoning proved to be as much 
of a failed strategy as balancing and hiding had been.
Hungary
Hungary entered the 1930s as a highly revisionist, but very weak state. At the end 
of World War I, the Treaty of Trianon had allocated lands which had been part 
of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to a variety of 
successor states. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and especially Romania were the 
primary beneficiaries of these territorial revisions. While borders had been drawn 
with ethnicity in mind, due to the complex and often intermingled geographic 
distribution of nationalities, many ethnic Magyars ended up as minorities in 
these successor states. Thus, throughout the period, Hungary’s primary foreign 
policy goal was the recovery of these lands. Due to the restrictions on rearmament 
imposed by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and the simple reality of Hungary’s post-
World War I demographics, Budapest was in no way powerful enough to defeat 
its neighbors. Even by 1938, after a modest effort at rearmament, Hungary had no 
large-caliber artillery, few planes, and only enough ammunition for two days of 
fighting (Sakmyster 1980, 66, 90, 115–16, and 178). Thus, Hungary could recover 
its lost territories only with great power help.
While this seemingly made Hungary a natural ally of Germany – and in fact it 
ultimately did – the Hungarian regime was quite politically conservative and risk 
averse. Budapest thus saw Nazi Germany as both a potential threat and a potential 
ally (Macartney 1938, 755–63; Sakmyster 1980, x–xi and 26). Miklós Horthy, the 
Hungarian regent and head of state, was an anglophile who ceded much of the 
direction of foreign affairs to his foreign and prime ministers (Sakmyster 1980, 
28–40). Of these, only Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös was enamored with Nazism. 
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Had he lived past 1936, it is quite possible Hungary would have entered the German 
orbit earlier as he had been negotiating with the Germans behind Horthy’s back 
in late 1935 (Sakmyster 1980, 46–50).29 After Gömbös’ death, control of foreign 
policy passed into the hands of Kálmán Kánya, the Foreign Minister. While he 
tended to be anti-Nazi – he referred to Adolf Hitler, Hermann Göring, and Joseph 
Goebbles as a “common rabble rouser”, “a brute”, and “a buffoon” respectively 
– he was willing to explore any angle which could achieve Hungary’s irredentist 
aims as long as the risk was not too great (Sakmyster 1980, 54–7).
Beginning in 1936, international events slowly pushed Hungary into the 
German orbit. French acceptance of Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland 
cast doubt in Hungarian eyes on France’s willingness and military ability to uphold 
the post-war settlement in East Central Europe (Sakmyster 1980, 60). Hungarian 
and French relations were cool throughout the period, so a lack of French resolve 
did not reduce faith in an ally, but rather loosened a potential constraint. In 
general, Kánya was unwilling to commit Hungary in any direction lest it prove 
disastrous. He told his colleagues that he wanted to maintain Budapest’s “freedom 
of maneuver” while one of Kánya’s aides described him as wishing to “remain 
apart from the clash of interests of foreign powers, and, if a conflict broke out, to 
stay out of it if possible” (Sakmyster 1980, 85).
It is unsurprising then to learn that Kánya explored a variety of potential 
alliances. He made several efforts to coordinate his foreign policy with Poland, but 
despite Polish receptivity to the idea, this came to naught (Sakmyster 1980, 151–
3). Budapest also dabbled in negotiation with the Soviet Union, which had been 
going on since 1935 initially in hopes of forming an anti-Romanian pact and then 
with the aim of containing German expansionism in Southeastern Europe (Pastor 
2004, 732). In particular, Mihály Jungerth-Arnóthy, the Hungarian ambassador to 
the Soviet Union, told Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, that Budapest 
was against German expansion, but that if the Soviets refused to back Hungarian 
revisionism, Budapest would have no choice but to turn to Germany (Pastor 
2004, 734). This effort was likely doomed from the start given Horthy’s hostility 
to Bolshevism, but that the effort was even made suggests just how unwilling 
Budapest was to be tied to Berlin. Budapest even worked to reduce tensions with 
members of the anti-Hungarian Little Entente at a conference in Bled, Yugoslavia 
as late as August 1938 (Katona 1939, 603; Sakmyster 1980, 176).
Still, the drift was mainly in the German direction. By November 1937 
Budapest and Berlin were already discussing the division of Czechoslovakia 
between them with Hungarian claims on Slovakia being recognized by Hitler. 
Crucially, however, the timetable remained unclear and the talks never got beyond 
generalities, though the talks did allow the Hungarians to learn Hitler desired to 
annex all of Bohemia and Moravia, not just the Sudetenland (Sakmyster 1980, 
109–112 and 145).
As the Sudetenland issue began to heat up in the spring of 1938, Hungary still 
hoped to avoid being drawn into a European conflagration and was still distrustful 
of the Germans. Kánya reiterated this desire to remain neutral to both British 
diplomats and Hermann Göring as the crisis unfolded over the summer of 1938 
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(Sakmyster 1980, 173). Thus, while he rejected British suggestions to ally with 
Czechoslovakia, in part due to Hungarian irredentist aims, Kánya had also been 
quite displeased by the Anschluss in March 1938, telling neutral diplomats that he 
much preferred an independent Austria to a Germany of 80 million on Hungary’s 
borders (Pastor 2004, 735; Sakmyster 1980, 93 and 131).
In August 1938, as Hitler was planning on making his move on Czechoslovakia, 
the Hungarian leadership was invited to Germany for a state visit which was 
attended by Horthy, Kánya, and Prime Minister Béla Imrédy. During the visit, 
Hitler detailed his plan for attacking Czechoslovakia and offered Slovakia to the 
Hungarians provided Hungary aided the effort. The offer was rejected for a variety 
of reasons. First, Imrédy, based on reports from the Hungarian embassy in Paris, 
believed the French would back Czechoslovakia (Pastor 2004, 736; Sakmyster 
1980, 175 and 183). Imrédy was also concerned that Romania and Yugoslavia 
would honor their commitments to the Little Entente and attack Hungary if 
Budapest was in on the carve-up of Czechoslovakia (Steiner 2011, 588). Second, 
Horthy was convinced that British sea power would ultimately win the coming 
war (Steiner 2011, 588–9) and told Hitler so directly saying, “You can mobilize 
in five days and put thirty Army Corps here and forty there, while England will 
take perhaps five months to mobilize, but in the end she will inevitably win” 
(Sakmyster 1980, 179). Finally, the cautious Kánya was horrified by Hitler’s 
willingness to gamble, stating in private of Hitler “that madman wanted to unleash 
a war, whatever the cost” (Sakmyster 1980, 184). As the visit unraveled, Hitler 
ominously warned the non-committal Hungarians that “he who wanted to sit at 
the table must at least help in the kitchen” (Sakmyster 1980, 180).
The Munich crisis, however, unfolded much differently than the Hungarian 
leadership had expected and they began to question the wisdom of their decision 
to not bandwagon with Berlin. Imrédy, originally an ardent anglophile, became 
irritated at London’s tendency to ignore Hungary and both he and Kánya were 
furious that London was pressuring Prague to make concessions to Berlin but 
not to Budapest (Rothschild 1977, 178–9; Sakmyster 1980, 188–9 and 193). 
Kánya had little faith that Britain would take a strong stand in Central Europe 
ever since Lord Halifax’s trip to Germany in November 1937 in which Halifax 
gave Germany a green light for peaceful border revisions in the east (Sakmyster 
1980, 112). This led Hungary to take a more aggressive approach during the crisis 
than originally planned. Budapest promised the Wehrmacht overflight and landing 
rights in the event of war and along with Warsaw, insisted that any concessions 
to ethnic Germans must be made to all minorities in Czechoslovakia – essentially 
a demand that Polish and Hungarian areas be ceded (Sakmyster 1980, 195 and 
200–1). The Hungarians also interrupted trade with Czechoslovakia, but refused 
German requests to create incidents outside of a small operation in the Carpatho-
Ukraine (Sakmyster 1980, 202–5 and 209–14). Ultimately, this tentative 
bandwagoning obtained for Budapest several predominantly Magyar areas in 
southern Czechoslovakia through the First Vienna Award of November 2, 1938.
More importantly the crisis demonstrated to the Hungarian leadership, 
especially Imrédy, that Germany was the dominant power in East Central Europe 
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and Britain would not project its power into the region (Sakmyster 1980, 208). 
In response to German requests, Imrédy forced the cautious Kánya from office 
and replaced him with István Csáky, who stated that Hungary needed to display 
“unshakable fidelity to the Axis Powers” (Sakmyster 1980, 222). Csáky quickly 
took the Hungarians into the Axis camp. In January 1939 Hungary joined the Anti-
Comintern Pact, promised to leave the League of Nations (accomplished in April), 
and began discussions about dismembering the remainder of Czechoslovakia 
(Pastor 2004, 737; Sakmyster 1980, 222–4). When Hitler moved to occupy 
Bohemia and Moravia in March, the Hungarians duly occupied Carpatho-Ukraine 
which Hitler had allotted them (Pastor 2004, 740; Sakmyster 1980, 226).30 Thus, 
Budapest’s turn towards Germany after Munich was stark. Having decided that 
Britain and France would not build a balancing coalition against Germany in East 
Central Europe and seeing an opportunity to achieve many of their long-held 
irredentist aims, the Hungarians flung themselves into the Axis camp in early 
1939 – a move which within a few years would of course prove disastrous.
This is not to say there were no bumps in the road between Munich and the 
Hungarians’ decision to join the Germans in the invasion of the Soviet Union 
in June 1941; there were. The Hungarians were genuinely shocked by the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Horthy and Pál Teleki, who had replaced Imrédy as 
Prime Minister in February 1939,31 both remained long-convinced of Britain’s 
potential strength and were offended by the destruction of Poland – a state with 
which Hungary had always maintained good relations (Steiner 2011, 954). The 
Hungarians refused offers of Polish territory to join the war, refused Germany the 
use of Hungarian rail lines for the duration of the campaign, let between 70,000 
and 100,000 Poles flee across Hungary to continue the conflict in the West, and 
even allowed a small volunteer legion to fight on the Polish side (Rothschild 
1977, 182; Steiner 2011, 956).
This, however, was but a temporary setback in the German–Hungarian 
relationship. In late summer 1940, German mediation granted Hungary the 
northern half of Romanian-held Transylvania in the Second Vienna Award. The 
Hungarians soon reciprocated the German aid by joining the Tripartite Pact in 
November. They also participated in the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, 
receiving Prekmurje, Međimurje, and Bačka as spoils.32 Thus, with the exception 
of the disagreement over Poland, from Munich onward Hungary was solidly in the 
Axis camp with the Hungarian leadership being committed to bandwagoning with 
Hitler both for spoils and because balancing options simply were not available 
given Horthy’s antipathy for the communist Soviet Union.
Thus, the Hungarians, always highly revisionist yet fearful of Germany, moved 
from a wait-and-see approach to one of bandwagoning with Germany as it became 
clear Britain and France would not effectively oppose Germany’s redrawing of the 
map in East Central Europe. As Hungarian aims could be achieved only with great 
power assistance, it was necessary for Budapest to either seize the opportunity or 
give up on its irredentist aims. Hungarian estimates of the distribution of forces 
moved favorably in the German direction, especially after the West abandoned 
Czechoslovakia at Munich. Also, given that the Munich settlement eliminated 
To bandwagon or hide II 93
one of Hungary’s main enemies, Czechoslovakia, and undid the Little Entente, 
the nature of the opportunity strongly favored Hungary shifting from neutrality to 
bandwagoning. Finally, as much of the territory Hungary sought had been held by 
Czechoslovakia, the nature of the opportunity was again inclined strongly toward 
bandwagoning. Overall, Hungary’s actions fit well with the theory’s predictions.
Conclusion
Polish, Yugoslav, Romanian, and Hungarian behavior all reflect the theory’s 
predictions. Remarkably all four states had a fairly accurate view of Hitler’s 
aggressive intentions. Decisions to move toward hiding or bandwagoning were 
not driven by changing beliefs about German intentions. Rather they were 
driven by changing estimates about the likely balance of capabilities. In turn, 
these estimates were largely driven by shifting beliefs about French and British 
intentions and also by the fact the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the occupation 
of the Sudetenland, and – in the cases of Romania and Yugoslavia – post-1939 
German conquests, had placed the German military in a much stronger position 
than previously.
Poland entered the mid-1930s with a preference for balancing against Germany, 
especially as many of Germany’s revisionist aims included Polish territory. Yet 
after the occupation of the Rhineland and the growing evidence that Britain and 
France were not going to take effective steps to confront Germany in East Central 
Europe, the Poles for a time moved away from balancing. At a couple points the 
Poles flirted with hiding, but given German intentions toward the Polish Corridor 
and Poland’s proximity to Germany, hiding was never likely to succeed. The Poles 
also briefly tried to transcend by directing German aggression against the Soviet 
Union, but to no avail. When the West’s fecklessness and weakness were made 
fully apparent at Munich, the Poles bandwagoned with Germany in order to pick 
up small enclaves of Czech territory. Ultimately, Warsaw returned to balancing as 
it became clear that Poland was to be Germany’s next victim, even though Poland 
expected little effective help from France and Britain. Thus, as it became clear that 
it was unlikely that an effective balancing coalition would form against Germany 
and that the nature of the German move into the Rhineland had deeply disrupted 
the balance of power, Poland became less interested in balancing and flirted with 
other strategies. When none of these succeeded, since Hitler was determined to 
destroy Poland, the Poles returned to balancing.
Yugoslavia likewise began as a member of France’s balancing coalition, but as 
with the Poles, the Yugoslavs moved away from balancing as it became apparent 
that the West was not going to effectively balance against Germany. Additionally, 
the nature of the German move into Czechoslovakia made it impossible for the 
Little Entente to function, further reducing the odds of successful balancing. 
Since Yugoslavia was not a target of Germany in the late 1930s, the Yugoslavs 
attempted to hide once they abandoned balancing. This was successful for a time 
until Italy’s conflict with Greece drew Germany deeply into Balkan politics. By 
1941, Germany bordered directly on Yugoslavia as did four other Axis states. 
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With Hitler no longer willing to countenance Yugoslav neutrality and with its 
military position being completely untenable, Belgrade opted to bandwagon with 
the Axis for its own safety. This was immediately undone by a military coup by 
individuals who could not stomach allying with the Axis. The new government 
attempted to return to hiding, but when it was obvious that hiding was impossible, 
they even considered bandwagoning. The Germans had already decided upon 
invasion, however, so whether the new government would have fully embraced 
the policy of the old will never be known. Still, it is striking that the pressures from 
the international environment were forcing the new government to contemplate a 
return to the policies it had seized power in order to stop.
Romania was also initially disposed to balance and even tried to transcend 
many of the divisions within East Central Europe to form an effective balancing 
coalition. Much like Yugoslavia, Romania abandoned balancing after Munich as 
that agreement undid the Little Entente and made it excruciatingly clear that the 
French and the British would not effectively balance against German aggression 
in the east. Romania then hid until 1940 when severe territorial losses due to the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and the Second Vienna Award turned Romania into a 
revisionist state. This combined with the military ascendency of Germany in East 
Central Europe led Romania to bandwagon with the Germans.
Hungarian behavior was fairly straightforward. Unlike the other three 
states, Hungary was always a revisionist power and thus never considered 
balancing. Rather it hid early on as it was too weak to do anything else. When 
the remilitarization of the Rhineland and more especially the resolution of the 
Sudetenland crisis made it clear Germany was ascendant in the east and that 
Britain and France were not likely to do anything about it, Hungary quickly 
moved to bandwagon in order to fulfill its irredentist aims. Thus, all four powers 
shifted strategies due to changes in their estimates that an effective balancing 
coalition would form.
Geography also played a role in each case. While Poland always shared a 
border with Germany – and a border largely free of natural obstacles at that – 
the other three states were initially physically buffered from German power by 
the presence of other states. After the Anschluss, Germany bordered directly on 
Hungary and Yugoslavia. Additionally, Germany was able to bring pressure on 
Yugoslavia and Romania as it gained allies which bordered these states. Recall 
that by 1941 Yugoslavia was essentially surrounded by Axis states. For these 
states, as the German threat grew nearer and the odds of receiving succor from 
other balancers grew dimmer, the will to resist diminished.
Likewise, the paucity and decline of effective international institutions made 
balancing less feasible and bandwagoning and hiding more realistic. Over the 
1930s, the League of Nations proved to be feckless and the multilateral alliance 
structures within Southeastern Europe collapsed. As was seen above, both 
the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente were ultimately abandoned by their 
members. The French alliances with states in the region, too, were abandoned 
or weakened. This left the minor powers to deal with Germany bilaterally rather 
than multilaterally – a most uneven playing field for the small states studied in this 
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chapter. Given this power disparity, these states were left with only two options: 
cozy up to Germany or try to lay low. Trying to balance could lead only to defeat 
and dismemberment. Obviously, there is an element of the classic chicken-and-egg 
problem here. Were these organizations and alliances abandoned because states 
opted against balancing or did states fail to balance because the institutions were 
weak? In truth, there are elements of both factors at work. Essentially, a vicious 
spiral was created. As states became less inclined to balance, they weakened 
institutions in part as a way to explore other options. As the institutions weakened, 
states became less confident that balancing would be successful, leading to them 
to invest even less in the institutions than before. This ultimately culminated in 
these states abandoning the post-World War I balancing institutions in favor of 
German-sponsored bandwagoning institutions.
Economic ties also played a role in pushing states from balancing toward 
bandwagoning and hiding. Though not covered explicitly in the cases above, trade 
relationships made it particularly difficult for states like Hungary, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania to balance, especially given the economic pressures brought on by the 
Great Depression (Wandycz 1981, 553). German trade policy during the 1930s 
favored bilateral relationships between Germany and the states of East Central 
and Southeastern Europe and undermined alternative trading relationships. For 
example, the Germans were willing to overpay for agricultural products from the 
Danubian basin. This meant that the agricultural sector in Southeastern Europe 
could remain profitable despite being inefficient. This resulted in Hungary, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia all becoming dependent on the German market for their 
agricultural goods (Hirschman 1980; Steiner 2011, 955). Furthermore, in order 
to deal with the scarcity of gold and hard currency to pay for its imports, the 
Germans set up a system of clearing houses that effectively limited these countries 
to spending their trade surplus on German goods. Also, German industry was set so 
as to be able to exploit low-grade mineral resources from Yugoslavia and Romania 
(Hirschman 1980) – resources that were not in demand elsewhere due to their 
poor quality. The Germans also bought these agricultural and mineral products 
in sufficient quantities to ensure price and quantity stability. This inefficiency 
and low quality meant that there was no ready substitute for the German market. 
When combined with the fact that these countries imported many of their finished 
goods and armaments from Germany, any political move that severed relations 
with Germany would have significant economic costs (Hirschman 1980).33
Events of the 1930s deepened this dependence. Yugoslavia’s participation in the 
sanctions regime erected by the League of Nations against Italy after Mussolini’s 
invasion of Ethiopia cost Belgrade one of its major markets (Steiner 2011, 152). 
Likewise, the Anschluss gave Germany control over Hungary’s major source of 
iron and steel imports (Steiner 2011, 556). Similarly, Romania and Yugoslavia lost 
an important trade partner when Germany occupied Czechoslovakia. Even while 
Czechoslovakia remained independent, the Czechoslovak market was simply too 
small to replace the German market for agricultural goods (Wandycz 1981, 553). 
While this did not make balancing impossible, it was one more argument in favor 
of hiding or bandwagoning.
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Of course, reality is usually more complex than theory. Most clearly, three of 
the four cases were somewhat complicated by domestic politics. While domestic 
politics played very little role in Polish foreign policy in the period covered, they 
did play a role in the other three states. Most clearly, Yugoslavia’s response to Italian 
and German pressure was severely hampered by internal ethnic divisions. At times, 
however, it was decisions about how to proceed in foreign affairs which drove the 
domestic politics and not vice versa. Paul had Stojadinović removed from power 
largely to facilitate Yugoslavia pursuing a more neutral course. In a similar fashion, 
Imrédy removed Kánya from power to bring about Hungarian cooperation with 
Germany. Thus, the decision to change policies preceded the change in personnel. 
This was not, however, always the case. While it could be argued that the coup in 
Romania which overthrew Carol was somewhat similar in that it was done to bring 
about a shift in Romanian foreign policy, such extralegal actions are of a different 
character. Whether Carol could have kept Romania neutral for long is unclear, but 
certainly the coup sped up the shift to bandwagoning. The coup in Yugoslavia was 
similarly driven by a desire to change foreign policies, though of course the new 
regime did not last long prior to the German invasion. Perhaps the clearest effect 
of a state’s policy taking a different path due to a domestic event was Hungary 
becoming far more cautious due to the death of Gömbös who may well have 
brought Hungary into the Germany camp more quickly had he lived. Nevertheless, 
the factors advanced by the theory such as the relative balance of capabilities and 
the nature of the opportunity clearly influenced state behavior even given the role 
played by domestic politics in a number of the states. Having shown in this and the 
preceding chapters that a variety of foreign policy behaviors in response to threats 
to the status quo including balancing, bandwagoning, and hiding can be explained 
during ante-bellum periods by the factors covered above, the next chapter will 
explore the nature of balancing and bandwagoning after the outbreak of war.
Notes
 1 Of the four states covered, only Hungary and Yugoslavia entertained any hopes of a 
positive relationship with the Soviet Union.
 2 At the end of the war Hungary ended up with its 1937 borders minus a few border 
villages lost to Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia actually gained territory in Istria from 
Italy. All of the states’ borders shifted considerably over the course of World War II. 
Hungary primarily gained territory while Germany was ascendant, while Romania 
both gained and lost significant chunks of territory due to Hitler’s redrawing the map 
of Europe. After the war Poland lost territory in the east while gaining territory in the 
west. Both Poland and Yugoslavia were completely dismembered for a time during 
the war.
 3 The territorial dispute with Czechoslovakia, while emotional, was not at the center 
of Polish foreign policy. It was, however, an insuperable obstacle to any Polish–
Czechoslovak alliance (Cienciala 1992, 79–80).
 4 After the war a member of Beck’s staff claimed the Poles had even discussed 
mobilization plans to aid Czechoslovakia, but there is little extant paperwork to either 
substantiate or refute the claim.
 5 These views of Beck’s were also reflected in his instructions to the Polish ambassador 
to Romania.
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 6 This area, which comprised the far eastern tip of Czechoslovakia, is also known as 
Ruthenia or the Sub-Carpatho-Ukraine.
 7 The British seem to have believed that given tensions with the Soviets, even if Poland 
was overwhelmed, Germany would be forced to keep many divisions in the east 
(Strang 1996, 741).
 8 The alliance, also known as the Balkan Pact, was aimed to protect against the revisionist 
ambitions of a number of states including Hungary, Italy, Albania, Bulgaria, and the 
Soviet Union. Interestingly, a similar pact was signed between Yugoslavia, Greece, 
and Turkey in 1953 with the exact same aims. This later agreement would fizzle out 
due to the Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement after the death of Stalin and the rising 
tensions between Greece and Turkey.
 9 Chernozemski had joined the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in 
1922 by which time the organization had aligned itself with Bulgaria. By the 1930s 
Chernozemski worked as an instructor in Ustaše training camps in Italy and Hungary.
 10 The general staff also warned that Yugoslavia’s position was “quite dangerous” 
and that Britain and France had failed to give any useful, concrete commitments to 
Yugoslavia (Hoptner 1962, 41–2).
 11 This led to Stojadinović being seen by Germany as the best choice to head the 
Yugoslav government. Berlin repeatedly ordered the Volksdeutsch in Vojvodinia to 
vote for Stojadinović (Rothschild 1977, 259).
 12 Throughout 1937 Belgrade strove to improve Franco-Yugoslav military coordination. 
Only when these attempts went nowhere and French weakness was made manifest 
by the Munich crisis, did the Yugoslavs begin to buy fewer armaments from France 
(Alexander 1992, 225–30).
 13 Stojadinović’s supporters had taken to wearing military uniforms and performing the 
Roman salute. Ultimately Stojadinović was encouraged to go into exile in March 
1941 out of a fear that he could potentially become the focus of a German-led coup if 
he remained in the country.
 14 Several feelers were also put out to the Soviets, but these went nowhere and ultimately 
the Soviets were scared off from pursing an aggressive policy in the Balkans by France’s 
collapse. Talks with Turkey proved equally barren (Hoptner 1962, 206 and 225).
 15 The British had dispatched a very small number of troops to aid the Greeks.
 16 The hard-pressed British were not being stingy; they simply had no additional troops 
available to deploy to the Balkans (Churchill 1948 v.3, 94–110).
 17 As it turned out, the Yugoslav army performed even worse than expected.
 18 The Germans knew Yugoslavia was just stalling for time. Hitler had said as much to 
Mussolini back in December and had expressed the hope that future victories would 
push Yugoslavia into the Axis camp (Churchill 1948, v.3, 13).
 19 Romanian contacts with Britain were generally limited throughout the period.
 20 King Carol was deeply anti-Soviet and anti-Communist in outlook (Steiner 2011, 
744–5).
 21 Poland and the Soviet Union also worked to undercut Titulescu’s efforts to strengthen the 
Little Entente. In general, Beck viewed the Little Entente with great skepticism because 
it strengthened Czechoslovakia at the expense of Hungary (Wandycz 1988b, 425).
 22 Titulescu hoped that the Soviets would replace the Italians in helping to resist German 
pressure on Austria after the Italians had fallen out with the French in the wake of the 
invasion of Ethiopia (Wandycz 1988b, 422–3).
 23 Admittedly, given the Hungarian and Bulgarian claims on Romanian territory, as well 
as Romania’s existing commitments to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, it 
would have been a tough sell even before the remilitarization of the Rhineland and fall 
of Titulescu.
 24 The traditional explanation is that the government agreed to allow the overflights, 
only to be overruled by Carol. Some doubt, however, exists as to the veracity of the 
evidence on whether the government ever agreed at all (Ragsdale 1998).
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 25 Nicolae Petrescu-Comnène, the Romanian foreign minister, shared his concerns 
about Hungarian expansion into Slovakia with the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan 
Stojadinović (Hoptner 1962, 118).
 26 Hitler did intervene diplomatically to prevent Stalin from also occupying southern 
Bukovina.
 27 Hitler informed Mussolini of his belief in Antonescu’s reliability as an ally for these 
very reasons during a meeting in December 1940 (Churchill 1948, v.3, 13).
 28 After the war, Romania did get Transylvania back from Hungary, but never did 
reacquire Southern Dobruja from Bulgaria.
 29 Gömbös had been promising to institute fascist reforms in exchange for German arms.
 30 This involved limited combat with Slovak forces.
 31 Imrédy had been forced to resign because of revelations he had Jewish ancestors.
 32 Teleki opposed Hungary’s participation in the invasion as going against Hungary’s 
pledge of non-aggression toward Yugoslavia (see above), but was overruled by 
Horthy. Teleki committed suicide shortly after German troops began passing through 
Hungary on their way to Yugoslavia.
 33 Changing arms suppliers has additional costs as it means a loss of access to ammunition 
and replacement parts for older equipment and requires retraining troops so that they 
can use the new equipment (Hirschman 1980).
6 Balancing and bandwagoning by 
other means
How the outbreak of war affects states’ 
responses to threats
So far the discussion has centered on strategies that states employ when faced 
with an emerging threat. In general, the theory and cases have thought about how 
states respond to such potential and actual threats during periods of peace and 
during crises, especially those preceding a war. Only the case on Yugoslavia in 
Chapter 5 focuses on decisions after the outbreak of war, though the cases on 
Romania and Hungary also include some decisions after World War Two started. 
Yet, the outbreaks of wars by their very nature often threaten non-belligerent 
states by immediately or potentially altering the balance of power. How states 
respond to wartime challenges to the balance of power may be different from 
how they do so in peacetime. During peaceful and ante-bellum periods questions 
about whether threats are real can be particularly tricky as it is often difficult to 
answer questions about the relative balance of forces and intentions.1 In order to 
draw sound inferences on such questions, states must focus on the diplomatic 
actions of their fellow states to gauge intentions and on military buildups in order 
to make estimates about capabilities. Given that diplomatic maneuvers are often 
intentionally duplicitous and determining the relative balance of capabilities 
between militaries that have not recently engaged in combat presents a thorny 
challenge, uncertainty and shifting estimates become a central part of the story.
Indeed, bargaining theories of war often point to this ante-bellum uncertainty 
as one of the more compelling explanations of why states wage war as opposed 
to striking a mutually acceptable bargain (Fearon 1995). It is possible that during 
wars the answers to both types of questions, as well as those about the nature of 
the opportunity, would be clearer as battles, strategic maneuvers, and the demands 
made by states – both diplomatically and tacitly through military maneuvers – would 
reveal states’ capabilities and intentions (Slantchev 2004). This means that thinking 
about balancing and bandwagoning during wars – periods when new information is 
revealed about intentions and capabilities – could be fruitful as behaviors after the 
onset of hostilities may be different from those during peaceful periods.
Furthermore, in previous chapters it has been loosely implied that states which 
engaged in balancing or bandwagoning behavior would either be among the 
initial belligerents in a war caused by those behaviors or would join that war soon 
after it began. As the case of Hungary in the preceding chapter shows, this may 
not always be the case. Budapest’s decision to bandwagon was made before the 
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invasion of Poland in September 1939. Yet, Hungary did not become a belligerent 
until 1941 despite bandwagoning with Germany from early 1939 onwards.2
This calls into question the reasonableness of the belief that bandwagoners and 
balancers would quickly become active belligerents once war breaks out. Obviously, 
such immediate belligerency does occur. Balancers could join a war on the first day 
of combat and of course the initial parties to the war could be engaged in balancing. 
While the nature of bandwagoning requires the existence of a multilateral war 
for belligerents to bandwagon from day one (otherwise with whom would those 
states be bandwagoning?) such behavior does occur. However, states that balance 
or bandwagon during peacetime can have good reasons not to want to translate this 
policy into joining a war when it breaks out. Transforming a peacetime policy of 
balancing or bandwagoning into a wartime policy of balancing or bandwagoning 
requires states to take on additional costs and uncertainties. Similarly, a state that 
decided to respond to a peacetime challenge to the status quo by hiding may find 
this policy untenable during war even if it is not directly attacked by any of the 
belligerents. The question, however, is not whether rapid intervention occurs,3 but 
rather is it reasonable to assume that intervening quickly is the norm?
First, we have to decide what we mean by quickly. A cutoff of 30 days from the 
outbreak of hostilities is probably reasonable in the modern era. Such a window 
gives states sufficient time to work through any domestic mechanisms for declaring 
war or deploying forces into combat.4 It is also sufficient time for governments to 
receive and verify reports of the outbreak of hostilities and go through any last-
minute diplomacy to avoid a wider war. The historical record offers support for such 
a cutoff. For instance, after the outbreak of hostilities between Serbia and Austria-
Hungary in the late summer of 1914, many states quickly joined what became World 
War One. Russia, Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, and Japan all joined the war 
within 30 days. Yet though a further seven states would ultimately join, only one – 
the Ottoman Empire – did so between the initial rush in August 1914 and the spring 
of 1915. The remaining states would join slowly, one by one, over the course of the 
next three years. Therefore, a 30-day window seems reasonable, though of course 
other cutoffs are possible. However, in practice other cutoffs produce similar results. 
Using a 20-day cutoff, Japan ceases to be an early joiner during World War One. 
Using a 40-day cutoff, Finland becomes an early joiner in the 1920 War of Estonian 
Liberation and Canada becomes an early joiner in the 2001 Invasion of Afghanistan. 
No other military interventions into interstate wars are affected by such shifts in the 
cutoff point in the post-1816 period. Thus, the exact cutoff point is not crucial.
Of the 102 states in the Correlates of War (COW) Interstate War dataset version 
4.0 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) that joined ongoing wars, 29 did so in the first 
30 days though four of these joined in what were also the last 30 days due to wars 
lasting less than two months. This means most states that ultimately intervene do 
not do so in the first 30 days. There are two possible explanations for this. First, 
states which employ bandwagoning or balancing strategies in the ante-bellum 
period often delay joining wars when they in fact break out. Second, states which 
join wars well after their initial outbreak may not have been engaged in balancing 
or bandwagoning in the ante-bellum period. Rather they may have only chosen to 
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do so after events within the war led them to change their strategies. Each of these 
possibilities will be considered in turn, beginning with states delaying belligerency 
despite engaging in balancing and bandwagoning in the ante-bellum period.
Certainly there are some examples of such delayed belligerency, such as the 
Hungarian example discussed above. Indeed, states have a number of incentives to 
delay belligerency including waiting for potential opponents to exhaust themselves, 
waiting for opponents to move their forces away from the frontier, and waiting for 
their own rearmament to be completed. Recall, too, the discussion in Chapters 2 
and 3 of the advantages of delaying balancing until some future date. Yet, there are 
reasons to think Hungary might be an exception. While states may want to delay 
entering wars until it suits them, it is not clear why potential opponents would allow 
a state to delay belligerency until a more favorable time provided that state’s future 
belligerency was nearly certain. If it is optimal for one side to wait, presumably the 
other side has an interest in fighting now and would initiate a conflict regardless of 
its opponent’s desire (Murray 1984, 314–15 and 362–3). Reiter (1995) finds that 
this sort of preemption is very rare, suggesting that states rarely delay entry into 
wars for these sorts of tactical reasons. Indeed, Hungary, even though it was already 
bandwagoning with Germany, delayed entry not for tactical reasons but for strategic 
ones. The Hungarian leadership had yet to be convinced that open belligerency was 
in their interest and opposed the destruction of Poland.
This leads directly to the second, more likely explanation that a late joiner’s 
decision to balance or bandwagon is influenced by the war itself. While such states 
could have engaged in balancing or bandwagoning strategies in the ante-bellum period 
– much as Hungary did – many may have opted to hide or perhaps were not even 
concerned by the ante-bellum crisis.5 One reason to think these later joiners would not 
have engaged in balancing or bandwagoning strategies prior to the war comes from 
the alliance literature. That literature shows that alliances, and in particular defense 
pacts, are good predictors of military intervention (Huth and Russett 1984; Most 
and Starr 1980; Raknerud and Hegre 1997; Siverson and King 1979; Siverson and 
Starr 1991),6 but that alliances decline in predictive power the longer a war has lasted 
(Joyce, Ghosn, and Bayer 2014; Melin and Koch 2010). Indeed, Shirkey (2009) finds 
defense pacts are significant predictors of military intervention only during a war’s 
first 30 days.7 States which attempted to balance or bandwagon are likely to have 
formed alliances in the ante-bellum period. The fact that alliances are good predictors 
of intervention only early in wars suggests the intuition that states pursuing balancing 
or bandwagoning strategies prior to the war will join quickly, has merit. Presumably 
states which join later were not engaged in balancing or bandwagoning strategies 
prior to the war – at least not in relation to the states which composed the war’s initial 
belligerents – and did not form alliances with future belligerents. Given that such 
states are the majority of interveners, it is important to think through what would 
prompt them to balance or bandwagon once a war is underway.
Such states should be responding to events within wars which create threats 
or opportunities prompting them to join (Shirkey 2009). They do so in hopes 
of altering the probable settlement of the war (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 
1979). Thus, these later joiners are engaged in balancing or bandwagoning and 
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are prompted to do so by the course of the war itself. In other words, states learn 
from and adjust their strategies in response to events in wars.8
Since wars reveal information about states capabilities and intentions to both 
belligerent and non-belligerent states (Fearon 1995; Goemans 2000), this means 
wars affect states’ estimates of the variables discussed in the models presented in 
Chapters 1 and 2: the relative balance of capabilities; the nature of the challenger; 
and the nature of the opportunity. For instance, battles may run contrary to a non-
belligerent state’s expectations, indicating that the war presents an opportunity 
for bandwagoning or a need to balance (Blainey 1973). Likewise, as belligerent 
powers make demands and threats – and quite possibly increase or decrease them 
in relation to events on the battlefield – it may become clear that the challenger 
is more or less revisionist than anticipated (Davis 2001; Werner 2000). Much as 
with learning about capabilities from battles, this learning should also cause some 
non-belligerent states to revise their strategies.9 Finally, military successes (or 
defeats) by the challenger could change the nature of the opportunity presented to 
the challenger, once again potentially causing states to shift the strategy they have 
chosen. This logic should apply to belligerent states as well as non-belligerent 
states and could lead to peace (Slantchev 2004) or to states changing sides.
Finally, it is worth remembering that not all states join wars willingly. 
Of the states which joined ongoing interstate wars since 1816, 15 did so 
because their territory was invaded or their military forces were attacked 
(see Table 6.1). The table lists the state which joined, the COW War Number 
Table 6.1 States which joined wars after being attacked*
Argentina (49) – balancing
Belgium (106)** – hiding
Greece (106) – bandwagoning and hiding
Australia (130) – balancing
Great Britain (130) – balancing
United States (130) – balancing
Canada (130) – balancing
Belgium (139) – hiding
Ethiopia (139) – defense***
Greece (139) – hiding
Netherlands (139) – hiding
Norway (139) – hiding
Soviet Union (139) – bandwagoning
Yugoslavia (139) – hiding
Angola (186)** – balancing
* World War Two is divided into two wars: one in Europe (139) and one in the Pacific arising from 
the Third Sino-Japanese War (130). Australia and Canada had troops in British possessions in the Far 
East which were attacked by the Japanese on December 8 along with the British forces garrisoning 
those possessions. Other states were occupied during both World Wars, but did not engage in 
sufficient resistance to be considered belligerent states by COW.
** Attacked during the first 30 days of the war.
*** Became a belligerent to expel existing Italian occupation.
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for the war if joined (see Table. 6.5) and the state’s ante-bellum strategy. 
Only two of these attacks happened within the first 30 days of the war: Belgium in 
World War One and Angola in the War over Angola (1975–1976). In the former, 
Belgium was clearly trying to hide. In the latter, Zairian and South African forces 
attacked Cuban troops in Angola prior to attacking Angolan troops.10 Thus, it is 
a bit odd to see Angola as a joiner rather than as an original belligerent and the 
whole episode could be seen as an intervention into the Angolan civil war. There 
is no reason to assume the other states which were attacked much later were trying 
to balance or bandwagon. They may well have been trying to hide for instance. 
Table 6.1 indicates which of these behaviors best categorizes each state’s ante-
bellum strategy. Removing these involuntary joiners from the calculation leaves 
27 states joining in the first month (still including four of which joined in what 
was also the last month) and 60 joining thereafter.
Motives for war and the timing of military intervention
It should be possible to deduce some patterns between why states join ongoing 
wars and when they are likely to do so over the course of a war. When a state 
joined can be thought of as falling into one of three broad categories: early (defined 
above as the first month); mid-war; or very late – likely after the outcome has been 
decided (herein defined as the last month of the war). States can also be thought of 
as joining for one of three reasons: balancing; bandwagoning for territorial spoils; 
and bandwagoning for non-territorial spoils.11 This excludes states which joined 
wars because they were attacked or invaded as such states would be engaged 
in defense rather than balancing. Cross-referencing timing and state motives 
generates nine possible types of voluntary military intervention (see Table 6.2). 
Of these nine types, only five should be likely to occur as the mix of certain 
motives and timing does not make sense from a rational actor perspective. 









(B) Should rarely  
occur. Too soon to 
know which side to 
join. 
Motive for rare joiner: 
ante-bellum alliances
(C) Should not occur. 
Belligerents not yet 
seeking allies. 
Motive for exception: 
ante-bellum alliances
Mid-war (D) Likely to 
occur. Motive: 
events in the war
(E) Likely to occur. 
Motive: events in the 
war
(F) Likely to occur. 
Motive: spoils offered 
by belligerents
Last month (G) Should not 
occur. No need 
to or too late to 
balance
(H) Likely to occur. 
Motive: events in the 
war
(I) Should not 
occur. No reason for 
belligerents to seek 
allies
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One other type should occur rarely and three should be very unlikely to occur. 
Why this is can be seen by going through each motive for joining.
First, there is little reason to expect balancers to join very late in a war (Table 
6.2, Box G). If a non-belligerent was concerned that a belligerent was likely to 
alter the distribution of power in sufficiently unacceptable ways that balancing 
against that belligerent was attractive, the potential balancer would intervene as 
soon as this became apparent, well before the end of the war. In the last stages of 
a war it would be either too late to effectively balance or apparent that balancing 
was unnecessary. Even if a potential balancer waited until its prospective allies 
were on their last legs to join them and balance against their adversaries, this likely 
would not be the end of the war as successful balancing would likely take months 
or years. Thus, balancing is likely to extend wars, not rapidly end them. Only 
highly successful or highly unsuccessful balancing, combined with an extreme 
hesitation to balance even after the need to balance becomes apparent, would result 
in balancers entering in the last month of a war. Such a scenario is improbable.
Earlier balancing in either a war’s first month or mid-war is likely to occur. 
Balancers joining in the first month of the war (Box A) should be doing so out 
of ante-bellum alliance commitments, while balancers joining mid-war (Box 
D) should be joining in response to information revealed by the war.12 This is 
because if a potential intervener decides that its alliance is not a sufficient reason 
to balance initially, the alliance alone is unlikely to ever be sufficient by itself. 
Rather, information from the war itself would have to change the potential 
balancer’s mind.13 Furthermore, in the first month of the war, there is likely to be 
little information that was not already available ante-bellum about which side is 
likely to win and effects of such an outcome on the overall distribution of power.14 
Any information available ante-bellum should already have been factored into 
alliance structures; hence those structures should drive first-month balancing, but 
not later balancing. This fits with the previously discussed findings that alliances 
get honored early in the war or not at all, and thereafter, revealed information 
drives the timing of joining.
Bandwagoning for territorial spoils is likewise limited in when it should occur. 
Bandwagoners, like any rational actor, want to receive the maximum benefit for 
the minimal cost. Additionally, bandwagoners are often weaker states that can 
affect the outcome of a war only in limited ways. Thus, it is best for potential 
bandwagoners to wait to join a war until it becomes clearer which side will win. 
Events within a war should reveal information about which side is more likely 
to win. Additionally, bandwagoners would want to join closer to the end of a 
war than the beginning, as this would mean they would have to pay fewer costs. 
However, if potential bandwagoners wait too long to join, their services would 
be of less value to the belligerents and they may well receive fewer spoils.15 This 
delicate act of waiting to determine which side to join if any and joining early 
enough to be rewarded, but late enough to limit costs means that bandwagoners 
seeking territorial spoils would likely join either mid-war (Box E) or in the last 
month of the war (Box H). They would be unlikely to join in the first month of a 
war (Box B) as it would not be apparent whether spoils would be available. Some 
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states, however, may bandwagon this early in the hopes of spoils as the result of 
ante-bellum bandwagoning and ante-bellum alliances.
Similarly, potential bandwagoners seeking spoils not attached to the war would 
need to join early enough to receive substantial benefits. In the post-World War 
Two period, these sorts of bandwagoners have been sought by belligerents more 
so than they have sought out belligerents (see Shirkey 2009, Chapter 7). For 
example, the United States actively sought and obtained the aid of South Korea, 
Thailand, and the Philippines in the Vietnam War through offers of military and 
economic aid. For these reasons, bandwagoners seeking non-territorial spoils 
should be unlikely to join in the last month of a war (Box I), as belligerents on the 
winning side would be unlikely to seek assistance so late and the reward would 
likely be meager, making bandwagoning less attractive. The rewards would be low 
in part because bandwagoners seeking non-territorial spoils cannot simply seize 
what they want. This is distinct from territorial bandwagoners who can occupy 
the territory they desire in hopes of increasing their bargaining leverage through a 
fait accompli. Instead, non-territorial bandwagoners have to receive their rewards 
directly from more powerful states. Additionally, states on the losing side near 
the end of a war likely would be seeking a great deal of assistance – and non-
territorial spoils are unlikely to be sufficient to motivate such efforts.
Non-territorial bandwagoners are also unlike to join early in a war (Box C) for 
two reasons. First, belligerents are unlikely to be seeking allies so soon, though it 
is not impossible that this could occur. Second, negotiations over non-territorial 
spoils should delay these bandwagoners’ entries. This is because while such 
bandwagoners are still pursuing spoils, they are not seeking territory and cannot 
simply seize what they want. Such states may be seeking a better relationship 
with a powerful state or economic, military, technical, or diplomatic aid. Such 
an improved relationship could take the form of a new or strengthened military 
alliance or other diplomatic help. Also, states may bandwagon with a powerful 
state simply to avoid becoming a target of that state (Walt 1985). What is distinct 
about all of these benefits is they are not directly tied to the outcome of the war 
itself. A state which is rewarded financially receives that benefit regardless of the 
military outcome of the war. Additionally, states seeking better relations with a 
great power will likely retain the great power’s goodwill regardless of who wins 
the war. Because the rewards are not tied directly to the war, the course of the 
war is not vital to their decision-making, though it should influence the size of 
rewards that the state they are bandwagoning with is willing to offer (Shirkey 
2009). The only concern for such bandwagoners, beyond the direct costs of the 
war, would be a severe defeat that prevents their ally from providing significant 
aid – financial, diplomatic, or military – to the bandwagoning state. Thus, non-
territorial bandwagoners are most likely to join mid-war (Box F), though their 
decision to join would likely not be tied to events within the war, but rather to 
negotiations with the stronger belligerents over spoils.16
It is also worth considering which of these types of intervention should be 
more likely to lead to joining the winning side. First, states joining in the last 
month of a war regardless of motive should be highly likely to win as in most 
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cases the outcome of the war should be clear so close to the end of the war and 
states are unlikely to hitch their wagon to an obviously losing cause. Second, 
bandwagoners seeking territorial spoils joining mid-war should win at a higher 
rate than those joining in the first month. This is based on the same logic as for 
states joining at the end of a war as territory-seeking bandwagoners should aim 
to join the winning side. These mid-war bandwagoners, however, should win less 
often than those bandwagoning at the very end of the war. Third, states which 
join to balance mid-war should be less likely to win compared with balancers 
that joined immediately. This is because mid-war balancers would be joining as it 
became clear there was an increasing need to balance. In other words, they would 
be prompted to join by setbacks to their preferred side rather than by successes, 
meaning their odds of victory should be lowered. Fourth, there should be little 
relationship between winning and losing for states which bandwagon for non-
territorial spoils as those spoils are unlikely to be connected to the outcome of 
the war. This means such bandwagoners may not consider which side is likely to 
win when contemplating intervention.17 An exception would be those states which 
bandwagon for territorial spoils in the last month of a war, but this is a category 
of joining that as argued above is very unlikely to occur (see Table 6.3). Last, it 
is not clear whether joiners should win or lose more often than not, nor is it clear 
whether balancers will win or lose more often than bandwagoners.
Findings
These hypotheses are tested and the results presented in Table 6.4. Any state that 
voluntarily began its belligerency after the first day of the war is included in the 
table.18 The state’s name and the COW war number (the list of COW wars and their 
respective war numbers can be found in Table 6.5) are given as well as whether 
the state joined the winning or losing side according to COW. States which joined 
a given war multiple times are listed for each entry with a roman numeral after 
their name indicating which entry is being indicated. Only states which switched 
sides are considered as joining multiple times. States which simply exited for a time 
Table 6.3 Types of joining and the likelihood of winning
Balancing Bandwagoning – 
territorial spoils
Bandwagoning –  
non-territorial 
spoils
First month More likely to win 
than later balancers
Less likely to 




Mid-war Less likely to 
win than earlier 
balancers
More likely to 




Last month Highly likely to 
win; unlikely to 
occur
Highly likely to win Highly likely to 
win; unlikely to 
occur
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Table 6.4 Joining by type, belligerent, and war

































































































during a cease-fire or negotiations are not counted as rejoining when they reentered 
the conflict. For example, the second time France joined World War Two is listed 
as France II (139), but Bulgaria and Serbia are not counted as having joined the 
First Balkan War when their ceasefire with the Ottomans ended.19 World War Two 
has been split into its European and Pacific theaters, with the Pacific theater being 
treated as a continuation of the Third Sino-Japanese War that began in 1937.
1 Franco‐Spanish War of 1823
4 First Russo‐Turkish War of 1828–1829
7 Mexican–American War of 1846–1847
10 Austro‐Sardinian War of 1848–1849
13 First Schleswig‐Holstein War of 
1848–1849
16 War of the Roman Republic of 1849
19 La Plata War of 1851–1852
22 Crimean War of 1853–1856
25 Anglo‐Persian War of 1856–1857
28 War of Italian Unification of 1859
31 First Spanish–Moroccan War of 
1859–1860
34 Italian–Roman War of 1860
37 Neapolitan War of 1860–1861
40 Franco‐Mexican War of 1862–1867
43 Ecuadorian–Columbian War of 1863
46 Second Schleswig‐Holstein War of 
1864
49 Lopez War of 1864–1870
52 Naval War of 1865–1866
55 Seven Weeks War of 1866
58 Franco‐Prussian War of 1870–1871
60 First Central American War of 1876
61 Second Russo‐Turkish War of 
1877–1878
64 War of the Pacific of 1879–1883
65 Conquest of Egypt of 1882
67 Sino‐French War of 1884–1885
70 Second Central American War of 1885
73 First Sino‐Japanese War of 1894–1895
76 Greco‐Turkish War of 1897
79 Spanish–American War of 1898
82 Boxer Rebellion of 1900
83 Sino‐Russian War of 1900
85 Russo‐Japanese War of 1904–1905
88 Third Central American War of 1906
91 Fourth Central American War of 1907
94 Second Spanish–Moroccan War of 
1909–1910
97 Italian–Turkish War of 1911–1912
100 First Balkan War of 1912–1913
103 Second Balkan War of 1913
106 World War I of 1914–1918
107 Estonian War of Liberation of 
1918–1920
108 Latvian War of Liberation of 1918–
1920
109 Russo‐Polish War of 1919–1920
112 Hungarian Adversaries of 1919
115 Second Greco‐Turkish War of 
1919–1922
116 Franco‐Turkish War of 1919–1921
117 Lithuanian–Polish War of 1920
118 Manchurian War of 1929
121 Second Sino‐Japanese War of 
1931–1933
124 Chaco War of 1932–1935
125 Saudi–Yemeni War of 1934
127 Conquest of Ethiopia of 1935–1936
130 Third Sino‐Japanese War of 1937–1941
133 Changkufeng War of 1938
136 Nomonhan War of 1939
139 World War II of 1939–1945
142 Russo‐Finnish War of 1939–1940
145 Franco‐Thai War of 1940–1941
147 First Kashmir War of 1948–1949
148 Arab–Israeli War of 1948–1949
151 Korean War of 1950–1953
153 Off‐shore Islands War of 1954
155 Sinai War of 1956
156 Soviet Invasion of Hungary of 1956
158 Ifni War of 1957–1959
160 War in Assam of 1962
163 Vietnam War Phase 2
166 Second Kashmir War of 1965
169 Six Day War of 1967
170 Second Laotian War Phase 2, 
1968–1973
172 War of Attrition of 1969–1970
175 Football War of 1969
176 War of the Communist Coalition of 
1970–1971
178 War for Bangladesh of 1971
181 Yom Kippur War of 1973
184 Turco‐Cypriot War of 1974
186 War Over Angola of 1975–1976
187 Second Ogaden War Phase 2, 
1977–1979
189 Vietnamese–Cambodian War of 
1975–1979
190 Ugandan–Tanzanian War of 1978–1979
193 Sino‐Vietnamese Punitive War of 1979
199 Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988
202 Falklands War of 1982
205 War over Lebanon of 1982
207 War over the Aouzou Strip of 
1986–1987
211 Gulf War of 1990–1991
215 War of Bosnian Independence of 1992
216 Azeri–Armenian War of 1993–1994
217 Cenepa Valley War of 1995
219 Badme Border War of 1998–2000
221 War for Kosovo of 1999
223 Kargil War of 1999
225 Invasion of Afghanistan of 2001
227 Invasion of Iraq of 2003
Table 6.5 List of COW interstate wars v.4.0
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States were categorized by when the state joined and why the state joined, 
mirroring the structure of Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Motives for joining were coded 
as follows. States whose main reason for intervening was upholding the status 
quo in regard to the issues that were at stake in the war were coded as balancing. 
Likewise states whose main goal was trying to revise the status quo in regard 
to the issues at stake in the war and which were seeking territory were coded as 
territorial bandwagoners. Seeking territorial spoils includes bandwagoning in the 
hopes the winning side will not seize the territory of the state in question or at least 
will limit its annexations. In other words, pure Balance of Threat bandwagoners 
(Walt 1985) can seek territory – the retention of their own.20 Bandwagoning states 
seeking both territorial and non-territorial spoils were classified as territorial 
bandwagoners. This is because the states in question tend to prioritize their 
territorial goals over their non-territorial goals. Finally, states whose main goal 
was extracting non-territorial spoils were coded as non-territorial bandwagoners. 
Such states often do have a clear preference for the outcome of a war, but that is 
not their primary reason for joining. Rather, they join in hopes of currying favor 
or securing rewards from a powerful state already in the war. Thus, non-territorial 
bandwagoners can end up allied with states engaged in balancing.
Timing of entry is broken down as joining in the first month, joining in the last 
month, and joining in any other month (mid-war). In wars lasting less than two 
months, it is possible for a state to join on a date that is both within the first and last 
month of the war. These interventions were coded as happening in the first month 
if they occurred closer to the war’s onset and in the last month if they occurred at or 
past the mid-point of the war.21 It is also indicated whether a state won (W) or lost 
(L) the war. Stalemates (S) are also coded. Entries which fit with the hypotheses 
outlined above in Table 6.2 are in the standard font; misses are in italics.
The actual distribution of joiners by time and motive fits the expected 
distribution fairly well. Early and mid-war balancing were both expected to be 
common behaviors. The data indicates they were: 15 states balanced in the first 
month and 21 did so mid-war out of a total of 87 cases of military intervention. That 
is 17.2 percent and 24.1 percent of the cases respectively. Of the early balancers 
nine (60 percent) had allies already in the war when they entered, consistent 
with expectations.22 Nine mid-war balancers also had alliance obligations with 
active belligerents (42.8 percent), a somewhat lower percentage as expected. 
This does not count the three states that formed balancing alliances with one of 
the belligerents after the start of the war, but prior—often by days—to the state 
joining the war. This is because such alliances were caused by the decision to join 
the war, rather than decision to join the war being caused by the alliance.23
Mid-war bandwagoning for both territorial and non-territorial spoils were also 
predicted to be common behaviors; they were, with 15 (17.2 percent) and 22 (25.2 
percent) instances respectively. As expected, mid-war territorial bandwagoning 
was influenced by alliances less than first-month territorial bandwagoning was. 
Only three states (20 percent) had alliances with belligerents – again not counting 
those that were created after the outbreak of war with active belligerents to 
facilitate bandwagoning.24 Such last-minute alliances are clearly driven by events 
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in the war, meaning both the alliance and belligerency are products of these events. 
The final behavior predicted to be likely, late territorial bandwagoning, had only 
two instances but this was 67 percent of the total instances of joining in the last 
month. Presumably many of the mid-war territorial bandwagoners hoped to end 
up in this box and simply got the timing wrong.25 Also, as discussed below, a case 
can be made that Romania’s intervention into the Second Balkan War belongs in 
the late rather than early territorial bandwagoning box.
Three behaviors were predicted as being very unlikely to occur: last-month 
balancing; last-month non-territorial bandwagoning; and first-month non-
territorial bandwagoning. The evidence supports these predictions. There are no 
cases, one case, and three cases of these behaviors respectively. Additionally, one 
of these misses, Mongolia’s (130) late non-territorial bandwagoning, is directly 
tied to the Soviet Union’s joining of the same war (Third Sino-Japanese / World 
War Two in the Pacific) in a predicted box – last-month territorial bandwagoning. 
As Mongolia was a Soviet satellite state with a very limited freedom of action 
when it came to its foreign policy, the intervention makes sense. Mongolian 
participation lowered Soviet costs and Mongolia lacked the freedom of action 
to extract territorial concessions for its participation. Saudi participation in the 
Yom Kippur War and French and Australian participation in the Invasion of 
Afghanistan are misses for the theory, but all three were allied to states already in 
the war, as expected for early joiners.26
Last, early territorial bandwagoning was predicted to happen, but only rarely. 
Eight cases fall into this box (9.2 percent). This is somewhat more frequent 
than expected, but is certainly less common than first-month balancing and all 
forms of mid-war joining. Also, it was claimed that when such early territorial 
bandwagoning did occur, it would be the result of pre-war alliances. Of the eight 
states that exhibited this behavior, five had alliances with states that were either 
the initial belligerents in the war or that had already joined the war: France in the 
War of Italian Unification, Italy in the Seven Weeks War, Germany and Japan in 
World War One, and Jordan in the Yom Kippur War.27 Of the other three states in 
this box, Romania in the Second Balkan War joined in the last month of that war, 
but closer to the beginning by four days. The Romanians were driven to enter by 
Bulgaria’s obvious military collapse and the opportunity to pick up the southern 
Dobruja cheaply. Thus, Romanian motives look more like those of a last-month 
joiner, which in fact Romania was. The other two states, Modena and Tuscany, in 
the Austro-Sardinian War, did in fact have an ante-bellum alliance with Austria, 
but ended up joining the Sardinian side. This is because their ducal governments 
were overthrown in the revolutions of 1848 and the new republican governments 
threw in their lot with Sardinia against the conservative Austrians who were trying 
to restore the overthrown dukes to power. In other words, Austria and the ducal 
governments honored their alliances thereby naturally arraying the revolutionary 
governments on the other side. Thus, Modena’s and Tuscany’s behavior appears 
to be the exception that proves the rule.
Overall, the notion that there are distinct types of joining holds up well. 
Different motives led to different types of triggering events and different timings 
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of entry. Balancers joined early out of alliance considerations and mid-war in 
response to revealed information. Bandwagoners seeking territory joined mid-
war and occasionally very late and did so in response to revealed information. 
Bandwagoners not seeking territory joined mid-war in response to negotiations 
with alliance partners. There were a few misses but they were largely explainable 
and they do not undermine the overall value of our argument.
Interestingly, bandwagoning was more common overall than balancing (51 
instances versus 36). This runs contrary to Waltz’s (1979) expectations, but is 
consistent with Schweller (1994). Obviously, as a great deal and perhaps even 
the preponderance of balancing and bandwagoning would occur during periods 
of peace rather than war and given that other behaviors like hiding are possible, 
this is not a conclusive test of Waltz’s proposition that states should tend toward 
balancing. Still, it fits with other studies that suggest Waltz’s claim is likely 
incorrect (Rosecrance and Lo 1996; Schroeder 1994; Schweller 1994).
It is also striking that 23 of the 26 states which engaged in non-territorial 
bandwagoning joined coalitions led by the United States and that 25 of the 26 
cases occurred from 1944 onwards. The former is consistent with McDonald’s 
(2015) observation of the prevalence of US-led coalitions in the post-World 
War Two era. The latter is consistent with Shirkey (2009) which finds that such 
bandwagoning should be more common in the post-World War Two era given 
the norm of territorial integrity.28 Presumably as one of the leading states of 
the post-World War Two era the United States is in a strong position to hand 
out such non-territorial spoils. Two of the three states not bandwagoning with 
the US – Mongolia in World War Two and Sardinia in the Crimean War – also 
allied themselves with leading powers. As mentioned above, Mongolia was a co-
belligerent with the Soviet Union (and technically also with the United States) 
while Sardinia joined a Franco-British coalition.
Predictions that certain behaviors were more likely to result in a state being on 
the winning side of a war were also made. These predictions had mixed results. 
Faring well were the predictions that states that joined in the last month of the 
war would win at a high rate and that there would be little relationship between 
non-territorial bandwagoning and winning for states that joined early or mid-
war. States won in all three of the last-month joining cases and early and mid-war 
non-territorial joiners won nine wars, lost five, and drew 11 (the draws are all a 
result of the Korean War), though three of these wins come from the Invasion 
of Afghanistan as COW counts that war as having ended when the Taliban fell 
and then later resumed as a new civil war. If those three wins are excluded, the 
record becomes six wins, five losses, and 11 draws. These outcomes fit well with 
the predictions.
The results for other predictions in relation to winning and losing were poor. 
Early balancers were also predicted to be more likely to win than mid-war 
balancers. In fact, they did exceptionally well, winning 14 times and drawing only 
once. However, mid-war balancers also did very well, winning 18 times, losing 
once, and drawing twice. The predictions fared equally poorly for territorial 
bandwagoners. While early territorial bandwagoners were predicted to be less 
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likely to win, they in fact won four times and lost four times – a better record than 
mid-war territorial bandwagoners which were predicted to win more often. The 
mid-war bandwagoners only won six times compared with nine defeats. Thus, 
overall balancers went 32–1–3 while territorial bandwagoners went 12–13–0 when 
last-month bandwagoners are also included. The record for bandwagoning when 
non-territorial bandwagoners are included is little changed at 18–17–11 excluding 
the three wins from the Invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, the striking result is that 
states that intervene during wars out of balancing motives do far better than those 
that join for the purpose of bandwagoning. Given that balancing is often seen 
as the more difficult behavior this is initially surprising, but it is likely a result 
of the fact the bandwagoners are often less powerful states compared with the 
states already in the war and thus their entries are unlikely to significantly affect 
the outcome of the war. Balancers, other the other hand, are often powerful states 
whose contributions to the war effort can often turn a defeat into a victory. Indeed, 
that is precisely the point of interventions driven by balancing concerns.
Conclusion
Detailed cases studies would need to be performed on those states which 
intervened militarily mid-war and in the last month of wars to know for certain 
that their leadership’s decision-making was influenced by estimates of the military 
balance, the nature of the challenge, and the nature of the opportunity. However, 
states’ aggregate behaviors are consistent with what would be expected if they 
were indeed focused on those variables. The timing of states’ entries is consistent 
with what one would expect given the broad motives of those states.
When this is combined with the fact that prior studies have found that 
military interveners are indeed influenced by battlefield results – in other words 
information about the military balance and the demands made and rewards offered 
by belligerent states (Shirkey 2009; 2012) – confidence in the conclusion that 
non-belligerent states are engaged in very similar decision-making processes as 
states in the ante-bellum period grows. Presumably states which choose to remain 
out of the fray often are making similar calculations. However, as with states 
that opt to hide prior to the war – i.e., neither balance nor bandwagon – they are 
concluding that hiding or another peaceful strategy is their best option.
Why does this matter beyond trying to explain non-belligerent states’ behavior 
during wars? It matters in part because it suggests states are always engaged to 
some degree in these sorts of calculations. In other words, states are presumably 
worried about the relative balance of forces, the nature of threats, and the nature 
of opportunities, not only when wars are likely to occur in the near future or 
are already underway, but even when war is a remote or unlikely prospect. This 
means the theory and hypotheses developed in Chapters 1, 2, and 4 can be applied 
to help understand contemporary state behavior even if it is unclear that a war is 
likely to result. This is consistent both with realist theories that see balancing and 
bandwagoning as regular behaviors in both peace and war (Schweller 1994; Walt 
1985; Waltz 1979) and bargaining theories that see state behavior as an endless 
Balancing and bandwagoning by other means 113
string of bargaining (Blainey 1973; Fearon 1995; Powell 2012; Wagner 2004; 
2007; Wolford 2014).
Chapter 7 attempts to apply the hypotheses from Chapters 1, 2, and 4 to a 
case of potential balancing, bandwagoning, and hiding during just such a peaceful 
period. It explores the contemporary case of assertive Chinese behavior in the 
South China Sea and the reaction of other states to that behavior. It also seeks to 
predict what alignments and state behaviors are likely and argues that tensions in 
the region are unlikely to lead to war in the near term.
Notes
 1 How states answer these questions in large part determines whether a period remains 
peaceful or is but a prelude to further war.
 2 This excludes the very small clash between Hungary and Slovakia – also a German 
ally – in March 1939.
 3 The act of a state becoming an active belligerent in an existing war has been variously 
called diffusion, contagion, intervention, and joining in the literature. For objections 
to the use of diffusion and contagion see Shirkey (2009). For objections to the use of 
intervention outside of a humanitarian context see Finnemore (2003).
 4 Certainly one can think of situations where it would be impossible to deploy troops 
into combat zones prior to the 30-day window expiring, but if a state had neither done 
that nor declared war, it is not clear why such a state should be considered to be at war.
 5 The United States prior to World War One would be an example of such unconcerned 
behavior, while Greece is an example of a state that was trying to hide.
 6 Of course this is only a general trend. For example, Italy famously decided not to join 
the Central Powers in 1914, with whom it had signed the Triple Alliance, but instead 
later joined the Entente in 1915.
 7 There are a couple of other findings from the intervention literature which fit with 
the arguments made in the preceding chapters. First, geographically proximate states 
are more likely to join ongoing wars than are other states (Bremer 1982; Gleditsch 
2002; Hammerström and Heldt 2002; Houweling and Siccama 1988; Leeds 2005; 
Most and Starr 1980; Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering 1994; Raknerud and 
Hegre 1997; Richardson 1960; Shirkey 2009; Siverson and Starr 1991; Starr and 
Most 1976; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998; Ward and Gleditsch 2002). This is 
consistent with, though not dependent upon, the notion that more distant states 
would be more able to successfully hide. Second, great powers are more likely to 
join wars (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering 
1994; Richardson 1960; Shirkey 2009; Siverson and Starr 1991; Wright 1965). 
Again, this is consistent with our previous arguments that smaller states should be 
more inclined to hide.
 8 States should update their expectations in response to any bargaining between third 
parties (Iklé 1964).
 9 Here Levy’s (1994) definition of learning is used whereby learning is the updating of 
expectations in light of new information.
 10 The Cuban forces were assisting the Angolan government in its civil war.
 11 States could conceivably be seeking both territorial and non-territorial spoils. For the 
purposes of categorization below, such states are considered to be seeking territorial 
rather than non-territorial spoils. See Table 6.5 for a list of COW war numbers and the 
wars they indicate.
 12 All balancers would be acting out of self-interest. Balancers are not less self-interested 
than bandwagoners.
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 13 In other words, a mid-war joiner could conceivably have an alliance with an initial 
belligerent, renege on those commitments by not intervening initially, and then join 
later due to information revealed by the war.
 14 One possible exception to this is if all parties thought the war would be brief, 
early events could indicate that would not in fact be the case. It is unclear how this 
knowledge would trigger joining or how it would alter the way in which states honor 
ante-bellum alliance commitments. We are grateful to M. J. Peterson for pointing this 
out.
 15 Even though bandwagoners cannot necessarily change the ultimate outcome of the 
war, they can reduce the costs borne by stronger states. Thus, bandwagoners are worth 
rewarding provided they join early enough to bear some costs even if they cannot alter 
the ultimate outcome of the war.
 16 Territorial bandwagoners may also delay entry due to ongoing negotiations over 
spoils (Shirkey 2009, Chapter 5).
 17 This is not to claim that non-territorial bandwagoners lack a preferred outcome for 
the war, just that their preferences and expectations for the outcome of the war are not 
central to the timing of their intervention.
 18 Thus, Table 6.4 excludes initial belligerents and states that became a belligerent by 
being attacked or invaded.
 19 Both states were among the initial belligerents in that war and are thus excluded from 
Table 6.4.
 20 Such states are not balancing even though they want to preserve the status quo of 
their own territorial alignments as they are aligned with the side that seeks to alter 
the broader status quo. Obviously, states can mix Balance of Threat motives with 
revisionist aims where they seek the territories of other states in addition to hoping to 
preserve their own borders.
 21 This results in Romania being coded as joining in the first month of the Second Balkan 
War, Jordan and Saudi Arabia being coded as joining in the first month of the Yom 
Kippur War, and the Ottoman Empire being coded as joining in the last month of the 
Second Balkan War.
 22 Members of the British Commonwealth such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa were considered as allied to the United Kingdom for the purposes of 
World War Two, both in the Pacific and in Europe.
 23 The three states are France and Britain in the Crimean War, both of which signed 
an alliance with the Ottomans days before joining the war, and Peru in the Chincha 
Islands War which became an ally of Chile but delayed declaring war so that it could 
legally take delivery of naval vessels it had purchased from Britain. At the time British 
law prevented exporting arms to belligerent powers (Burr 1980).
 24 Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire during World War One and Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania during World War Two fall into this category of forming an alliance prior to 
belligerency but after the outbreak of war.
 25 Italy and Romania in World War One both joined in response to successful Entente 
offensives and thought they were joining near the end of the war. See Renzi (1987) 
and Torrey (1998) respectively for the motives behind these states’ interventions.
 26 France and Australia are coded as winning the Invasion of Afghanistan because COW 
codes the war as ending when the Taliban fell from power in December 2001. The 
subsequent civil war is coded as another war entirely.
 27 Alliance data was taken from the COW Alliance Dataset 4.1 (Gibler 2009).
 28 See Zacher (2001) for evidence of the existence of this norm.
7 The rise of China
Will states balance, bandwagon, or 
hedge in the South China Sea today?
In 2012, Beijing released a new passport which included a map of China 
encompassing not only Taiwan, but also dozens of disputed islands in the South 
China Sea as well as territory contested with India. The passport provoked official 
protest by both the Philippine and Vietnamese governments. Border officials of 
the latter even refused to stamp the new passport. Indian officials responded by 
putting a map on visas issued to Chinese citizens featuring India’s own version of 
the disputed border (Fisher 2012; Guinto and Heath 2012; Dominion Post 2012).
This is but one minor manifestation of China’s increasing willingness to push 
its territorial claims and the responses this has provoked in its neighbors. One 
particularly contentious area for Chinese territorial claims has been the South 
China Sea. Beijing has aggressively asserted its fishing and hydrocarbon rights 
within the nine-dash line area it claims in the South China Sea (Wong 2015). This 
has led to regular clashes between Filipino and Chinese fishermen (Hernandez 
2015). Chinese naval vessels have also plied waters near Malaysian offshore oil 
and gas facilities to the discomfort of Kuala Lumpur, though in general tensions 
between China and Malaysia are not as high since their claims overlap less with 
each other than with the other parties to these disputes (Chan 2016, 175–6; Perlez 
2014b). More provocatively, China has engaged in extensive island building, 
turning small islets and submerged reefs in the Spratly Islands into full-fledged 
islands by pumping sand from the sea floor. From January 2014 to June 2015 
the Chinese created 2,000 acres of new land in the Spratlys – most notably at 
Fiery Cross Reef and 200 miles east at the appropriately named Mischief Reef 
(Cooper and Perlez 2015a; Sanger and Gladstone 2015; Wong and Perlez 2015).1 
Though there has recently been a halt in island creation, this is a result of China’s 
shift to building military facilities on those new islands, rather than a decrease in 
assertiveness from Beijing. These new facilities include a 10,000 foot runway on 
Fiery Cross Reef and hardened hangars large enough to accommodate a variety 
of military jets on Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs (Sanger and Gladstone 
2016; Wong and Perlez 2015).2 China has also invested considerable sums into 
upgrading its military capacities on Hainan Island – especially air and naval 
assets – and has established a missile battery on Woody Island in the Paracel 
Islands (Buszynski 2012, 145–6; Erickson et al. 2015; Landler and Forsythe 
2016; Storey 2011, 91). These new military facilities have considerably extended 
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the potential ranges of Chinese missiles, jets, radar, and naval patrols (Forsythe 
and Perlez 2016).
While it is natural that China’s assertiveness would grow in line with increases 
in Chinese power resources (He and Feng 2012), such actions defy the spirit of a 
non-binding 2002 agreement signed by China and the members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to avoid provocative actions in the South 
China Sea (Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China 2002). Unsurprisingly, these actions have led to 
tension between China and some ASEAN members and caused ASEAN to seek 
to deepen the agreement. In particular, ASEAN wants China to acknowledge full 
respect for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
self-restraint, and the non-use of force to resolve disputes – concessions China has 
been unwilling to make (Browne 2015). Indeed, China has slowed negotiations 
with ASEAN on a more binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea to a 
glacial pace (Browne 2015; Rapp-Hooper 2015b; Perlez 2016b). Beijing’s actions 
in the South China Sea and unwillingness to make concessions in the Code of 
Conduct negotiations have led ASEAN to state in an official release that China’s 
policies have “eroded trust and confidence and may undermine peace, security, 
and stability in the South China Sea” (Rapp-Hooper 2015a).
Chinese rhetoric has been equally tough. In May 2015 at a regional defense 
conference in Singapore, Admiral Sun Jianguo threatened that China may set up 
an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea similar to the one it has 
already established in the East China Sea (Wong 2015). That same month, embassy 
spokesman Zhu Haiquan articulated the Chinese legal position. He stated,
China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and 
their adjacent waters. The relevant construction, which is reasonable, justified 
and lawful, is well within China’s sovereignty. It does not impact or target 
any country, and is thus beyond reproach. 
 (Entous, Lubold, and Barnes 2015)
Likewise, speaking to the media in March 2014 in reference to the South China 
Sea, Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, insisted that,
As for China’s territorial and maritime dispute with some countries China 
would like to carry out equal-footing consultation and negotiation and 
properly handle by peaceful means on the basis of respecting historical facts 
and international law. There will not be any change in this position … we will 
never bully smaller countries yet we will never accept unreasonable demands 
from smaller countries.
(Wong 2014)
Given Chinese obstructionism on the Code of Conduct, unwillingness to 
recognize international courts’ jurisdiction in territorial disputes (see below), and 
unorthodox interpretations of the rights conferred by exclusive economic zones 
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(Twomey 2014), references to negotiations and international law are less than fully 
reassuring. In particular, Chinese officials insist that since their claims precede the 
signing of UNCLOS, that treaty’s provisions cannot be used to downgrade or 
limit their claims (Buszynski 2012, 140). China has also bristled at criticism from 
other states. Hua Chunying, a foreign ministry spokeswoman, reacted harshly 
in the spring of 2015 to US objections to China’s land reconstruction program, 
arguing that,
The US side made inappropriate remarks on China’s longstanding sovereignty 
as well as rights and interests in the South China Sea to foment dissention and 
criticized China’s normal and justified construction activities on islands and 
reefs. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2015)
Still, the importance of recent Chinese actions should not be overplayed. The 
man-made islands are not easily defended and do not confer maritime control 
under UNCLOS.3 Additionally, the South China Sea facilities are especially 
vulnerable to corrosion from sea water and the islets themselves are threatened 
with erosion. Most importantly, Chinese actions have done nothing to evict other 
claimants from the features they occupy. Doing so would require force and would 
be a significant escalation of current Chinese behavior (Erickson et al. 2015; 
Forsythe and Perlez 2016).
Also, the degree of change in Chinese behavior can be overstated. China has taken 
assertive actions in the past, especially prior to 2000 (Johnston 2011).4 There were 
significant tensions between China on the one hand and Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam on the other over features in the South China Sea during the early and 
mid-1990s (Acharya 2001, 135; Storey 2011, 112–14 and 255). This was followed 
by a lull in the late 1990s and early 2000s as China’s leaders focused on improving 
relations with their Southeast Asian neighbors rather than aggressively advancing 
its territorial claims (Goh 2007; Li 2010; Lim 2014, 119; Storey 2011, 65–9).
Furthermore, from a Chinese perspective Beijing’s actions can be seen as 
defensive. China’s past has made both the government in Beijing and broader 
nationalist sentiment highly sensitive to perceived territorial encroachments.5 
China is also to some degree reacting to other states’ attempts to bolster their own 
legal claims in the South China Sea and those states’ moves to exploit the Sea’s 
fishing and hydrocarbon resources. Also, the United States’ alliances with Asian 
states are often seen as directed at China and as a potential form of encirclement 
(Storey 2011, 260). This makes any US involvement in the South China Sea 
dispute appear threatening to China. In no small part, this is because Beijing sees 
control of the South China Sea as vital for ensuring it can maintain navigation 
for its exports and oil imports through the Straits of Malacca (Storey 2011, 85–
6). Thus, any powerful, foreign naval presence in the South China Sea can be 
construed as an implied economic threat. Finally, control of the South China Sea 
serves as a potential defensive shield against any military threats to southern China 
(Buszynski 2012, 141–6; Li 2010; Lim 2014, 117 and 130; Storey 2011, 91).
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That said, recent actions do indicate a significant increase in Chinese assertiveness 
since 2007 (Storey 2011, 91) and raise an important question: how will China’s 
neighbors in Southeast Asia react to the new policies that accompany China’s 
rising power?6 The previous chapters and international relations theory more 
broadly suggest at least three possibilities: bandwagoning, balancing, and hiding. 
Bandwagoners would befriend the rising power in hopes of obtaining rewards and 
increasing their security. Balancers would work to resist and hopefully block the 
growing demands of the rising state. States which hid would do so in the hope that 
by not interfering or cooperating with the rising power they would be left alone.7 
In practice, states may hedge by taking a mixed approach: working with Beijing on 
some issues while opposing it on others (Murphy 2010; Roy 2005). Indeed, some 
behaviors may defy traditional descriptions of behavior altogether. And of course, 
the various states in the region may pursue quite different policies from each other.
Still, it is worth considering whether there is a trend toward a given behavior. 
Which direction regional state behaviors lean is important not just within Southeast 
Asia but also globally as local behaviors structure the overall environment in which 
all states will interact with China. A region where many smaller states are actively 
bandwagoning with China would be far more threatening to outside states than one 
in which China’s neighbors mostly balanced against it or even hid. We argue that 
due to the geo-strategic, economic, and institutional characteristics of the region, it 
is very unlikely that any of these states will choose to bandwagon with China. The 
states in the region have the capacity and ability to resist China in important ways. 
Significant shifts in the strategic, economic and institutional situation of the region 
would have to occur to induce widespread bandwagoning with China. While this is 
not impossible, it remains highly improbable for the foreseeable future. Of course, 
an absence of bandwagoning does not mean effective balancing either. First, the 
behavior of states bordering the South China Sea may vary significantly from 
those of Southeast Asian states that have no claims in that sea with non-claimant 
states being less likely to balance. Second, states may hedge or hide in the hope of 
passing the buck to other states or to the future. Finally, even states attempting to 
balance may fail to cooperate effectively with each other. Indeed, the large number 
of states in the region, and the fact that they face a single potential threat, makes 
collective action problems a real concern (Walt 2010).
The remainder of this chapter will be organized as follows. First, the theoretical 
implications for the three types of uncertainty – intentions, capabilities, and the 
nature of the move – are considered in relation to Chinese actions in the South 
China Sea. Second, the current problem facing the states in the region will be 
examined in light of the problems faced by states in East Central Europe in the 
1930s. This comparative case study will examine the crucial differences between 
the geostrategic environment between the two regions and time periods and their 
implications for the likelihood of balancing are explored. Third, the behavior of 
states with territorial claims in the South China Sea plus that of the United States 
is described. Last, we discuss how closely the behavior of these states fits with the 
theoretical expectations derived from the types of uncertainty and the differences 
between East Central Europe and Southeast Asia.
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Types of uncertainty
By restricting the case to states’ actions in the South China Sea, the level of 
uncertainty is greatly reduced. If China’s rise was examined globally or even 
just within the entirety of Asia, uncertainty about intentions, capabilities, and 
the strategic advantage obtained by various Chinese moves would be quite 
large. For our more narrow purposes, these very large uncertainties do play a 
role in influencing US behavior in the South China Sea and suggest it will be 
quite difficult for Washington to craft policy for the long run. Trying to determine 
Chinese intentions or relative military capabilities 20 or 30 years from now is 
most difficult. In the short run, however, the nature of these uncertainties vis-à-vis 
the United States is not that much different from the ones posed by action in the 
South China Sea. Thus, it will suffice to explore the more narrow case with the 
understanding that the conclusions drawn from it only apply locally and in the 
near to medium term.
First, there is very little uncertainty about the strategic value of the Chinese 
moves. While de jure control of the South China Sea would be quite valuable, as 
will be seen below, Beijing’s actions are not significantly increasing the odds of 
such an outcome. And as far as de facto control goes, Chinese military installations 
on islets in the South China Sea – as opposed to those on Hainan Island – are quite 
vulnerable and do little to shift the military balance (Erickson et al. 2015).
Second, on the question of military capabilities there again is little uncertainty.8 
Chinese air and especially naval assets are far superior to those of any rival claimant 
and the gap is growing rather than shrinking. This would remain true even if the 
other claimants were to combine their forces. If the US Navy is brought into 
consideration, however, the balance of air and naval assets shifts strongly away 
from China. While the Chinese are developing significant sea-denial capacities, the 
US Navy remains much stronger than the People’s Liberation Army Navy and could 
render decisive aid to the other claimants if it so chose (Lim 2014). Thus, much as in 
East Central Europe in the 1930s, the balance of forces hinges on an outside power’s 
willingness to intercede. Therefore, any uncertainty about relative capabilities in the 
South China Sea boils down to uncertainty about US intentions and commitments.
Finally, there is uncertainty about Chinese intentions, but it is a limited sort 
of uncertainty. Beijing clearly intends to establish full Chinese control and 
sovereignty throughout all of the South China Sea that lies within its historical 
claim – the nine-dash line. On the other hand, Beijing has given little reason to 
believe it would seek territory beyond the line in the maritime areas of Southeast 
Asia. As will be seen below, China has successfully resolved several other 
outstanding territorial disputes with Vietnam. This helps to clarify the limits of 
Chinese aims. What is unclear is how many risks Beijing would be willing to 
run to achieve its goals. Would Beijing use large-scale military force and risk a 
serious confrontation or military clash with the United States? The possibility that 
China may escalate could make both its regional rival claimants and the United 
States wary about taking too firm a stand and makes the formation of a balancing 
coalition less likely. Thus, China’s claims are limited but threatening nevertheless.
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That said, the nature of uncertainty in the South China Sea suggests it should 
be possible to build a successful balancing coalition. The likelihood of balancing 
here depends on two factors. First, whether or not the United States is willing to 
provide both significant material support to states in the region and leadership 
around which a coalition can form. Second, whether or not the United States and 
the states in the region find taking a hard line against China’s claims in the South 
China Sea is worth potentially damaging relations with Beijing. Neither of these 
necessary conditions is guaranteed, meaning states may try to hide, hedge, or 
transcend. As will be seen below, the differences between East Central Europe 
in the 1930s and Southeast Asia today also give reasons to think that a balancing 
coalition in the South China Sea could form. At a minimum, they suggest that 
bandwagoning with China is unlikely.
Key differences between 1930s East Central Europe and Southeast 
Asia today
Many scholars have previously debated whether balancing or bandwagoning in 
Asia is more likely (Acharya 2003; Christensen 2006; Friedberg 2000; Goh 2008; 
Kang 2009; Mearsheimer 2010). This chapter differs from previous analyses in 
that we use a specific comparative case of bandwagoning – that of East Central 
Europe in the 1930s which we developed in Chapter 3 – rather than looking 
at only Asia or at centuries-long sweeps of European history as a comparison. 
There are several uncanny similarities between contemporary Southeast Asia and 
1930s East Central Europe which make the comparison relevant. First, each has a 
rising, revisionist great power with claims on territories held by its much weaker 
neighbors. Second, both China today and Germany in the 1930s had strong 
economic ties with the smaller powers in their region. Third, in both cases the 
rising power had significant co-ethnics abroad in the region. However, this last 
point is not as relevant as the first two since China’s diaspora differs from German 
minorities in Europe. Namely, the Chinese diaspora is the product of emigration 
which started in the nineteenth century, not a humiliating loss of territory.9 As a 
result, it is much less likely to be the cause of irredentist claims or to fuel popular 
nationalist demands.
Of course, the differences are equally striking and relevant. China is not 
seeking to export a doctrine of racial hatred and radical political reorganization 
and its leadership appears to be more risk averse than were the Nazis.10 Also, the 
Chinese, unlike the Germans in the 1930s who threatened the existence of all 
of the states in East Central Europe, do not pose an existential threat to any of 
their neighbors with the exception of Taiwan. These differences are important 
as they make China far less threatening and far more attractive as a partner for 
neighboring states than was Nazi Germany. Yet, despite the concerns Germany 
raised, it was able to attract a great many states to its banner. Thus, it could be 
possible for China to do the same.
What would balancing or bandwagoning behavior among Southeast 
Asian states today look like? Balancers should not only resist Chinese claims 
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diplomatically, but also engage in military buildups (internal balancing) and 
seek to forge and strengthen alliances to oppose China (external balancing). 
Bandwagoners on the other hand should seek closer political relations with 
Beijing including the formation or strengthening of military alliances. Such states 
should also move away diplomatically from the United States or other potential 
rivals of China. While closer economic relations with Beijing would be consistent 
with bandwagoning, increasing economic ties would also be consistent with a 
variety of other behaviors and could simply be the result of regional economic 
development and the global increase of international economic ties in general. 
However, closer economic relations with China which come very much at the 
intentional expense of economic relations with other states – i.e., trade diversion 
rather than trade creation – would be indicative of bandwagoning.11
Other behaviors are also possible. For instance, states could hide. These states 
would avoid taking stances on contentious security issues and maintain a low 
diplomatic profile. States could also oppose China on some issues while working 
with China on others. If these states attempted to maintain good relations with 
both China and the United States they could be seen as hedging, provided that 
the states in question saw such behavior as a way to keep future options open and 
risks low. Such behavior could also be consistent with attempts at transcending, 
provided the said states worked assiduously to reduce tensions and solve the 
underlying points of contention between China, the United States, and other 
regional players. Finally, such behaviors might not fit with any one dominant 
theme, but rather reflect a complicated basket of behaviors that vary based on the 
issue and context.
Four key differences between East Central Europe in the 1930s and Southeast 
Asia today suggest that the bandwagoning scenario is in fact very unlikely.12 
Differences in geopolitics, inter-regional disputes, regional organizations, 
and economic ties both inside and outside the region all reduce the odds of 
bandwagoning and point to the real possibility of balancing or hedging. Each of 
the four factors is explored in turn, showing first how they led to bandwagoning 
in the 1930s and then how the situation in Southeast Asia today is unlikely to lead 
to similar behaviors.
The geopolitics of great power military assistance
The geopolitics of East Central Europe in the 1930s greatly favored bandwagoning 
while those of Southeast Asia today do not. By the late 1930s Hungary, Romania, 
Finland, and Bulgaria all had bandwagoned with Nazi Germany. Even Poland and 
Yugoslavia, both of which Germany ultimately invaded, bandwagoned for a time. 
This outcome was helped by three aspects of the geography of Europe. First, East 
Central Europe was vulnerable to land invasion from Germany, while the sea 
provides a buffer for many Southeast Asian states, especially those with territorial 
claims in the South China Sea. Second, while Germany stood between the East 
Central European states and their potential great power allies, for Southeast 
Asian states the sea serves as a route for great power aid. Geography greatly 
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constrained the ability of Britain and France to aid the states in the region due to 
Germany’s central location. Chamberlain and Daladier, the British and French 
Prime Ministers, repeatedly emphasized that there was no way to get British and 
French forces to Czechoslovakia if war occurred. The western powers did have 
the ability to launch an offensive against Germany; however, given their belief in 
the superiority of defensive military tactics, this was unattractive. Furthermore, 
opening a “Western Front” was deeply unpopular at home given both the memories 
of World War One and the difficult economic situation (Shirer 1984). Indeed, in 
1939 the western powers did little more than formally declare war and mobilize 
to defend the French frontier after Germany invaded Poland. A third obstacle 
to balancing was that the British and French had little desire to help. Neither 
was sure that protecting these states was worth the risk of war. The British were 
not even sure the survival of these states was particularly important. France had 
tried in the 1920s to create a string of alliances in the region to prevent German 
resurgence. However, by the 1930s the value of these alliances to France was in 
doubt, leading Paris to weaken its commitment to its erstwhile allies. Finally, the 
states of East Central Europe were also worried about the Soviet Union and some 
saw it as a greater threat than Germany. Thus, the Soviets remained an unknown 
quantity, further complicating the situation (Schweller 2006) and making strategic 
calculations more difficult than they are today in Southeast Asia.
As was seen in Chapter 5, the elites of Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania vigorously debated whether to bandwagon with, hide from, or balance 
against Germany (Cienciala 1992; Hitchins 1994; Sakmyster 1980; Lukač 1979). 
But ultimately they knew that opposing Germany without great power assistance 
was national suicide, especially since they could not count on a coalition of 
their neighbors. All this not only made bandwagoning more attractive than the 
alternative but also eventually made it seem like the only viable option available 
for many of the states in East Central Europe.
In contrast to 1930s Europe, the geography in Southeast Asia is far more 
favorable for balancing. First, of the states with claims in the South China Sea, 
only Vietnam shares a land border with China and it has resolved its land border 
disputes as well as those in the Gulf of Tonkin with Beijing (Storey 2011, 116–
17). The rest – Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines – are all either 
offshore or significantly removed from China. This greatly reduces the immediacy 
and danger of any Chinese threats. Second, all have access to the sea, meaning 
China is unable to effectively block military aid from the United States. Indeed, 
the United States is a significant arms supplier to many of the states in the region 
(Roy 2005). The United States also has bases in Australia, Japan, and Guam which 
greatly increase its ability to project power into the region. Thus, the United States 
can offer effective military assistance in a way Britain and France could not in 
the 1930s. This is vital as the United States is the only plausible external, great 
power intervener in the South China Sea. Incidentally, this reduces the odds of 
buck-passing as the United States has no other great power to pass the buck to. It 
does not, however, eliminate the possibility as Washington could pass the buck 
to the future – a possibility that would align with British and French behavior 
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in the 1930s.13 These sea routes also allow states such as Australia and Japan to 
intervene, though any such intervention would most likely be in conjunction with, 
and certainly not in opposition to, the United States.
This argument runs contrary to some realist thought. Mearsheimer (2001) argues 
that common land borders promote balancing because a rising power presents a 
direct threat to those countries it borders. This is consistent with arguments that 
naval power and wealth are less likely to be balanced against than are land forces 
(Angell 1915; Levy and Thompson 2005; 2010; Parent and Rosato 2015). Of 
course, given the limited number of cases of rising powers and the Eurocentric 
bias of studies on balancing (Levy and Thompson 2005; 2010) it is possible that it 
is insular powers rather than any state projecting sea power that is unlikely to be 
balanced against (Blagden 2011).14 Either way, this reluctance to balance against 
sea or insular powers derives from a belief about the stopping power of water 
(Blagden 2011; Levy and Thompson 2005; 2010; Mearsheimer 2001). In other 
words, it is harder for states to project military power across oceans than across 
land borders. However, while this is a reasonable conclusion for geographically 
proximate states – France can project military power into Germany more easily 
than it can into Britain – it does not hold for distant states. Over great distances, it 
is easier to project power across water due to the ease of shipping and the inability 
of other states to block that movement. For instance, in the 1930s, it was easier 
for Britain to project military power globally than it was to project power into the 
heart of Central Europe. This ability to project power by sea was a crucial factor 
in the creation and maintenance of the British Empire in the past and likewise is 
a vital aspect of the United States’ position as the preeminent military power in 
the world today. Thus, our conclusion that the sea increases rather than decreases 
the odds of the United States providing assistance to regional actors, allowing 
Southeast Asian states to potentially engage in balancing in the South China Sea.
Mearsheimer (2001) also claims that sea borders require great powers engaged 
in balancing behavior to base military forces in the states of the smaller powers 
that are geographically proximate to the threat. Mearsheimer quite reasonably 
argues that small powers may, for reasons of sovereignty, be reluctant to allow 
foreign troops on their soil and that if the potential balancer shared a land border 
with the rising power, such basing would be unnecessary. However, if the balancer 
is physically separated from its potential allies by the rising state as France was in 
the 1930s, it may not be able to protect its potential allies. Furthermore, the threat 
to sovereignty may be reduced if the potential balancer is geographically removed 
and only naval and air assets are to be based on the smaller states’ territories. 
Thus, again sea lanes may well facilitate rather than hinder balancing in Southeast 
Asia today.
Third, the United States is more willing to back the states of Southeast Asia 
today than Britain and France were to support the states of East Central Europe 
in the 1930s.15 One factor strongly suggestive of how Washington would act in 
the event of a crisis in the region is that unlike Britain in relation to East Central 
Europe in the 1930s, the United States sees itself as having direct, national 
interests in the South China Sea. While Washington has no territorial claims in 
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the region and does not officially take sides in territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea, it does insist on the freedom of navigation through that body of water 
(Entous, Lubold, and Barnes 2015). Given that $5.3 trillion worth of goods pass 
through the South China Sea and of that total $1.2 trillion are either exported 
from or imported into US ports (Erickson et al. 2015), this is not just a matter of 
principle but one of significant material interest as well.16 Many of the goods not 
bound for the United States are headed to US allies such as Japan and South Korea 
(Kaplan 2011). Likewise, the distance that would need to be covered not only 
by merchant ships but also by US naval vessels passing from the Pacific to the 
Indian Ocean if the South China Sea were closed to international shipping would 
be significantly longer. Worse, if the sorts of maritime territorial claims China is 
advancing in the South China Sea were applied globally, a great many shipping 
lanes could be impacted. Washington has been careful to be consistent on freedom 
of navigation in recent years.17 When five Chinese naval vessels appeared off the 
coast of Alaska, the US government confirmed their right to be there (Cooper 
2015). These factors help to ensure Washington will see the region as strategically 
vital for decades to come.
Of course, it could be argued that France had a far greater interest in East 
Central Europe in the 1930s in that France’s security rested in part on its alliances 
with states in that region. However, this is debatable as it also seemed possible 
that Germany might seek to redress its borders in the east while accepting those 
in the west (see Chapter 3). In any event, the fact that France did not adequately 
balance means even significant great power interests are not a guarantee of 
balancing behavior. Not surprisingly, many Asian states still question the extent 
of Washington’s commitment, and therefore, have tended to hedge rather than 
depend fully on the United States (Sanger 2016). Even so, the contemporary 
geopolitical setting in Southeast Asia is far more propitious for effective great 
power aid overall than was East Central Europe in the 1930s.
Territorial disputes among potential balancers
Second, territorial claims between the states of Southeast Asia are much less 
divisive and more limited than those that plagued East Central Europe in the 
1930s. Germany used the disputes of the 1930s to play one state off against 
another and impose itself as an arbiter of those conflicts. Today’s disputes do 
not pose nearly as serious a barrier to cooperation and offer few opportunities to 
China for meddling.
In the 1930s almost all of the states of East Central Europe had territorial 
disputes with each other. Poland had territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. 
Hungary had claims against all of its neighbors (Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia). Bulgaria had claims against Romania, Yugoslavia, and 
Greece. Many of these disputes involved large amounts of territory, especially 
in the case of Hungary.18 These were not peripheral issues, but often formed the 
core of states’ foreign policies. In addition, these territories usually had important 
emotional and nationalistic significance to their populations which made them 
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central to domestic politics. The very legitimacy of many states was questioned, 
most especially that of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as prior to 1918 they had 
either not existed or had been much smaller in scope. The territorial disputes 
threatened to either dramatically shrink or outright destroy these states – a far 
cry from the current situation in Southeast Asia where none of the relevant states’ 
rights to exist are questioned and their mutual disputes are not central to states’ 
foreign policies or domestic politics.
These various claims in East Central Europe greatly hindered cooperation 
(Kaufman 1992, 424). For example, if Poland had worked with Romania, it would 
have made coordinating with Hungary, a state with which Poland traditionally had 
warm relations, very difficult. While Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania 
could coordinate against Hungary, they could not bring Poland or Bulgaria into such 
a league due to Polish tensions with Czechoslovakia and Bulgarian tensions with 
Romania and Yugoslavia. Even when France negotiated alliances with many states 
in the region (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia), those alliances 
had to remain bilateral pacts as multilateral agreements were simply impossible 
(Hitchins 1994). Thus, while these states were all threatened by Germany, they 
were also greatly threatened by each other, and therefore, unable to work together. 
Berlin exploited these divisions. Through its ability to arbitrate these disputes and 
the promise of territory taken from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the 
Soviet Union, Berlin was able to induce states to bandwagon with it.
China lacks such inducements. While there are important animosities between 
several states surrounding the South China Sea, their territorial disputes are largely 
limited to offshore disputes in the South China and Celebes Seas. An important 
exception is the Philippine claim to Malaysian Sabah – the so-called Northern 
Borneo Dispute. However, this claim has not been pressed since the 1960s and 
full relations between the countries were restored in 1989. The stability of this 
situation is perhaps best demonstrated by a recent incident. In February 2013 
several hundred armed militants acting under the direction of Jamalul Kiram III, a 
claimant to the defunct Sultanate of Sulu, left the Philippines and landed in Sabah 
with the stated goal of restoring the territory to the Philippines. While this led to 
a protracted and violent standoff between Malaysia and Kiram’s followers, it did 
not trigger a dispute between the two countries (BBC News Asia 2013). Malaysia 
also has a border dispute with Indonesia, but the two states are working to resolve 
it diplomatically (Rapp-Hooper 2015a). These disputes are not insignificant, but 
compared with the territorial claims in East Central Europe in the 1930s, they are 
quite manageable and do not provide China with opportunities to exploit. Given 
the lesser salience of their territorial claims on each other, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines should be able to focus on their shared 
dispute with China.19 Simply put, contemporary Southeast Asia is not a powder 
keg of regional irredentism in the way East Central Europe was in the 1930s.
What could prove more problematic are the border disputes among other 
Southeast Asian states within ASEAN. Member states, such as Cambodia and 
Thailand, do have significant border disputes with their neighbors (Acharya 2001, 
130). While such states are not party to the dispute in the South China Sea and 
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their disputes do not rise to the level of the Eastern Central European disputes of 
the 1930s, they are important. To the extent that states that are party to the South 
China Sea dispute attempt to use ASEAN to resolve their dispute with China, 
these other disputes matter. These other ASEAN states with territorial disputes 
may not want to set precedents within ASEAN for how border disputes should 
be resolved which could prejudice their own claims. This could lead these states 
to limit ASEAN’s role in producing a binding resolution in the South China Sea. 
This should be kept in mind when ASEAN is covered below.
The role of regional organizations
Third, the existence of regional organizations through which states can coordinate 
their responses to a local rising power enhances the likelihood of balancing. 
International institutions allow states to confront rising powers multilaterally 
rather than bilaterally, thereby reducing power imbalances. Regional organizations 
are crucial as it is difficult for small states to set the agendas of global institutions. 
Unlike East Central Europe during the 1930s, Southeast Asian states today have 
in ASEAN a regional organization they can turn to.
States in East Central Europe in the 1930s had no regional organizations 
through which to unite. True, the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia tried for a time to act as a regional guarantor of the 
post-World War One settlement, meaning it was an obstacle to Hitler’s ambitions. 
It had some early successes, such as preventing a Hapsburg from taking the 
vacant throne in Budapest. The alliance was even able to strengthen itself through 
increased institutionalization via the 1933 Reorganization Pact. By the mid-
1930s, however, the Little Entente had become ineffective as a result of French 
neglect, German interference through the Stojadinović government of Yugoslavia, 
and increasing economic problems. As a result, by 1936 the institution began to 
regress and in 1938 it formally dissolved (Hitchins 1994; Krizman 1978). Turning 
to the notoriously ineffective League of Nations was not an attractive option. The 
League’s dithering after Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s invasion of 
Ethiopia, made it apparent that the League was ineffective at opposing aggression. 
Even had the League been better designed, its great power members tended to 
sacrifice the interests of lesser powers to their own agendas. Thus, the states of 
East Central Europe had no effective institutional vehicle for coordinating their 
response to Germany and ultimately were left to strike the best bilateral deals they 
could with Berlin. Usually this meant bandwagoning.
Contrary to this, ASEAN offers Southeast Asian states a forum through which 
they can negotiate with China simultaneously rather than in one-on-one settings 
where they would likely be overwhelmed. While China is more powerful than 
ASEAN, the imbalance is not as great as in bilateral relations. The body – though 
not entirely united on issues regarding the South China Sea – has diplomatically 
backed members in disputes with China over the South China Sea since a 1995 
dispute between Beijing and Manila (Chan 2016, 175; Ott 2011). Also, when 
China participates in ASEAN summits, ASEAN members can and usually do 
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invite other non-member states, such as the United States and Australia, to take 
part. This further offsets China’s power. In fact, China, Australia, and the United 
States, as well as Japan and India, are involved in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF). The ARF is designed to facilitate multilateral discussions and negotiations 
between ASEAN members and other regional stakeholders. In 2010 it provided 
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with the opportunity to issue a statement 
supporting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Tellingly, Clinton was 
strongly encouraged to make such a statement by Vietnam (Ott 2011).
Additionally, global international organizations today offer more hope for 
ASEAN states than the League of Nations offered East Central European states 
in the 1930s. Even the staunchest critic of the United Nations will admit it is far 
more effective than the League ever was. Several ASEAN states have pressed 
their claims in the South China Sea at the UN, including an ongoing effort by 
the Philippines which has been supported by its fellow ASEAN members (Ott 
2011). Given the difficulty small states have in driving the UN’s agenda, however, 
ASEAN and the ARF will remain the more important venues for cooperation. Still, 
it is clear the UN offers more promise than the League did. Taken together, these 
regional and international fora have been so useful in resisting Chinese pressure 
that Beijing has discouraged their use and much prefers bilateral negotiations 
when addressing territorial disputes (Hemmings 2011).
Thus, ASEAN and the ARF provide states opposing China in the South China 
Sea with important tools for coordination which the states of 1930s East Central 
Europe lacked. Furthermore, ASEAN and the ARF, unlike the Little Entente, are 
not designed primarily as obstacles to China’s foreign policy goals and in fact 
they have proved useful to China in furthering regional economic integration. As a 
result, ASEAN and the ARF are unlikely to become targets for dismemberment by 
China. For these reasons, regional organizations can potentially play an important 
role in allowing Southeast Asian states to balance rather than bandwagon if they 
so choose.
The nature of economic ties
The fourth factor decreasing the likelihood of bandwagoning is the nature of current 
economic connections as compared with those in the 1930s. Southeast Asia today 
is characterized by multilateral interdependence while East Central Europe in the 
1930s was characterized by bilateral dependence. While there is debate about the 
extent to which economic interdependence can prevent conflict (Barbieri 1996; 
Gartzke 2007; Russett and Oneal 2001), there is agreement that unidirectional 
economic dependence often forces governments to avoid antagonizing the state 
upon which they are dependent (Hirschman 1980). As with the other factors, the 
economic relationship between Germany and the states of East Central Europe in 
the 1930s was more favorable to bandwagoning than is the relationship of China 
with Southeast Asian states today.
World War One had important economic consequences for the states of East 
Central Europe. Not only did it disrupt international trade flows which never 
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fully recovered, but also the redrawing of maps in 1919 meant the balkanization 
of prewar economies, serious economic dislocations, and consequently a very 
slow economic recovery. By 1933 what international economic cooperation had 
emerged post-bellum was in severe decline because of the Great Depression and 
the resultant beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This robbed East Central European 
states of vital export markets. Germany took advantage of this situation to 
make the states of East Central Europe dependent upon it. Hjalmar Schacht, the 
Reichsbank President, adopted the “New Plan” which aimed to achieve autarky 
as far as possible and where necessary turned to Eastern European states for 
raw materials and markets. The end result was a series of disadvantageous trade 
treaties which put the East Central European states in a dependent economic 
relationship with Germany. These states simply had no alternative to this course 
given the loss of their export markets due to globally higher tariffs. This meant 
that crossing Germany on security issues would have serious negative economic 
impacts – impacts which would be more severe for the states of East Central 
Europe than for Germany (Hirschman 1980; Leitz 1997; Spaulding 1990).
The situation in Southeast Asia today could not be more different. First, the 
strong economic ties between China, the United States, and the states of Southeast 
Asia, while not balanced, form a web of mutual economic interdependence 
(Acharya 2014), not of particular dependence as in 1930s East Central Europe. 
Southeast Asia states do have important economic ties to China which make 
maintaining good relations with China important. For instance, Vietnam imports 
low-cost manufacturing parts from China and many poor Vietnamese agricultural 
workers live in southern China (Mullany and Barboza 2014). Such ties should limit 
the reaction of Southeast Asian states to Chinese provocations in the South China 
Sea. That said, these states are not unilaterally dependent upon China. Southeast 
Asian states have trading relations with many countries, both within Asia and 
globally. Intra-Southeast Asian trade doubled as a percentage of total trade for 
Southeast Asian states between 1995 and 2005 and is larger as a percentage of 
their total trade than NAFTA is for its member states (Acharya 2014). Thus, while 
these states benefit from trade with China, they have many trading partners and 
their relations are web-like rather than resembling a hub-and-spoke system.
Furthermore, these ties are important to China as well and severing them would 
cost China markets for its exports and suppliers for low-cost imports (Storey 
2011, 134–44; 161; 172–5; 185–6; 224–7). Southeast Asian and Chinese trade 
is characterized by horizontal rather than hierarchical relationships (Men 2007) 
and regional trade is functionally integrative in nature (Dent 2008). There are also 
flows of foreign direct investment going in both directions between China and 
Southeast Asian states (Storey 2011, 203–4; 241–4). Crucially, China’s economic 
ties with Southeast Asia are strongest with those states which are parties to the 
South China Sea dispute. Chinese trade ties to the maritime states of Southeast 
Asia are twice as large as Chinese ties to the mainland Southeast Asian states 
(Storey 2011, 85).20 These economic ties to date have tended to dampen, rather 
than exacerbate, maritime disputes (Chan 2016, 56–7; Koo 2009). Therefore, 
while economic ties with China may reduce incentives to take a hard line, they 
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likewise limit China’s incentives to provoke a rupture and are structured such that 
these states can push back against Chinese claims without overly endangering 
their economies.
Of course, the importance of economic ties with China could also limit how 
outside parties respond to Chinese actions. Such ties make an open, explicit 
US policy of containment towards China – à la US policy toward the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War – unworkable and unappealing (Carpenter 2014). 
Other potential outside interveners in the South China Sea dispute have equally 
strong incentives to avoid antagonizing China. For example, Australia engages 
in significant trade with China. These economic ties induced Australia to join 
China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank despite its concerns about 
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and American calls to remain aloof 
from the Bank (Perlez 2015c). Yet, these broader economic ties also insure states 
will pay attention and react to Chinese moves in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 
They also mean China has additional incentives to not provoke third parties as 
China benefits significantly from those relationships. Thus, while economic ties 
create incentives to mute responses to Chinese actions, they also create incentives 
to react to those actions and for the Chinese to limit those actions.
Second, while the Great Depression of the 1930s shattered the fragile economic 
ties that had been slowly reestablished in the 1920s, the financial crisis of 2007–
09 and its global economic repercussions have not diminished international 
economic cooperation in the same manner or degree. Trade levels have remained 
high globally, giving Southeast Asian states many possible trading partners. This 
is neither to minimize the economic challenges which arose from the 2007–09 
crisis nor to suggest all is well with the global economy today. Rather it is to 
point out that these economic dislocations did not lead to the increased trade 
barriers and beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s. Also, given that severing 
ties would significantly hurt China as well as ASEAN members and given that 
ASEAN states could find at least partial substitutes for trade with China, Beijing 
should be reluctant to sever trade in an attempt to gain political leverage. Doing 
so would weaken China’s economy and the odds that it would induce Southeast 
Asian states to make political concessions are far lower than they were in Europe 
in the 1930s. Indeed, since the enactment of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 
in 2010 regional trade has grown significantly even as territorial disputes have 
heated up (Ott 2011; Storey 2011, 78–81). Thus, these trade ties have proven 
resilient and are unlikely to force ASEAN members to bend to China’s will.
Third, continued Chinese economic growth depends on maintaining trading 
connections with the world at large. This in turn requires China to be seen as 
largely playing by the rules. This has led Beijing to back off from more provocative 
positions and not push as hard as one might otherwise expect. For instance, China 
relented by ending its restrictions on the export of rare earth minerals in order to 
comply with a World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling. To be sure, shifts had 
occurred in the rare earths market which made restricting exports less appealing 
in both economic and political terms, but nevertheless China was willing to play 
by the rules when the WTO court’s ruling went against it (Gholz 2014).
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This comparison between 1930s Europe and Southeast Asia today suggests 
that states bordering the South China Sea are unlikely to bandwagon with China. 
In fact, it would take a dramatic reversal in these four factors for this to become 
a likely foreign policy alternative: e.g., a major increase in Chinese power 
projection capacities; the collapse of ASEAN; the withdrawal of the United States 
from the region; and a dramatic breakdown of economic cooperation in the region 
and across the Pacific. Of course, these factors are interdependent and interactive. 
For instance, an increase in the level of territorial squabbling amongst Southeast 
Asian states would not only create an opening for China to become an arbitrator 
of those disputes, but it would also weaken ASEAN and possibly disrupt regional 
trade. Thus, deterioration in one of the factors could lead to deterioration in the 
rest. But this is not an inevitable slippery slope. Rather a series of sustained crises 
in each of these areas would be needed. Thus, contemporary conditions suggest 
that significant pressures to bandwagon are unlikely to form.
State behavior in the South China Sea today
Does actual state behavior fit with these predictions? Are states with claims 
in the South China Sea balancing, bandwagoning, hiding, or hedging? Do 
Washington’s policies and actions support the contention that the United States is 
likely to aid states if they resist Chinese encroachments in the South China Sea? 
Is ASEAN playing an important and productive role? Each of these questions 
will be address below.
States with territorial claims in the South China Sea
States with claims to the reefs, shoals, and islets in the South China Sea have 
taken a series of actions to resist China’s growing assertiveness in advancing 
its own claims to these features. The actions broadly fall into three categories: 
direct resistance within the South China Sea and modest increases in military 
budgets; attempts to draw closer to the United States; and the use of international 
institutions and legal instruments to challenge Chinese claims and actions in 
court. Each will be covered in turn.
China’s occupation of reefs and islands in the South China Sea has not cowed 
its smaller neighbors. Rather they have matched the tactic. Vietnam has occupied 
twenty-nine such features and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan have 
occupied another fourteen features between them (Kaplan 2011; Rapp-Hooper 
2015a). Manila has removed markers placed by Beijing on islets within the zone 
claimed by the Philippines (Buszynski 2012, 142). All of these states have built 
military facilities on at least some of the features they occupy and have engaged 
in limited land-reclamation efforts (Erickson et al. 2015; Rapp-Hooper 2015a).21
There have also been direct confrontations. Since 2005 there have been regular 
clashes between Chinese fishing vessels and those of Vietnam and the Philippines. 
In 2011, Chinese ships harassed Philippine and Vietnamese oil exploration vessels 
(Buszynski 2012, 141–4). More recently in May 2014, the Chinese attempted 
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to advance their claims in the Paracels by deploying an oil exploration rig. This 
resulted in a series of confrontations over the course of several weeks between 
Chinese ships and Vietnamese Sea Guard ships and fishing vessels, with each side 
deploying water cannons and using ramming tactics. This resulted in the injury of 
several Vietnamese sailors and the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel (Mullany 
2014; Mullany and Barboza 2014; Perlez 2014a; Perlez and Bradsher 2014). The 
incidents resulted in anti-Chinese rioting in Hanoi and the self-immolation of a 
woman in Ho Chi Minh City in an attempt to pressure the government into taking 
an even stronger line with the Chinese (Bradsher 2014a; Perlez 2014a). In the same 
month, the Philippines detained eleven Chinese fishermen as a result of the dispute 
over Half Moon Shoal in the Spratly Islands (Mullany 2014; Mullany and Barboza 
2014).22 More recently, Chinese fishing vessels and Indonesian naval ships engaged 
in a series of confrontations between April and June 2016. These clashes resulted 
in injuries and the seizure of a Chinese fishing vessel (Cochrane 2016a).
Additionally, while these states cannot win a naval confrontation with China 
without US aid, they do seem willing to invest in their own security. Defense budgets 
on average have risen by a third over the last decade, with a focus on naval assets 
and aviation (Acharya 2003; Kaplan 2011). In October 2014, Malaysia decided 
to increase its defense budget by 10 percent and the Philippines has adopted a 
15-year naval modernization plan focused on fast-attack craft, submarines, stealth 
frigates, and anti-submarine warfare helicopters. Manila has acted on this plan 
by purchasing a variety of transport and patrol vessels as well as two older US 
Coast Guard cutters (Green 2014; Rapp-Hooper 2015a). Likewise, Vietnam has 
recently purchased anti-ship and land-attack missiles from Russia (Rapp-Hooper 
2015a). Discussions have also begun to create a joint training program between the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei (Rapp-Hooper 2015a).23
This is not to claim that Southeast Asian states seek military conflict with 
China. The vast majority of states in the region desire good relations with China 
in order to maintain economic cooperation (Rapp-Hooper 2015a). Compromise 
solutions such as negotiations or arbitration over the territorial disputes are 
possible and so are mixed approaches. Malaysia, for instance, allows American 
P-8 Poseidon surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft to take off from Borneo and 
is exploring further military cooperation with its neighbors and the United States, 
while simultaneously engaging in joint military exercises with China (Perlez 
2014b; Rapp-Hooper 2015a).
Nor is it to claim that attempts by Southeast Asian states to resist Chinese claims 
have always been successful; they have not. For instance, the Philippines abandoned 
the rich fishing grounds around Scarborough Shoal to China after Beijing refused to 
abide by a US-brokered deal (Perlez and Bradsher 2014) and Manila’s attempts to 
increase the US presence in the Philippines were tied up in court by Filipinos who 
still resent the former US occupation of and influence in the country (Hernandez 
2015; Whaley 2014). Likewise, Vietnamese moves toward closer relations with the 
United States, while real, remain tentative to the frustration of some Vietnamese 
elites outside of the government (Perlez 2016d; Tuong 2014) and internal divisions 
about the wisdom of moving closer to the United States are shaping succession 
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politics in Vietnam at the highest level (Ives 2016a; 2016b). Two manifestations of 
this reluctance on Hanoi’s part for closer relations have been the limited scale of 
the annual joint military exercises with the United States Navy and the denial of US 
requests for access to Cam Ranh Bay (Perlez and Bradsher 2014).24 Furthermore, 
despite spending increases, these states’ defenses remain limited. The Philippine 
armed forces are especially weak, lacking both submarines and fighter jets. Its 
navy remains very small and consists mainly of vessels from the World War Two 
era (Bradsher 2014b; Hernandez 2015).
Also, the Chinese military is not standing still. For 2015, the military budget 
increased by 10 percent to $145 billion which is roughly in line with annual 
increases over the last 20 years (Twomey 2014; Wong and Buckley 2015; Wong, 
Perlez, and Buckley 2015). These budget increases have occurred while the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been reducing its numbers. This is the result 
of the PLA’s substantial modernization effort which focuses on naval and air assets 
– the very systems that would be relevant in any military conflict in the South 
China Sea – at the expense of infantry formations. Modernization is crucial, as 
only with modernization can China project force long distances from its shores.25 
Specifically, China has focused on sea control and sea denial capabilities rather 
than on abilities to project power past the so-called first island chain (Lim 2014, 
94).26 The Chinese have developed quite capable anti-ship missiles with impressive 
ranges and a reasonably capable submarine fleet (Buszynski 2012, 145–6; Lim 
2014, 87–92). Such capabilities would be more than sufficient to defeat the navies 
of its Southeast Asian neighbors and greatly increase the risks for US Navy ships 
operating within the South China Sea.27 What China lacks is a first class surface 
fleet and the supply and amphibious capabilities that would be necessary for 
projecting power past the second island chain into the open Pacific.28 Beijing has 
done little to address these deficiencies. Thus, the modernization effort for the 
time being is aimed at shifting regional power realities rather than surpassing the 
United States Navy (Foot 2006; Lim 2014, 75–82).29 Though by the PLA’s own 
estimates such efforts would not make China a global military power until 2050 
(Kroenig 2015), they would increase China’s ability to project power off of its 
coasts much sooner. And of course, given China’s size and growing wealth there 
is no way for its rivals in the South China Sea to match its might. Thus, while 
Vietnam and the Philippines have taken steps to resist Chinese moves, the local 
military balance remains decidedly and increasingly in China’s favor.
The United States
The United States’ role in the South China Sea is determined in part by the desire 
of regional actors for an increased US presence. The Philippines has lobbied the 
United States for support in their disputes with China (Wall Street Journal 2011). 
Manila’s desire to bring in outside parties to the dispute is nicely illustrated by the 
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman, Charles Jose’s statement 
to the media in May 2015 arguing that “The Philippines believes that the US, 
as well as all responsible members of the international community, do have an 
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interest and say in what is happening in the South China Sea” (Entous, Lubold, 
and Barnes 2015). Former Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III was 
particularly strident in his calls for aid from the United States. He directly and 
rather hyperbolically compared his country’s plight to that of Czechoslovakia in 
1938 stating in a media interview,
If we say yes to something we believe is wrong now, what guarantee is there 
that the wrong will not be further exacerbated down the line? At what point 
do you say, “Enough is enough?” Well, the world has to say it – remember 
that the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent 
World War Two. 
 (Bradsher 2014b)
Philippine entreaties have had some success. Washington, via the Manila 
Declaration, renewed its commitment to the defense of the Philippines (Hemmings 
2011) and US military aid doubled in 2015 to $50 million, with discussions of 
it rising to $300 million (Hernandez 2015). Washington has provided funds for 
the modernization of Philippine patrol ships and the acquisition of unmanned 
surveillance blimps (Whaley 2016a). Furthermore the Philippine government 
agreed in 2014 to allow the United States to station a limited number of troops and 
materiel at Philippine military bases. This agreement was expanded in April 2016 
to allow the United States to base 200 servicemen and women at five Philippine 
facilities for the next ten years (Whaley 2016a; 2016b). Manila has even mulled 
over inviting the United States to return to Subic Bay (Hernandez 2015), though 
this seems unlikely to occur. Joint American–Filipino training exercises, as well 
as joint air and naval patrols, have become common (Whaley 2016b). Whether 
the recent election of Rodrigo Duterte, who has a well-known antipathy toward 
the United States and has said he is open to bilateral discussions with Beijing over 
the South China Sea, to the Presidency of the Philippines will derail these moves 
toward closer ties remains to be seen (Paddock 2016; Sanger 2016). Certainly, 
Beijing at least believes there is an opening to improve ties with the Philippines as 
China has slowed the planned construction of military facilities on Scarborough 
Shoal since Duterte’s election (Perlez 2016b). Likewise, the election of Donald 
Trump as US president further complicates these relationships and deepens the 
uncertainty. On the one hand, Duterte has welcomed the election of Trump. 
On the other hand, Trump’s willingness to challenge longstanding diplomatic 
understandings in order to ‘get a better deal’ could lead to questions about the 
solidity of US commitments in the region. Weeks before his inauguration Trump 
has already angered Beijing by accepting a phone call from the president of 
Taiwan on December 2, 2016 and openly questioning the One-China Policy on 
December 11, 2016.
US ties with other states in the region have also been strengthened. Washington 
has concluded medical and nuclear technology deals with Hanoi (Hemmings 2011) 
and the United States lifted the ban on the export of military hardware to Vietnam 
in 2014 (Kroenig 2015). The United States has also drawn closer to Singapore. In 
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2004, Singapore opened the Changi naval base which hosts a US Navy logistics 
unit, four US littoral combat ships on a rotational basis and can accommodate a 
US aircraft carrier (Roy 2005; Selden 2013). The United States is a major supplier 
of military hardware to Singapore and the government of Singapore generally sees 
the Americans as a stabilizing force in the region (Storey 2011, 235–7). Likewise, 
Washington lifted the ban on military-to-military contacts with Indonesia and its 
decades-old arms embargo on Vietnam (Buszynski 2012, 148; Harris 2016). The 
US Navy has also engaged in repeated joint exercises with Indonesia, Vietnam, 
and Malaysia and has at times deployed aircraft carrier groups to the region with 
the intent of influencing Chinese behavior (Perlez 2016c; Roy 2005; Rapp-Hooper 
2015a; Storey 2011, 224–7; Whaley 2014).
Even so, many of these states still feel insecure. This insecurity no doubt arises 
in part from Washington’s focus on maintaining the freedom of navigation rather 
than support for the smaller states’ territorial claims. The United States does not 
recognize Manila’s or Hanoi’s claims to any features in the South China Sea 
and has been clear that it does not believe its defense pact with the Philippines 
covers the South China Sea (Buszynski 2012, 149). Crucially, while American 
officials have denounced Chinese actions – in 2014 then Secretary of Defense 
Chuck Hagel said China was engaged in “intimidation and coercion” and had 
“undertaken destabilizing, unilateral actions asserting its claims in the South 
China Sea” (Cooper and Perlez 2014) – their rhetoric has mainly reflected the 
focus on US navigation rights rather than states’ territorial claims. For instance, 
US Secretary of State John Kerry, in a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang 
Yi, emphasized concerns about land reclamation and called for the security of sea 
lanes and fishing grounds to be managed in accordance with international law 
(Gordon 2015). He did not weigh in on the merits of Hanoi’s and Manila’s claims. 
US President Barack Obama reiterated these concerns about reclamation and free 
navigation in November 2015 at a Pacific Rim economic summit (Shear 2015).
American actions have likewise focused on navigation rights. The United 
States has engaged in overflights of Chinese reclamation projects, insisting they 
are in international air space (Cooper and Perlez 2015a) and sent a guided missile 
cruiser within twelve miles of the Chinese-occupied Subi Reef in October 2015 
(Cooper and Perlez 2015b).30 This reef was carefully chosen as before Chinese 
reclamation projects it was submerged at high tide and therefore is not entitled to 
the twelve-mile limit under UNCLOS (Cooper and Perlez 2015a).31 Washington 
has regularly conducted similar patrols throughout 2016 (Cooper 2016). These 
actions were clearly chosen for their legal implications and focus on the right of 
navigation rather than on who controls various features in the South China Sea. In 
defending the patrol, US Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr. indicated that it was in line 
with global US policy, stating that, “We’ve been conducting freedom of navigation 
operations all over the world for decades, so no one should be surprised by them. 
The South China Sea is not, and will not, be an exception” (Perlez 2015b). The 
US legal position is such that it runs counter to the maritime territorial claims of 
any state which would use reclaimed land or partially submerged features to assert 
sovereignty over what Washington sees as open water.
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Consistent with this, US commitments to aid the Philippines in the South 
China Sea have remained limited. After Obama was rather vague in May 2014 
on whether the US would defend the Philippines against a Chinese attack, the 
farthest US Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes would go in reassuring 
Manila was to state,
We have reaffirmed our support for mutual defense treaties with allies in the 
region and have supported the efforts of the Philippines to pursue international 
arbitration to resolve maritime disputes. 
(Perlez and Bradsher 2014)
Given the United States’ view of what its defense pact with the Philippines 
requires, this statement did not commit the United States to action in the South 
China Sea. Even Rhodes’ limited reassurance was undercut a few weeks later 
when clashes occurred between Chinese, Vietnamese, and Philippine vessels. 
An anonymous US official, rather than denouncing Beijing’s actions, instead 
stated that “None of the countries are helping matters” (Cooper and Perlez 2014). 
Understandably, Filipino officials remain unsure as to the reliability of US security 
guarantees.
Partially in response to Washington’s less than certain commitment, states 
in the region have attempted to strengthen their relations with other potential 
interveners in the conflict. For instance, the Philippines has engaged in joint 
military exercises with Australia and Japan and worked to obtain diplomatic 
support from India. Likewise, Vietnam has undertaken military exercises with 
India and has improved ties with Japan (Rapp-Hooper 2015a). These efforts have 
borne some fruit. Japan is considering aerial patrols in the South China Sea. 
Australia has publically stated its opposition to recent Chinese actions. Finally, 
India has declared its support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea 
and signed an agreement with the United States in 2015 to keep sea-lanes open 
(Buszynski 2012, 143; Rapp-Hooper 2015a).
Regardless whether Washington wants to increase its commitment to Vietnam 
and the Philippines or remained more narrowly focused on the issue of the 
freedom of navigation, it faces several thorny challenges in crafting a response to 
Chinese maritime claims and land reclamation. First, it faces a problem of dual 
deterrence (Crawford 2003; Jervis 1994). While Washington wants to keep China 
from taking aggressive actions and effectively asserting sovereignty over the 
South China Sea, it also wants to discourage allies such as the Philippines from 
taking actions which could lead to a militarized dispute.32 As Vikram J. Singh, the 
former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, 
said after encounters between Vietnamese and Chinese vessels in May 2014,
Wars start from small things, often by accident and miscalculation – like 
dangerous maneuvers by aircraft that result in a collision or aggressive moves 
that lead to an unexpected military response. 
(Cooper and Perlez 2014)
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In other words, Washington fears that states may take overly risky actions if they 
are assured of US support in any military confrontation that may follow. Some 
observers argue US actions have already emboldened Hanoi and Manila (Wu 
2014). Thus, though the Americans want to deter China, they also want to restrain 
other parties and avoid entrapment. When the challenge of dual deterrence is 
combined with Chinese salami-slicing tactics where each move is calculated to 
be below the threshold which would warrant an armed response (Browne 2015; 
Schelling 1966), Washington faces a particularly thorny problem when it comes 
to designing responses to Chinese assertiveness. It is easy to do too little and also 
easy to do too much.
Second, the United States is unable to focus squarely on the South China Sea 
or even Asian matters more broadly. Washington is often distracted by events 
in the Middle East or Eastern Europe and it is particularly difficult to confront 
Chinese and Russian aggressiveness simultaneously. Furthermore, even within 
Asia the Americans often want or need Chinese cooperation – for instance in 
dealing with North Korea (Choe 2016; Christensen 2011; Green 2014). On top 
of this, it is not at all clear that public support exists within the United States for 
a policy of containment (Green 2014, 206). Finally, if Chinese moves are driven 
in part by defensive motives as some argue (Twomey 2014), US actions which 
aggressively counter Chinese moves could make matters worse by aggravating 
the security dilemma (He and Feng 2012). Beijing is well aware of these tensions 
and has attempted to exploit them. Chinese officials have tried to signal that any 
US action challenging Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea would result 
in worse relations. As Hugh White, a former Australian defense official observed 
in relation to Beijing’s island building and oil exploration,
China is deliberately doing these things to demonstrate the unsustainability 
of the American position of having a good relationship with China and 
maintaining its alliances in Asia, which constitute the leadership of the 
United States in Asia. 
(Cooper and Perlez 2014)
Of course, the Chinese have much the same problem as the Americans. Beijing 
wants to maintain good economic relations with Southeast Asian states and with 
the United States (Wu 2014) just as much as Washington wants to maintain ties 
with China. Beijing certainly does not want to provoke a US policy of containment 
that mimics US policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Neither 
Beijing nor Washington wants the South China Sea to become the main issue in 
their relationship.
When combined with the fact that military balancing is inherently costly, 
a third challenge arises: free-riding. An overly robust US response to Chinese 
assertiveness could convince US allies and other states that they do not need to 
do the heavy lifting (Carpenter 2014). Many Asian states see the United States as 
a public good provider – specifically as a provider of stability and security (Goh 
2011, 387). This has led states in the region to welcome the US’s presence, but 
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also to underinvest in their own defense. For instance, even Japan – one of the few 
states in the region with the economic resources to confront China – spends very 
little on defense in relative terms when compared with the United States. Japanese 
defense spending remains quite low and seems unlikely to increase substantially 
in the near future. Even marginal increases have encountered significant domestic 
resistance (Holmes 2012; Scanlon 2014; Spitzer 2013).33 Likewise, as discussed 
above, Philippine defenses remain anemic. Given that ASEAN states have 
economies and populations far smaller than China’s and cannot unilaterally 
confront China, they face strong temptations to pass the buck. Of course, this 
limited capacity also reduces the inherent problems associated with free-riding 
as the contributions of many of the states bordering the South China Sea are not 
strictly necessary to construct a successful balancing coalition. Still, burden-
sharing is always useful and to the extent that local actors know they would 
have to pay costs, it may restrain them and help avoid some of the problems of 
dual deterrence discussed above. These challenges have likely contributed to the 
murkiness of the US position in regards to the South China Sea.
At the end of the day, how much help these states can expect from third parties 
is an open question. Washington has been vague about its stance when it comes 
to potential clashes over disputed territory in the South China Sea. When queried 
whether Washington would aid Manila if push came to shove in the South China 
Sea, US Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert quickly responded “Of course, we would 
help” before adding “I don’t know what that help would be specifically” (Sanger 
and Landler 2014). Furthermore, as suggested above there are limits to how 
much regional actors want the Americans to do. As Rhodes put it, “The countries 
in the region want the United States to be present and to be a stabilizing force, 
but they also don’t want tension between the United States and China, certainly 
not at a high pitch” (Sanger and Landler 2014). Such views undoubtedly reflect 
Washington’s preferences as well.
The role of ASEAN and international law
Another avenue of resistance to Chinese territorial claims is through regional 
institutions and international law. Such an approach is useful as not only can 
institutions and law help smaller states resist great power pressure, they can also 
allow states to resist in ways that limit the severity of the confrontation. While the 
use of law and institutions do not make war unthinkable, they do constrain Chinese 
power and militate against the likelihood of war (Acharya 2014). Furthermore, 
Southeast Asian states, even those with good relations with the United States, do not 
want Washington to force them into choosing between China and the United States 
(Wu 2014, 210). States in the region wish to retain flexibility and many of them 
engage in hedging behavior (Acharya 2001, 180; Goh 2011, 387). For example, 
Singapore – a state with excellent relations with Washington – prefers cordial 
relations between Beijing and Washington and also wants to retain diplomatic 
room for maneuver (Storey 2011, 238–9). Its government’s main fear in regards to 
the South China Sea, given that Singapore has no territorial claims, is that disputes 
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there could destabilize the entire region (Storey 2011, 245–6). Thus, any solution 
to the overlapping territorial claims which heightens rather than reduces tensions is 
counterproductive in Singaporean eyes, no matter which states end up possessing 
the various features in the South China Sea. Such a view is hardly limited to 
Singapore, but rather is common among Southeast Asian states that do not have 
claims in the South China Sea. Thus, resolving the disputes through mediation – 
something both intergovernmental institutions and international law are explicitly 
designed to do – appeals to many Southeast Asian states.
ASEAN has played the main role in regional efforts to address the competing 
claims in the South China Sea. Since its creation, ASEAN has been seen as a 
potential vehicle for resolving regional disputes without the use of force and as a 
means to “enhance the bargaining power of small and weak states in their dealings 
with the Great Powers” (Acharya 2001, 52). None other than Lee Kuan Yew, the 
now deceased long-time Prime Minister of Singapore, stated that ASEAN would 
help to ensure that smaller powers in the region would “have their interests taken 
into consideration when the great powers make their compromises” (Acharya 2001, 
52). Thus, ASEAN would seem well suited to deal with a territorial dispute which 
involves several smaller states and two great powers either directly or indirectly.
Certainly, ASEAN has tried to resolve the dispute. It has taken a number of 
steps over the last two decades to address the South China Sea dispute, though it 
has moved in its customarily slow manner much to the frustration of the Americans 
(Acharya 2001, 132 and 178). Much of ASEAN’s efforts to mediate the South 
China Sea dispute have been through the ARF which was created in 1995. The 
ARF includes not only ASEAN members, but also many other states which are 
stakeholders in various regional issues, including China and the United States. 
This allows the various stakeholders in the South China Sea dispute to meet in a 
forum of which they are members and it also ensures through the inclusion of the 
United States that China cannot simply overpower ASEAN in the negotiations. 
Not surprisingly, China has resisted the use of the ARF for addressing territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea. Initially, Beijing opposed any inclusion of the 
South China Sea dispute on the ARF’s agenda, claiming that the ARF is “not 
an appropriate place” to resolve the dispute and that “the most effective way to 
handle this dispute is through bilateral negotiations” (Acharya 2001, 177). While 
Beijing ultimately relented to talks within the ARF, it still insists the ARF cannot 
have a managerial role in resolving the dispute and has yet to feel constrained by 
the ARF’s norms when it comes to the South China Sea (Goh 2011, 380–2). The 
main effect of the ARF may well be to grant legitimacy to the United States’ role 
in the South China Sea dispute and perhaps ultimately to cloak Chinese power 
(Goh 2011, 381).34
Given the weaknesses inherent in the ARF and ASEAN’s past difficulties 
in getting participants in negotiations to come to agreement, it is unsurprising 
that these efforts have borne limited fruit. The main achievement was the 2002 
non-binding agreement to avoid provocative actions in the South China Sea 
(Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China 2002). As discussed above, China’s actions since 
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2007 have run contrary to the spirit of this accord. ASEAN’s efforts to mediate the 
South China Sea dispute through the ARF have largely failed for several reasons. 
First, ASEAN emphasizes member sovereignty and non-interference, meaning 
ASEAN, by design, has very limited abilities when it comes to forcing compromise 
on states. This non-threatening aspect makes ASEAN negotiations attractive, but 
it also limits their effectiveness (Acharya 2001, 57; Ba 2010; Emmers and Tan 
2011; Goh 2011). Second, China has consistently resisted multilateral approaches 
to the South China Sea dispute (Storey 2011, 90). Third, ASEAN is not a vehicle 
for regional military cooperation (Acharya 2001, 61). Fourth, historically ASEAN 
has served as a vehicle to promote bilateral talks rather than as a multilateral 
forum. Yet, on the issue of the South China Sea member states wish to proceed 
multilaterally to increase their leverage vis-à-vis China (Acharya 2001, 178). This 
has required ASEAN to develop new ways of doing business, further slowing its 
actions. Finally, as long as China can pursue a forward agenda in the South China 
Sea without prompting serious ruptures in its relations with the United States 
and members of ASEAN, Beijing has little reason to desist and accept ASEAN 
mediation.
Parties to the South China Sea dispute have not limited their appeals to 
institutions and international law to ASEAN. The Philippines in particular has 
made use of legal instruments to resolve their disputes with the Chinese, though 
at times this has backfired. As discussed above, the Philippines accepted US 
mediation over Scarborough Shoal and withdrew from the disputed area with the 
understanding China would do the same. Instead China assumed control of the 
shoal, leaving then President Aquino at pains to emphasize that Manila has not 
renounced any of its territorial claims in the South China Sea (Bradsher 2014b).
Despite this setback, Manila has sought a variety of legal means to pursue its 
territorial claims in the South China Sea. For example, Manila has appealed to 
the United Nations, albeit to little effect (Whaley 2014). More importantly, in 
its dispute over South Johnson Reef, Manila has pursued a lengthy legal route. 
It formally protested to China in April 2014, then raised the issue at an ASEAN 
summit in May 2014, and finally took the case before the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague which agreed to hear the case in late October 2015 
(Deutsch 2015). The Court ruled in Manila’s favor, concluding that Chinese actions 
near Scarborough Shoal had caused environmental damage, that the feature was 
too small to be used for a territorial claim, and that therefore the area lay within 
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, meaning that Chinese fishing activities 
there were illegal (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2016). Importantly, the Court’s 
ruling did not give sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal to the Philippines and if the 
Court’s logic was applied to the rest of the South China Sea, it likely would mean 
that none of the features would be large enough to serve as bases to claim the 
surrounding waters as sovereign territory.35 There are indications that other parties 
to the South China Sea dispute may attempt to use the case to their advantage 
given the ruling in Manila’s favor (Escritt 2015; Harris 2016).36
That said, Cambodia – a state with close ties to China – blocked an attempt 
by the Philippines to have ASEAN release a joint statement which referenced the 
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ruling (Mogato, Martina, and Blanchard 2016). There are also concerns that the 
ruling may cause China to become more assertive in advancing its territorial claims 
rather than less. Some have even raised the possibility of China establishing an air 
defense zone over the South China Sea, though that has yet to happen (Hunt and 
Jiang 2016). Thus, though the ruling puts pressure on China it will not necessarily 
cause states to shift their positions on the disputes in the South China Sea.
That said, exactly what result the ruling will produce on the ground is unclear 
given that China has refused to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction and has said it 
will ignore the ruling (Bradsher 2014a; Hernandez 2015; Perlez 2015a; 2016a; 
2016b). This is consistent with China’s resistance to the application of UNCLOS 
to any of its maritime disputes (Bradsher 2014b). To the extent that China does not 
want to be seen as an outlaw state – Beijing wants to be able to use international 
law and international institutions to advance its interests in other issue areas – 
these lawsuits do apply real pressure even if they are unlikely to halt Chinese 
assertiveness by themselves (Browne 2015).
Thus, Southeast Asian states have turned to institutions and international law 
in their dispute with China over the South China Sea. While these mechanisms 
appear unlikely to bring about a resolution to the issue anytime soon, they do 
appear to enhance those states’ abilities to confront China in ways that are less 
likely to provoke a serious rupture.
Conclusion
There is little reason to believe Southeast Asian states would feel compelled to 
wilt in the face of Chinese territorial claims. Outright bandwagoning with China 
is unlikely. States with claims in the South China Sea will continue to resist 
Chinese territorial aspirations, albeit while simultaneously continuing to engage 
in mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Beijing. The main elements 
of uncertainty that exist are to what degree the United States would intervene in 
any conflict in the South China Sea and how aggressively China will pursue its 
territorial claims in the future. There is little uncertainty about the nature of the 
Chinese moves. They do very little to shift the balance of power or even improve 
China’s legal claims. Likewise, there is no uncertainty about the military prowess 
of China relative to the other claimant states. China’s military is vastly superior. 
While there is some uncertainty as to how well the US Navy would be able to 
cope with China’s newer sea denial technologies, it is still quite clear that the US 
Navy outclasses the PLA Navy in general. Thus, the sort of uncertainties covered 
in Chapters 1, 2 and 4 suggest US policy is crucial for determining whether a 
balancing coalition will emerge in the South China Sea. Given that neither the 
United States nor most Southeast Asian states favor poor relations between 
Washington and Beijing, it seems likely that American policies will continue to 
attempt to straddle the fine line between clearly opposing China’s claims while 
not provoking a crisis. This in turn would make it challenging for Southeast Asian 
states to do more in opposing China’s actions in the South China Sea than what 
they are already doing.
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In other words, an outright balancing coalition targeting China is unlikely to 
emerge. Rather states are likely to hedge through a mix of strategies and attempt 
to avoid being forced tightly into any camp.37 Hanoi’s and Manila’s resistance 
to Chinese claims while engaging in limited military buildups and tentative 
alliance formation is consistent with this. So is Manila’s preference for resolving 
disputes through multilateral organizations and international law. These methods 
pose less of a risk of a serious rupture in relations and the negative economic 
and security consequences which would follow such a rupture. Indonesia and 
Malaysia have been even more cautious, though given their efforts to improve 
ties with the United States and uphold their claims they also appear to be hedging 
rather than hiding. Such a mixing of strategies is not paradoxical, but rather 
aligns with the interests of these states. Claimant states are likely to continue 
to seek closer economic ties with China, while looking to keep open the option 
of military cooperation with the United States. Hiding is unlikely as states have 
strong incentives to stand firm in the face of territorial demands in the South 
China Sea. Finally, even though Singapore has no territorial claims to uphold, it is 
not hiding either. Instead, Singapore has sought to keep the United States engaged 
in the region while supporting ASEAN’s efforts to mediate disputes in the South 
China Sea. Singapore has also sought to avoid an outright confrontation between 
the United States and China. These attempts at mediation and problem-solving are 
consistent with transcending rather than hiding or hedging.
As one pulls back and looks at ASEAN members that do not border the South 
China Sea, balancing seems even more unlikely. Such states have few incentives to 
anger China and risk losing the benefits of cooperation. They are not faced with a 
direct threat and have little ability to contribute to a balancing coalition. That said, 
the same logic also suggests that such states have little incentive to bandwagon 
with China and balance against the United States. The recent policies of Burma 
and Thailand are illustrative. Burma has recently moved to improve relations with 
the United States and lessen its dependence on China while still remaining on good 
terms with Beijing. Thailand has moved in the other direction. Bangkok has sought 
to improve relations with Beijing while moving somewhat away from the United 
States.38 Even states such as Laos that have little to gain from closer relations with 
the United States may hedge or hide so as to remain on good terms with both 
Beijing and Hanoi. Thus, again hedging is a likely policy, though hiding is also a 
plausible option for states not bordering the South China Sea.
Our conclusions fit closely with those of Goh (2008). She suggests most 
ASEAN states have a profound ambivalence toward China. They want to benefit 
economically from China’s development, but do not want to be forced into a tight 
alignment with China. Likewise, most ASEAN states welcome a US presence in the 
region, but hope to avoid a serious confrontation between Beijing and Washington. 
Goh argues this leads ASEAN states to pursue two mutually supportive policies. 
First, ASEAN states generally attempt to enmesh China and the United States within 
institutional frameworks such as the ARF and multilateral economic ties. Second, 
most ASEAN states pursue some form of hedging. This allows them to acquire the 
benefits of friendly ties with both Washington and Beijing and avoid picking sides.
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Returning to the new Chinese passport, the response of China’s neighbors is 
telling. It does not indicate coming military conflict. Rather, it suggests that states 
will hedge by upholding their territorial claims while simultaneously cooperating 
economically with China and the United States. This tendency to pursue a mix 
of strategies will shape the strategic environment in which outside powers craft 
their strategies in Asia and characterize the policies of Southeast Asian states in 
the years to come.
Notes
 1 Mischief Reef, which is claimed by Manilla, was occupied by Beijing in 1995 (Storey 
2011, 255).
 2 This gives China a total of three airfields on manmade islands in the South China Sea 
(Hernandez 2015).
 3 The new facilities on Hainan Island, however, are more easily defended and do 
somewhat alter the local military equation.
 4 For instance, China seized full control of the Paracel Islands from the Republic of 
Vietnam as the result of a naval clash in 1974 (Lim 2014, 122).
 5 This sensitivity comes from a long history of being victimized by the territorial 
encroachments of other powers: the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century creation of European and Japanese spheres of influence which involved 
extraterritoriality, British and American gunboats patrolling several of China’s rivers, 
and finally a full-blown Japanese invasion in the 1930s and 1940s.
 6 Obviously, the reaction of other Asian states to Chinese assertiveness is important. Of 
special concern is Japan’s reaction to China’s territorial claims in the East China Sea.
 7 A case could be made that hiding carries the least risk of war in the South China Sea 
in the short run as it would neither trigger a local war nor speed China’s rise. Whether 
this is also true in the long term is less clear.
 8 This is true even though Beijing is notoriously opaque when it comes to its military 
capacities. This lack of transparency may be a deliberate attempt to hide Chinese 
vulnerabilities (Mastro 2016).
 9 Some ethnic Germans did reside outside of Germany or Austria as a result of earlier 
migrations. They were not, however, as significant politically in the 1930s compared 
with those ethnic Germans that ended up residing in non-German states because of the 
Central Powers’ defeat in 1918.
 10 This still leaves substantial room for risky behavior as Hitler was exceptionally 
tolerant of risk.
 11 Given the nature of economic substitution, closer economic ties with one state can 
result in reduced ties with another as there is only so much economic activity to go 
around even with economic growth. For instance after the adoption of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, US trade with the Caribbean decreased as US trade 
shifted toward Mexico and Canada. This was not the intent of the agreement and the 
United States subsequently took steps to reinvigorate trade with the Caribbean.
 12 See Chapters 3 and 5 for elaboration about the diplomacy of 1930s European states 
discussed in the sections below.
 13 Passing bucks to the future, while potentially rational, is also consistent with 
construal level theories in psychology which suggest that individuals have difficulty 
conceptualizing events far in the future. Such theories suggest states would balance 
against rising challengers far later than is optimal (Krebs and Rapport 2012).
 14 It is unclear how strong the reluctance to balance against sea or insular powers really 
is. For instance, the United States and Britain balanced against a rising Japan in the 
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late 1930s despite Japan being an insular and predominately sea power. Of course, 
Japan was projecting power onto the Asian continent via its invasion of China.
 15 Much like France in the 1930s in relation to East Central Europe, US alliances with 
Asian states tend to be bilateral rather than multilateral (Mastaduno 2002).
 16 Some estimates put the amount of commerce flowing through the South China Sea 
as equal to one third of global trade and half of the global trade in oil and natural gas 
(Chan 2016, 46).
 17 Of course, this has not always been the case post-1945 when US actions have at times 
run contrary to the principle. For instance, in the 1986 case, Nicaragua vs. United 
States, which was heard before the International Court of Justice, the Nicaraguan 
government successfully sued the US for, among other breaches, mining its harbors in 
violation of peaceful maritime commerce. Still, freedom of navigation has been a core 
principle of US diplomacy for most of American history (Bemis 1977, 571), perhaps 
making the current American insistence upon the principle more credible.
 18 The Soviet Union also had territorial claims against Poland and Romania.
 19 Whether this in fact will happen is another matter as China may be able to split off 
individual states from the potential coalition. For instance, Chan (2016, 176) argues 
that in return for Chinese acquiescence to its oil exploration in the South China Sea, 
Brunei has tacitly agreed to resolve its territorial disputes with Beijing bilaterally 
rather than multilaterally.
 20 Storey counts Vietnam and Malaysia as maritime states for this calculation.
 21 The four states have reclaimed a total of 125 acres over the previous 30 years whereas 
China has reclaimed 2,000 acres in one year alone. While the Philippines has offered to 
halt its reclamation efforts if China does so as well (Gordon 2015), this offer is unlikely 
to be accepted as Philippine reclamation efforts pale in scale to those of China.
 22 The overlap between these incidents is likely a result of Hanoi’s and Manila’s efforts 
to coordinate their responses to Chinese moves (Rapp-Hooper 2015b).
 23 Not all regional military cooperation is aimed at China. For instance, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines recently agreed to coordinate their naval patrols to 
reduce piracy in the region (Cochrane 2016b).
 24 Vietnam has allowed Singapore and Japan to use the naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay 
(Perlez 2016d).
 25 The effort is not aimed solely at projecting force into the South and East China Seas, 
but rather is aimed at modernizing the Chinese military as a whole. For example, 
China has recently developed the ability to deploy multiple independently-targeted 
reentry vehicles on its nuclear weapons which could significantly strengthen its 
nuclear arsenal (Sanger and Broad 2015).
 26 The first and second island chains are from China’s perspective looking out into 
the Pacific. The first chain runs from Japan, through Taiwan and the Philippines, to 
Borneo. The second chain runs from Japan, through the Bonin and Marianas Islands, 
to Palau and New Guinea.
 27 There is some question as to whether China has sufficient real-time detection and 
targeting capabilities to make its missiles as effective as they could be (Lim 2014, 
87–9).
 28 China’s supply and amphibious capabilities are sufficient for a regional conflict (Lim 
2014, 80–2).
 29 The modernization effort has included political and organizational reforms as 
well as the acquisition of new technologies. President Xi Jinping has attempted to 
tackle entrenched interests among the ground forces in the PLA and reshape the 
military’s organizational structures. As Xi told a committee of Chinese Communist 
Party leaders, “There cannot be modernization of national defense and the military 
without modernization of the military’s forms of organization … There has to be 
thoroughgoing reform of leadership and command systems, force structure and policy 
institutions” (Perlez and Buckley 2014).
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 30 It appears the United States may have mishandled the passage and acted in a way that 
did not uphold US claims as clearly as intended (Weinberger 2015).
 31 Land reclamation does not change the status of the reef in international law.
 32 The same dynamic exists with Japan in the East China Sea.
 33 This resistance is not based solely or even primarily on economic considerations. 
Japan has a long-standing debate between those that believe that Japan needs to take a 
more proactive military posture in the region and those that feel it is vital to maintain 
the more passive defensive policy that Japan has maintained since the end of the 
Second World War and which is still enshrined in its constitution.
 34 Goh references the English School’s notion that raw power is less effective than 
power which is cloaked in legitimacy by operating through rules, institutions, and 
other accepted forms of behavior. See Bull (1977) and Watson (1992).
 35 Such a view closely mirrors the United States’ position on the features in the South 
China Sea.
 36 Prior research has found that unambiguous legal principles can help peacefully 
resolve territorial disputes especially when those principles clearly favor one side 
over the other (Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011). This suggests that the Court’s ruling 
could be an important first step toward resolution, though China’s refusal to recognize 
the Court’s jurisdiction makes that outcome less likely at least in the short run.
 37 It could be argued that Manila and Hanoi are engaged in defense rather than balancing 
or hedging as China’s threat to their claims in the South China Sea has been actualized 
to some extent. However, China has not tried to take any features held by these states 
by force. Also, both Hanoi and Manila have been quite assertive in defense of their 
claims and seek to draw in outside players. Both seem to be concerned with the long-
term threat China poses to their South China Sea claims. Thus, their thinking and 
actions are more consistent with the logic of balancing than a more narrow conception 
of defense.
 38 In both cases, domestic politics have also played an important role in shaping foreign 
policy.
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the book’s major findings and explores several policy 
implications that stem from them. We have made three claims. The first, and 
primary, claim is that various types of uncertainty affect the likelihood of balancing 
in different ways. Second, a number of other factors are crucial in determining 
whether states are more likely to hide or bandwagon once they have opted not 
to balance. Third, these decisions continue to be made even after war has broken 
out but they play out in slightly different ways. Once the chapter has summarized 
our findings on these three points, it will derive several policy implications for 
potential balancers and bandwagoners that come out of these findings.
Review of the book’s main findings
States’ propensities to balance, bandwagon, or hide can be explained by a 
number of factors. In particular, we argued that uncertainty about states’ relative 
capabilities, the offensive nature of the challenger’s move, and the challenger’s 
intentions were crucial to whether or not a successful balancing coalition was 
likely to form. Further we argued that uncertainty about relative capabilities was 
especially devilish and could often prevent states from balancing. This uncertainty 
about capabilities was more important than uncertainty over the offensive nature 
of the challenger’s move against the status quo and both were more important 
than uncertainty over intentions. We also argued that states which fail to balance 
may pass the buck not only to other states but also to the future. Such states may 
engage in delay out of myopia or out of hopes that they will be better able to meet 
the threat posed by a rising state in the future.
These hypotheses were supported by the cases in Chapters 3 and 5. British and 
French behavior discussed in Chapter 3 fit particularly well with expectations. 
The leaders of those states were discouraged from balancing against Germany 
because they did not believe they had sufficient forces available to deter or defeat 
Germany and they hoped to push any confrontation, up to and including war, off 
until after they rearmed. Where intentions did play a major role in the case was not 
in wondering what the rising state intended, this was clear to most statesmen of 
the period, but rather, in uncertainty over whether other states would help balance 
against Germany. The French were unsure that they could count on British support, 
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leading Paris to favor appeasement. Likewise, the states of East Central Europe 
became less disposed to balance as they became convinced that neither Britain nor 
France would effectively oppose Germany. This implies that states with territorial 
claims in the South China Sea are likely to base their decisions about balancing 
against China on their expectations about US policy toward China.
We also argued in Chapters 5 and 7 that geography, divisions between 
potential balancers, the nature of economic ties, and the presence of international 
institutions should influence whether or not states bandwagon. First, states which 
had access to military aid from other states, especially from great powers, were 
more inclined to balance than those which were geographically isolated from their 
potential allies. Second, when substantial and politically significant territorial 
disputes exist between potential balancers this naturally makes cooperation 
between then almost impossible until these territorial disputes are solved. This 
made it less likely that a successful balancing coalition would form in the 1930s, 
reducing the appeal of balancing. It also allowed the rising challenger to exploit 
its ability to resolve these disputes in favor of one state. In fact, it was Hitler’s 
willingness to change the post-World War One settlement to reward cooperation 
and punish obstruction or opposition in the late 1930s that made his policy so 
successful. This even made hiding dangerous and pushed states to bandwagon 
with the rising power in hopes of currying its favor and avoiding its wrath. Such 
incentives played a major role in moving both Hungary and Romania into the 
Axis camp. Third, states which were economically dependent upon the rising 
challenger were more inclined to bandwagon with that challenger than were states 
which had multilateral economic ties and potential substitutes for their relations 
with the rising power. This also was true for states which relied on the rising 
challenger for military hardware. Fourth, effective global and especially regional 
institutions reduced temptations to bandwagon. Without effective institutions 
smaller powers can become diplomatically isolated. Such states have difficulty 
bargaining bilaterally with threatening great powers in the security realm and 
get pushed toward bandwagoning. The presence of effective institutions allows 
such states to proceed multilaterally thereby increasing their power. Institutions 
also create venues through which smaller states can oppose rising powers in less 
confrontational ways. This makes confrontation more palatable as it contains less 
risk of war. Again the cases in East Central Europe in the 1930s and Southeast 
Asia today supported this claim.
Also, all of the cases in Chapters 3, 5, and 7 showed that states do not make 
a single decision to balance, bandwagon, or hide but make these decisions 
repeatedly. States often changed strategies as their estimates about the likely 
costs and benefits of any given strategy changed. This is rational and to be 
expected, but is often forgotten. Chapter 6 showed that these calculations 
do not end when war begins. Rather states on the sidelines continue to make 
decisions about balancing, bandwagoning, and hiding. Their estimates about the 
relative distribution of capabilities, intentions, and the offensive nature of the 
challenger’s moves are all shaped by events within the war. Battles and wartime 
demands – much like arms races and crisis diplomacy – help answer questions 
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about and reduce uncertainty surrounding the three key types of uncertainty 
discussed above. Chapter 6 also showed that both balancing and bandwagoning 
are common strategies even after the outbreak of hostilities. Additionally, that 
chapter found that balancers tended to end up on the winning side of a war more 
often than bandwagoners. Likely this happens because great powers balance 
more often than they bandwagon. Such powerful states have a large effect on 
which side will win a war. Less powerful states, though at times balancers, make 
up a larger percentage of bandwagoners. This is likely because such states could 
do little to ensure the formation of a successful balancing coalition and because 
revisionist smaller powers have few ways to achieve their goals other than 
bandwagoning with revisionist great power challengers.
Last, many states, especially the smaller states of Southeast Asia today and to a 
lesser extent those of East Central Europe in the 1930s, pursued mixed strategies. 
Such states often consciously hedged their bets. This was especially true for states 
such as Poland in the 1930s and Vietnam and the Philippines today which cannot 
hide given that they had or have territorial disputes with a rising challenger. While 
other smaller states could potentially lay low diplomatically and avoid harm, these 
states were or are by their very location a focus of the foreign policy of the rising 
state. Such states cannot hide and cannot benefit much from bandwagoning either. 
That leaves balancing as an option, but if balancing is too costly or ineffective, it, 
too, becomes an unattractive strategy. Hence the result is a mix of strategies and 
an ongoing search for a policy that will work. Taken together these findings go a 
long way towards furthering our understanding of how states respond to threats in 
the face of uncertainty. They indicate what types of behaviors states are likely to 
engage in and illuminate the factors that influence when and how states will act.
Policy implications
These findings have several policy implications. Among these is that states which 
aim to balance need to make it clear to prospective allies that a successful balancing 
coalition can, and likely will, form. This requires not only resolute actions to 
demonstrate the intent to balance, but also the display of sufficient capabilities on 
the part of the state or states to defeat or deter the challenger. Failure to do this 
leads to potential allies hiding from or even bandwagoning with the challenger. 
As seen in Chapters 3 and 5, British irresolution and weakness led in part to 
France’s under-balancing and attempts to delay. Further, the combined weakness 
and irresolute behavior of both France and Britain influenced many of the states of 
East Central Europe’s decisions to hide or bandwagon with Germany. Uncertainty 
about which states would likely balance led to each state comparing its military 
might with Germany’s in isolation rather than comparing the combined power of 
the potential anti-Nazi coalition with Germany’s power. This reinforced notions 
of weakness and reduced the odds that states would balance.
Conversely, challengers need to do one of two things to avoid being confronted 
by a balancing coalition. First, rising challengers can attempt to achieve a position of 
strength by significantly increasing their own capabilities and exploiting divisions 
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between and sowing dissention among potential balancers. If the challenger can 
make balancing appear to be a costly and futile exercise, states are far less likely to 
engage in it. Each state that abandons balancing as a policy reduces the incentives 
for others to balance as the odds that a successful balancing coalition would 
form decrease as the potential coalition gets smaller. Therefore, challengers can 
create virtuous cycles (from their point of view) where the discouragement of 
one potential enemy leads to the discouragement of other potential enemies. The 
challenger should also attempt to exploit any potential divisions among likely 
balancers. It could offer to take the side of one potential balancer against another 
in any ongoing disputes – especially territorial disputes. The challenger could also 
make it appear that the likely burden of balancing or war would fall more heavily 
upon one of the balancers, making that state inclined to cut a deal to avoid the 
excessive costs. Thus, a mix of increased military spending, the offering of spoils 
to buy off potential enemies, and moves designed to illustrate the fecklessness 
of potential great power balancers to their likely allies can discourage balancing 
coalitions from forming in the first place.
Second, challengers could demonstrate that they are not a significant threat 
to most states’ interests, thereby encouraging appeasement and conciliation. The 
problem is that quite likely the actions necessary to demonstrate relatively benign 
intent cut in the opposite direction from those which would demonstrate the low 
likelihood of the formation of a successful balancing coalition. As argued above, 
military buildups, if they are sufficiently large relative to the military capabilities 
of potential balancers, help to convince states that balancing is impossible, thereby 
deterring those potential opponents from balancing. Yet, buildups also likely 
heighten those states’ perceptions of threat and reduce the odds of accommodation. 
Thus, challengers likely have to ultimately choose between scaring potential 
opponents into hiding or bandwagoning and finding ways of convincing those 
same states that the threat is sufficiently limited, making balancing an unnecessary 
expense. The only alternative to this choice – and one Hitler managed to pull 
off exceedingly well during most of the 1930s – is to simultaneously convince 
states that a successful balancing coalition is unlikely to form and that the brunt 
of the challenger’s demands are going to fall elsewhere. Certainly British and 
to a lesser extent French leaders were convinced of this during the Rhineland 
and Sudetenland crises. Both believed that confronting Germany was futile until 
after rearmament was complete and London believed that Berlin would turn east 
away from Britain and France, meaning time could be purchased at the expense 
of other states. In other words, London hoped that temporary accommodation was 
possible even though Germany posed a very real and obvious threat. Of course, as 
is well known this hope was soon to be dashed.
This jockeying between potential balancers and challengers continues after the 
outbreak of war. Both balancers and challengers continue to have strong incentives 
to encourage states to intervene militarily on their side. They can do this by 
offering spoils, but just as importantly by demonstrating an ability to win the war 
by winning battles. This is akin to demonstrating during peacetime that a potential 
balancing coalition is likely or unlikely to form. Third parties to the conflict will 
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likewise continue to evaluate their options. The actions of the belligerent powers 
may threaten them or provide them with opportunities. Thus, during the course of 
wars neutral third parties will continually have to make decisions about balancing, 
bandwagoning, hiding, or transcending.
Last, given the central importance of uncertainty over capabilities and whether 
or not states are able to construct a successful balancing coalition, investments 
in intelligence gathering are crucial. As shown in Chapter 3, the British and the 
French consistently overestimated the German military’s abilities between 1936 
and 1938. This was not a result of their intelligence services miscounting German 
hardware and men under arms. British and French estimates of the number of 
soldiers and planes in the Wehrmacht were relatively accurate. Rather they 
overestimated the quality of German planes and how many could be sent aloft 
at any one time, counted reservists as equivalent to first line troops, and missed 
crucial German materiel shortages. In other words, the intelligence errors were 
in estimating the quality of the German forces and in estimates about logistical 
challenges the Germans would face rather than in counting observables such as 
planes. These failures point to the importance of analysis as well as information 
collection. Recent US intelligence failures prior to the invasion of Iraq also suggest 
that simply throwing money at the problem is insufficient as US intelligence 
services are generally quite well funded. In fact, it is interesting that in 2003 
Washington and London seem to have suffered from a problem similar to that 
which afflicted London and Paris in the 1930s. Namely, despite having reasonably 
accurate assessments of the capabilities of Hitler’s Germany and Saddam’s Iraq 
respectively, these decision-makers chose to exaggerate the strength of their 
opponents. The key difference was one of motive: in the 1930s France and the 
UK were doing this to talk themselves out of acting whereas in the early 2000s 
the US and the UK we doing this to justify intervention (Committee of Privy 
Counsellors 2016). Thus, states faced with threats must ensure that they not only 
invest in the collection of sufficient intelligence, but also that their analysis of 
that intelligence is accurate and not distorted by the biases and preferences of 
intelligence officers and high-ranking government officials. Obviously, this is far 
easier said than done.
In this book we have attempted to find regularities in how states deal with 
the inherent uncertainty that surrounds potential threats. While we certainly 
have not exhausted the subject, as suggested above we have offered a number of 
explanations for how states address these uncertainties and why and when they 
chose to balance, bandwagon, hide, hedge, or transcend. Recent events in the 
Middle East, the Russian near abroad, and Asia all suggest that states will continue 
to face these sorts of challenges for a long time to come. This means that how 
states should respond to potential threats will continue to bedevil governments. 
We therefore feel this will remain an important area of research in international 
relations for many years to come.
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